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1.1. Background of the study 
 
Smallholder commercialization is frequently considered as a grand design development strategy 
in many African countries. This is because growing evidence is indicating that the success of 
agricultural productivity depends on the expansion of market opportunities (Gabre-Madhin & 
Haggblade,  2004; Njuki et al., 2011). Commercial transformation of subsistence-oriented 
smallholder agriculture is an indispensable pathway towards development of the agricultural 
sector (World Bank, 2008), economic growth and macroeconomic development (Timmer, 1997) 
and sustainable household food security and welfare (Pingali, 1997). Consequently, policy 
makers, agricultural research institutes and development organizations in Africa are shifting 
attention from enhancing productivity of food crops and livestock to improving profitability and 
competitiveness of the smallholders by linking them to markets (Njuki et al., 2011). These 
efforts are based on providing market information; organizing farmers into groups, associations, 
and cooperatives and coordinating contract farming and outgrower schemes (Fischer & Qaim, 
2012; Njuki et al., 2011).  
However, there are also growing concerns that the market-based development approach is 
captured by the rich, that increased assets to new market opportunities can displace local farmers, 
and that income control may shift from women to men (Jaleta et al., 2009, Sahan & Fischer-
Mackey, 2011; Njuki et al., 2011). According to Abbas (1997), Coles & Mitchell (2011), 
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011), Njuki et al. (2011) and Torkelsson (2008), female farmers face more 
constraints when engaging with market forces than male farmers. There are indications that 
commodities are taken over by men from women when entering the market arena, and that 
women tend to resort to less productive commodities and informal markets to avoid males taking 
over their commodities (Abbas, 1997; Njuki et al., 2011).  
One of the most important challenges in market development, according to Meinzen-Dick 
et al. (2011) and Coles and Mitchell (2011), is ensuring women`s control over income; at least 
preserving the income they used to control before entering the formal market. Sahan & Fischer-
Mackey (2011) emphasize the need to address power imbalances between men and women, and 
between large businesses and smallholders, as among the most conspicuous challenges and 
limitations of market-based approaches. Similarly, Jaleta et al. (2009) considered the need to 
integrate rural markets, to avoid the adverse consequence of exposing farm households to 
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volatile food market prices and food insecurity, while shifting smallholder farmers from 
subsistence to a commercial production system. Njuki et al (2011) argue that programs that aim 
to increase smallholder commercialization must address gender and intra-household dynamics by 
considering different commodity options, their relative opportunities for men and women, and 
the potential constraints and benefits with respect to intra-household relations and resource flows.  
 
1.2. Statement of the problem   
 
In Ethiopia, the commercial transformation of a subsistence-oriented agriculture is viewed as a 
focal point of the agricultural development policy. The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 
emphasizes the transformation of the agricultural sector, especially in terms of rapid 
diversification and commercialization, complemented by an effective marketing system (MoFED, 
2010). This is based on the assumption that smallholder commercialization leads to increased 
household income, meeting increasing demand for agricultural products and improving the 
welfare of the producers.  
Despite a long effort to commercialize the livestock sector in general and dairy 
production in particular, this sector faces various constraints that hinder active market 
participation of smallholder farmers in the country. One of these constraints is the tradition that 
makes selling milk a social taboo, especially within the Oromo society. In recent years, several 
interventions, including the adoption of exotic cattle breeds, and new management skills and 
improved feeds have been prescribed to stimulate the development of milk market in peri-urban 
areas. Steglich (1999), Tangka et al. (1999), MoFED (2010) and Chigawaz (2014) noted that 
these developments resulted in greater market participation of farm households and increased 
household income when market demand and infrastructure are favorable. In this study, we have 
identified four important issues that need attention for understanding the gender implications of 
these developments.  
The first of these issues is that smallholder milk market participation entails a shift in 
roles and responsibilities among household members and therefore may affect intra-household 
time allocation. Dairying is labour-intensive in Ethiopia and women and children contribute 
much of the labour (Feleke, 2003; Lenjiso, 2013; Tangka et al., 1999). Smallholder milk market 
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participation involves the adoption of new cattle breeds and new cattle management skills. These 
changes can potentially affect household labour use and intra-household time allocation. As the 
new cattle breeds are kept and fed in the backyards, this process may raise women`s workload, as 
animal feeding in the backyard fall under the women`s domestic responsibilities. 
The second important issue relates to the fact that dairy has traditionally been a women’s 
business in Ethiopia. In subsistence-oriented dairying, the production is basically for household 
consumption and the income generated from surplus dairy products goes to women. A shift in 
dairy farming from subsistence to market-orientated production and the subsequent integration of 
farmers into the market implies a shift of milk (products) from subsistence to cash commodity, a 
commodity produced for sale. This shift might be accompanied by a shift in income control from 
female to male, as documented by Abbas (1997) and Njuki et al (2011) for other African 
countries. Other evidence (see: Agarwal, 1997; Kabeer, 1999) indicates that women`s earnings 
and income control can affect their intra-household bargaining position. Given that milk is the 
only source of cash income for women in rural Ethiopia, shifting income control from women to 
men can have positive or negative consequences for women`s intra-household bargaining power.  
The third issue relates to the potential nutritional and income effects of smallholder milk 
market participation. Smallholder milk market participation can boost milk (product) 
consumption by making more milk (products) available at the household level. Moreover, 
household milk market participation increases household income, which can be used to purchase 
nutritious food. Thus, dairy production and marketing has the potential to boost dietary diversity 
and nutritional status among household members. However, milk market participation also 
involves a trade-off between milk consumption at the household level and milk sold in the 
market. The decision how much milk to sell and how much to consume at home might differ 
between households that participate in the market and households that do not. The implication of 
dairy intensification and commercialization for dairy food consumption, dietary diversity, and 
nutritional status at household and intra-household level, hence deserves a critical investigation.   
The fourth issue relates to the intra-household income control structure and the 
investment in children`s education. Parental investment theory suggests that there is a difference 
between mothers and fathers` investments in children. Also, the gender identity of the income 
recipient and decision makers in the household can affect how resources are allocated for intra-
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household welfare (Agarwal, 1997; Kabeer, 1999). Okali (2011) argues that husbands tend to 
reduce their household contribution as the income of their wives increases and neglect their 
responsibilities for maintaining household welfare as they commercialize their agricultural 
operation. With milk market participation there is a tendency that milk income control shifts 
from women to men. Given that milk income is the only income that women control in a 
subsistence-oriented dairying system, this shift can also affect child welfare in the Ethiopian 
context.  
Although commercialization of smallholder farms is viewed as the focal point to the 
agricultural development in Ethiopia, these four important issues are not yet clearly understood. 
This study seeks to provide more insight into these issues by addressing the following objectives. 
 
1.3. Research Objectives 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine the effect of smallholder milk market participation 
on intra-household gender relation and resource allocations in Ethiopia. Specifically, the study 
intends to: 
 Elucidate the effect of smallholder milk market participation on intra-household time 
allocation; 
 Assess the relationship between smallholder milk market participation and women`s 
intra-household bargaining power;   
 Explore the patterns of milk consumption, dietary diversity and nutritional status of 
young children in market participant and non-participant households; 
 Examine the relationship between the gender identity of the parent, household milk 
market participation and parental investment in child education 
 
1.4. Conceptual Framework 
 
Intra-household resource allocation is the process by which resources are allocated amongst 
members of the household, as well as the outcomes of those processes (Haddad, Hoddinott, & 
Alderman, 1997). The goal of intra-household resource allocation studies is mainly to understand 
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how rights, roles, responsibilities and resources are allocated between the household members. 
The theoretical development for understanding intra-household resource allocation passed 
through three major phases; the unitary household model, collective household models and 
bargaining household models (Chiappori, 1992; Haddad et al., 1997; Fukuda et al., 2005; 
Himmelweit et al., 2013). In the unitary household model, household members are assumed to 
have homogeneous preference and all resources, capital, labour, land, and information are pooled 
and allocated by the altruistic household head (Haddad et al., 1997). In collective household 
models, the household is considered as a collection of individuals, each of whom has a well-
defined preference function. These individuals are supposed to interact to generate household-
level decisions so that resource allocation is based on the members` consensus (Chiappori, 
1992). Bargaining models assume household members to have distinct tastes and preferences and 
resource allocation to be based on the member`s bargaining power (Agarwal, 1997).  
The unitary household model has influenced development policy-making in many 
developing countries. Most agricultural development interventions in these countries focus on 
boosting productivity and household income. These interventions influence household assets at 
least in three different ways (Meinzen Dick et al., 2013). First, they may increase agricultural 
assets, including land, livestock, water, and machineries that enable farmers to increase 
production. Second, they help build up a stock of more intangible assets such as human capital, 
social capital or political capital that complement the traditional agricultural assets. These “new” 
assets can be critical in enhancing women`s empowerment and their role in decision making. 
Third, they may increase returns to assets such as land and labour that are used in agriculture by 
enhancing technologies, strengthening markets and increasing factor productivity.  
 In Ethiopia, policies aimed at increasing smallholder milk market participation mainly 
focus on strengthening markets and expanding technology adoption in order to increase 
productivity and household income. According to Meinzen Dick et al. (2013), men and women 
control different types of assets. Interventions that increase men`s or women`s stock of a 
particular asset may therefore improve their bargaining power. These authors also state that 
interventions that reduce the gender gap in assets may lead to improvements in food security, 
health, nutrition and other aspects of wellbeing that are related to agency and empowerment. The 
major aim of this thesis is thus, to study whether this is valid in the Ethiopian context. The 
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connections between smallholder milk market participation and intra-household resource 
allocations that are central topic in this thesis are illustrated in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1. Smallholder Milk Market Participation and Intra-household Dynamics: a 
conceptual framework 
 
As shown in the diagram, smallholder milk market participation can affect demand for 
dairy labour and dairy productivity (arrow 1 & 2). Market oriented dairying is labour intensive in 
Ethiopia (Feleke, 2003; Lenjiso, 2013; Shapiro, et al, 2000). This is because market-oriented 
dairying is associated with the adoption of new cattle breeds, improved feed technology and new 
cattle management systems. Traditionally, dairying is a women`s business. They performed 
almost all the dairy activities, including managing livestock, cleaning barn, milking cows, 
processing milk into butter and cheese and selling these products in the local market (Lenjiso, 
  
 
   
  
  
Household Daily Milk Production 
household Milk Allocation 
Milk Processed at home Milk Sold Raw Own Consumption 
Household 
Milk Income 
Women`s milk 
income share 
Men`s milk 
income share 
Food Consumption 
& nutritional 
Status  
 
(Chapter Four) 
  
 
  
 
Parental investment 
in child education 
(Chapter Five) 
Demand for Labour  & Intra-
household Time Allocation 
(Chapter Two) 
Women`s intra-household 
Bargaining position 
 
(Chapter Three) 
 
 
 
Smallholder Milk Market Participation 
3 
8 
13 
17 
4 
5 
6 7 
9 10 11 12 
14 15 
16 18 19 
20 
1 2 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 8 
2013). Time devoted to one activity competes with time devoted to alternative activities and 
productive household members divide their time between these competing activities (Skoufias, 
1994; Fafchamps, 2001). Hence, women`s role in dairying might give them a better position to 
bargian on household dairy income (arrow 4). Moreover, increasing demand for dairy labour in 
milk market participant households increases household dairy productivity and income (arrow 3).  
 In traditional subsistence-oriented dairying system, intra-household milk allocation takes 
two option; own consumption and processing into butter and cheese for sales at the local market. 
The income generated by these activities has also been under women`s control (as in arrow 9). In 
milk market participant households intra-household milk allocation (arrow 5) takes three options; 
processed into butter and cheese (arrow 6), sold raw to the formal milk market (arrow 7) or 
consumed at home (arrow 8). Milk income from the formal milk market is received through the 
head of the household (arrow 10). This change from local to formal milk markets shifted control 
over dairy income from women to men in market participant households. Several studies 
(Agarwal, 1997; Kabeer, 1999; Njuki et al., 2011) indicate that women`s household income 
share (arrow 14) and their control over income influences their intra-household bargaining power 
(arrow 16). The contribution of women in the dairy sector can also play critical role in 
influencing their bargaining power over the fruits of their labour.  
 The most direct link between technological change in smallholder agriculture and food 
security is increased household food availability from own production (arrow 13). Dairy 
development schemes in Ethiopia can directly contribute to food security by making more milk 
available for home consumption. Previous studies indicate that consumption of more dairy 
products results in a better human nutrition and health in Ethiopia (Hoddinott et al, 2014; Tangka 
et al, 2002). However, dairy producers in Ethiopia tend to sell expensive calories (milk) and 
increase the net purchase of cheaper calories (cereals). This trade-off between income generation 
and calorie intake is an important area of investigation in the context of smallholder market 
integration. The other prominent link between smallholder milk market participation and food 
security is the income-food consumption link, where increased income facilitates higher food 
consumption (arrow 19). However, the intra-household decision-making processes can influence 
this income-food link. A better understanding of these critical relationships between self 
consumption, increasing income and changing intra-household resource allocation is crucial for 
designing interventions that can improve gender dynamics surrounding food security.  
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Increasing income at household level also has the potential to influence parental 
investment in human capital development. Human capital investment often constitutes a core 
component of resources transfer to children by parents (Dendir, 2014). In Ethiopia, milk market 
participation is associated with increasing household income (arrow 2) (Chagwiza, 2014; Lenjiso, 
2013). Increasing income at household level can boost human capital development by improving 
investment in child education, nutrition and health (arrow 18). However, several studies 
(Agarwal, 1997; Ashraf, 2009; Njuki, et al, 2011; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000) indicate that 
the intra-household income control structure is as important as the income itself for improving 
investment in human welfare (arrow 17 and 20). These studies argue that income controlled by 
women (arrow 17) does more justice to children compared to income controlled by men.  
 
 
1.5. Research Methodology   
1.5.1. Study Approach  
 
The study of intra-household dynamics cover household processes that happen behind closed 
doors. This makes it neither easy nor straightforward for scientific inquiry. Moreover, intra-
household research involves understanding the cultural concepts of division of labour, perceived 
and actual contribution of each household member, attitude towards status within households and 
how these affects resource allocation (Levin, Ralston & Haddad, 1993). In relation to 
development policy, intra-household allocation is a relatively new field of study and there are a 
number of important empirical questions that needs to be answered. Among these is the question 
on the effect of changing household income on the behavior and well being of household 
members. This question relates to the ways in which the income earned, as well as household 
member who earns it, influence how it is spent, and other household decisions like intra-
household time allocation, consumption and investment.  
 According to Levin et al. (1993) intra-household resource allocation research demands a 
multidisciplinary approach. This is because the type of data and the way it is collected can 
potential influence the answer of the research questions. Hence, we employ a mixed method 
approach to generate primary data that capture these dynamics and interactions. Information 
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generated through different techniques (field surveys, key and post-game interviews, behavioral 
experiments and direct observation) has been combined through triangulation. The data 
collection and analytical techniques are complementary and have their own strength and 
weakness. The combination of these different techniques is therefore believed necessary to 
enrich the research by confronting findings of one method against the other; to benefit from the 
strengths of each method and to compensate for conceptual weaknesses; and establish confidence 
and obtain trustworthiness of the research findings. 
 
1.5.2. Study Area and Sampling  
 
This study is conducted in Selale, which is situated in Oromia national regional state. Oromia is 
the largest state of the nine regional states of Ethiopia. It represents one-third of the total area of 
the country and inhabits about 36% of the country's total population (CSA, 2008). The region is 
classified into 18 zones. Selale is one of the 18 zones in Oromia, known for its high dairy 
production. It is purposefully selected for this study, because of its long-standing dairy tradition, 
dairy supply to the national market, dairy cooperative, and other dairy infrastructures that have 
facilitated dairy production and marketing.  
Selale is relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Oromo Ethnic 
group, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, makes up about 95% of the population and most of 
them are followers of the orthodox Christian church. The crop-livestock mixed-farming system 
and milk market coverage is similar across Selale. For this research, a sample of four primary 
dairy cooperatives was randomly selected from the list of 22 primary dairy cooperatives that are 
active members of Selale dairy cooperative union (SDCU). SDCU is the largest and the only 
formal milk buyer in Selale area. The four kebeles where the sample dairy cooperatives are 
located (one dairy cooperatives being in a kebele) were taken as a sample kebele for the study.  
By employing stratified sampling techniques, 300 farm households were selected from the four 
kebeles proportional to the size of their population. After further stratifying the households into 
milk market participant and non-participant households, 168 households were selected to 
participate in our experimental games (husbands and wives) and observational studies (4/5 
household members). We also performed key informant and post-game interviews. For these 
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interviews we selected participants based on their performance in the game, gender, household 
status in milk market and dairy related experiences.   
 
 
Figure 1. 2. Map of the study area (Selale) 
 
1.5.3. Data Collection  
 
The research presented in this thesis is innovative in that it combined data collected in several 
complementary ways. Household surveys, experimental games, observations and interviews are 
combined to collect different kinds of data needed for answering the research questions. 
Socioeconomic data (covariates) generated through a household survey are supplemented with 
observational data on intra-household time, food and nutritional allocations, and experimental 
data on women’s intra-household bargaining power and parental investment in child education. 
Moreover, qualitative information generated through interviews is used to gain insights into the 
motivations that underlie the participant’s decision in resource sharing games.  
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1.5.4. Logistics 
 
The information used in this thesis has been collected in three phases. In the first phase, we have 
conducted household survey to collect socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of farm 
household and key-informant interview to get insight into the context of the study area. The 
survey data was used to classify farm households into market participant and non-participants 
based on their level of integration into the milk market, and to refine observation checklists and 
experimental tools. In the second phase, experimental games were used to measure women’s 
intra-household bargaining power and parental investment in child education. Moreover, direct 
observation checklists were used to collect information on intra-household food consumption 
and dietary diversity and intra-household time allocation. In the third phase, post-game in-depth 
interviews were done to understand the behaviors that underlie participant’s decision in the game. 
The detailed data collection techniques are presented in the respective chapters. 
1.5.5. Data Analyses  
 
The basic approach of data analysis in this study is based on pairwise impact appraisal, using a 
comparison of milk market participants and non-participant households. The analysis has two-
steps. First, survey data were quantitatively analyzed. We have categorized household into milk 
producers and non-producers. Then we categorized milk producer households into raw milk 
sellers and non-sellers. Households who supply raw milk to the market (cooperatives, middlemen 
milk collectors, processing companies, hotels and cafeterias) are defined as ‘market participant 
households’, while those who produce milk on daily bases but do not sell raw milk are defined as 
‘non-participants’. Then, households were selected for experimental games and direct 
observation. The comparison was made on four major outcome variable; (1) intra-household 
time allocation, (2) women`s intra-household bargaining power, (3) intra-household milk 
consumption, dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children, and (4) parental 
investment in child education. We have used descriptive statistics, t-test, propensity score 
matching (PSM), and multivariate regressions to analyse the findings. The detailed analytical 
techniques are presented in each of the respective chapters.   
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1.6.  Thesis Outline  
 
This thesis consists of six chapters. In the first chapter, we provide an introduction into the 
research questions, a conceptual framework and the assessment methodology. In the second 
chapter, we address the research question ‘how smallholder milk market participation affects 
intra-household time allocation’. In this chapter, we study how four adult household members 
allocate their time between different household activities. The chapter demonstrates that market 
participant households allocate significantly more time to dairy related activities compared to 
non-participant households. Women also allocate significantly more time on dairying in market-
participant compared to non-participant households and compared to men in market-participant 
households.  
In chapter three, we study the relationship between smallholder milk market participation 
and women`s intra-household bargaining power. We examine how the transformation of a dairy 
production system and the accompanying change in income control structure affects the intra-
household gender relations, given the peculiar nature of dairy as a women`s commodity in 
Ethiopia. The analysis demonstrates that smallholder milk market participation improves 
interdependence between the couples and influences women`s intra-household bargaining power. 
 In chapter four, we address the research question ‘how smallholder milk market 
participation affects household and intra-household food security’. We compare animal source 
food consumption, household and intra-household dietary diversity scores and nutritional status 
of young children. The analysis demonstrates that milk market participant households have better 
dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children. 
 In chapter five, we present an experimental study on parental investment in child 
education. We study whether a gender difference in household income control and household 
milk market participation have a significant effect on parental investment in child education. The 
outcomes demonstrate that mothers invest significantly more in child education and parents from 
milk market participant households invest more in children compared to parents from non-
participant households. 
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 Finally, in chapter six, we summarize the evidence regarding the relationship between 
smallholder milk market participation and inter-connected intra-household relations. Moreover, 
we outline the analytical contribution of the thesis, its policy implications, the potential 
limitations of the study that need to be considered in future studies and we share some 
concluding thought. 
 
Table 1. 1. Overview of Chapters and Methods 
 
Chapter Research Question Data sources Analytical tools 
2 How does smallholder milk market 
participation affect member`s intra-
household time allocation? 
 Household survey 
 Direct observation 
checklist 
 T-test 
 Propensity score 
matching (PSM) 
3 How does smallholder milk market 
participation relates to women`s 
intra-household bargaining power 
 Household survey 
 Experiment 
 Post-game interviews  
 Descrpitive statstics 
 T-test 
 Propenisty score 
matching (PSM) 
4 Does milk market participation 
affect dairy food consumption, 
dietary diversity and nutritional 
status of young children? 
 Household survey 
 Dietary diversity 
observation checklist   
 T-test 
 Propensity score 
matching (PSM) 
5 How does the gender identity of the 
parent and household milk market 
participation affect parental 
investment in child education? 
 Household survey 
 Parental choice 
experiment 
 Post-game interviews  
 Descriptive statstics 
 T-test 
 Multiple regression 
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Chapter 2: Smallholder Milk Market Participation and Intra-
household Time Allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
*This chapter is based on a paper by Lenjiso, B., Smits, J., & Ruben, R. (2015). Smallholder 
Milk market Participation and Intra-Household time in Ethiopia, European Journal of 
Development research 27 (5). DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2015.54 
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Abstract 
 
We study the effects of smallholder market participation on intra-household time allocation in 
Ethiopia. We followed 156 households for two consecutive days and recorded time allocated to 
dairying, domestic chores, schooling, wage work, and leisure. Propensity score matching was 
used to determine the average effect of household market participation on intra-household time 
allocation. Results show that market participant households spend significantly more time on 
dairying and non-dairying activities than non-participant households. There are also substantial 
gender differences in intra-household time allocation. Although men take up only a small part of 
the dairy activities, milk income shifts from women to men in participant households. Given that 
in participant households, women spent substantially more time on domestic and dairying 
activities, it is important that time-saving technologies are introduced to reduce their workload 
in the household. Women’s participation in the formal milk market should also be strengthened 
to ensure their access to the milk income.  
 
KEY WORDS: Ethiopia, intra-household, milk-market, smallholder, time allocation 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
Time is what we want most, but what we use worst - William Penn 
 
Smallholder commercialization is considered an effective strategy for encouraging high value 
commodity production, increasing farm income and reducing poverty in developing countries. It 
is seen as the major pathway from a subsistence agrarian economy towards a more diversified 
economy and within Ethiopia it is a crucial feature of the growth and transformation plan 
(MoFED, 2010).  
However, despite the massive adoption of smallholder commercialization as a grand 
design development strategy, there is no consensus in the literature on its impact on the welfare 
of household members. Two strands of literature are important in this respect. One strand argues 
that there will be a positive impact on household income and individual welfare, because the 
increased household income will benefit all household members (Pingali, 1997; Timmer, 1997; 
World Bank, 2008; Chagwiza, 2014). The other strand argues that household level achievements 
may not necessarily translate into individual welfare for all, because interventions can work out 
differently for males and females and for different age groups (Abbas, 1997; Endeley, 2001; 
Jaleta, Gebremedhin, & Hoekstra, 2009; Njuki, et.al, 2011,  Coles & Mitchell, 2011; Fischer-
Mackey & Sahan, 2011). These authors therefore stress the importance of studying intra-
household dynamics before implementing development programs aimed at producing generic 
outputs at the household level.   
In this chapter, such a study of intra-household dynamics is performed. Our analyses 
focus on the effects of smallholder milk market participation on intra-household time allocation 
in Ethiopia. Linking smallholder dairy farmers to the milk market and creating dairy value chains 
is a major development goal of the Ethiopian government that is expected to lead to a substantial 
increase in smallholder`s dairy income (MoFED, 2010). Previous studies in Ethiopia (Lenjiso, 
2013; Chagwiza, 2014) have shown that changes towards market oriented dairying indeed 
increased smallholder’s cash income at the household level.  
Besides increasing household income, milk market participation also leads to changes in 
the production strategies. Participation is associated with the adoption of new cattle breeds, 
improved feed technology and new cattle management systems, including a change from freely 
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grazing cattle to keeping them near the house in the backyard. These changes in production 
strategy may have important consequences for the division of labour and time allocation within 
households. In Ethiopia, dairy is a semi-subsistence commodity that traditionally has been under 
women`s control. Women performed almost all the dairy activities, including managing 
livestock, cleaning barn, milking cows, processing milk into butter and cheese and selling these 
products in the local market (Lenjiso, 2013). Also the income generated by these activities has 
traditionally been under women`s control. However, there is evidence that when changing to a 
market oriented production system, men take over the traditional women`s commodities and 
their roles in production and marketing (Kaaria & Ashby, 2001; Njuki, Kaaria, Chamunorwa, & 
Chiuri, 2011). With milk market participation, milk becomes more like a cash crop and cash 
crops are traditionally under men`s control. It is the men who sign the contract with the milk 
companies and it is the men who receive the income gained by selling milk to these companies.   
 These changes in production strategy and in control over income will likely have 
consequences for the gender relations within the household. They may affect the household level 
time allocation, including the workload of women and girls, as well as the power relationships 
within the household. However, the exact nature of these influences is still largely unknown, as 
no rigorous time allocation study has been conducted so far in emerging countries like Ethiopia. 
This chapter aims to contribute to the field by measuring intra-household time allocation 
regarding dairying, domestic chores, schooling, wage work and in-house leisure. We examine 
time allocation and division of tasks in market participant as well as non-participant households. 
To do so, we follow 156 households for two consecutive days and record intra-household time 
allocation by using a detailed observation checklist. Half of the households are milk market 
participant and the remaining half is non participant. In this way, we contribute new empirical 
evidence regarding the consequences of milk market participation for the time allocation and the 
gender division of labour in the context of dairy farmer households in Ethiopia.    
The remainder of  this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly present the 
context of the study. In section 3, we revise the literature on intra-household time allocation. In 
section 4, we discuss the methods, materials and analytical procedures. In section 5, we present 
the empirical findings and in section 6, we discuss and conclude the study. 
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2.2. The Context: Dairy Production in Ethiopia 
 
Agriculture is the backbone of the Ethiopian economy. It accounts for 85% of employment, 45% 
of national income, and 90% of foreign exchange earnings. Smallholder family farms cultivate 
95% of the total crop land and produce more than 90% of total agricultural output (Mahelet, 
2007). The livestock sector contributes 12% to the total economy, 33% to the agricultural gross 
domestic product (GDP), and 12-15% of the export earnings. About 65% of the Ethiopian 
population earns their livelihood with livestock. The share of livestock income in total household 
income ranges from 37-87% (Solomon et,al., 2003).  
Ethiopia has a high potential for dairy development. It has the largest cattle population 
(53 million) of Africa and the 10th largest in the world, a relatively low animal disease incidence 
and a favorable climate for cattle rearing (Chagwiza, 2014). However, the dairy sector is largely 
subsistence oriented with low milk production (4 billion liters of milk per annum) and low 
consumption (26.6kg/year/person). Since the 1940s, there have been efforts to increase 
productivity and market orientation of the sector. The first attempt to introduce modern dairy 
production was made in 1947, when the United Nation Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
donated 300 Friesian and Brown Swiss dairy cows to the imperial government (Feleke, 2003; 
Staal, Pratt, & Jabbar, 2008). At that time, a small milk processing company was established in 
Shola to support the commercial dairy production. In 1975, the socialist government nationalized 
land and dairy farms and started the formation of peasant associations and producer cooperatives. 
However, the low price of dairy products and the strict government control on the cooperatives 
negatively affected individual dairy farmers and hindered dairy development in the country 
(Feleke, 2003; Staal et al., 2008). In the 1990s, Ethiopia came to adopt a relatively liberal market 
economy. Since then, the government has stimulated the transformation from a subsistence 
oriented dairy production system into a market oriented system (Staal et al., 2008, MoFED, 
2010). Although the dairy sector still remains traditional in large parts of the country, the 
emerging dairy value chain in peri-urban areas have created new market opportunities for 
smallholder dairy farmers.  
Women have always played a central role in the Ethiopian dairy industry. Traditional 
subsistence oriented dairy has been a women`s business. They manage the cows, clean their 
sheds, milk the cows and processes the milk into cottage butter and cheese. They also sell the 
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market surplus in the local market. The income generated in this way has also been controlled by 
them and generally used for household maintenance (Feleke, 2003; Tangka et al., 1999). 
 
2.3. Market participation and intra-household time allocation  
  
Several models of intra-household resource allocations are relevant for our study. The unitary 
household model, assumes household members to have homogeneous preferences and all 
resources, including capital, labour, land, and information to be pooled and allocated by the 
altruistic household head (Haddad et al., 1997). The collective model characterizes the household 
as a collection of individuals, each of whom has a well-defined objective function. These 
individuals interact to generate household level decisions. Resource allocation decisions are 
therefore based on members` consensus (Chiappori, 1992). Bargaining models consider the 
household to be an institution of social control that governs time allocations of its members 
between different activities, whereby each time allocation decision is the outcome of 
negotiations between household members (Fairhead & Leach, 2005 and Fukuda, Nepal, & Yai, 
2005). These models assume household member to have distinct tastes and preferences and 
resource allocation decisions to be based on individual bargaining power (Agarwal, 1997; Njuki, 
et al., 2011). Time devoted to one activity competes with time devoted to alternative activities 
(Skoufias, 1994). According to the model of Fafchamps (2001),productive household members 
divide their time between labour for own income-generating activities, labour provided to others, 
and leisure. The model assumes that individuals are willing to provide labour if they receive a 
compensation that is at least equal to what could be earned in the off-farm labour market. The 
labour supplied by household members should therefore be proportional to the amount of benefit 
generated from this activity. Given that previous studies (Lenjiso, 2013; Chagwiza, 2014) 
indicate that smallholder milk market participation in Ethiopia positively affects household 
income, Fafchamps’ model would predict that marketing would lead to a shift in intra-household 
time allocation towards market related activities.     
Household’s exposure to the world economy may have gendered effects in developing 
countries (Fontana & Wood, 2000). The market based production system creates opportunities 
for generating income from goods that previously were produced and consumed within the 
Household (McPeak & Doss, 2006). As such, participation in the market involves a change in 
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production orientation, from consumption to profit (Pingali, 1997). This change can directly or 
indirectly affects relationships between household members and decisions regarding the 
household division of labour and time allocation. In the Ethiopian diary sector, the shift towards 
market related activities might increase household members workload, particularly the workload 
of women. Ethiopian women contribute considerably to agricultural production (Ogato et al., 
2009; Harun, 2014). They play an important role in cattle management, particularly in the 
management of cows. In market participant households, cows are kept in the backyard instead of 
freely grazing in the field. Given that backyard activities are part of the domestic domain, these 
changes may have increased women`s workload considerably.  
In sum, smallholders` milk market participation has the potential to increase labour 
productivity and household income. However, it might also involve an increase in the workload 
of women, as well as a shift of milk income from women to men. In our analyses, we aim to find 
out to what extent and in which ways intra-household time allocation differs between milk-
market participant and non-participant households.  
 
2.4. Methods and Materials 
 
This study was conducted in Selale, one of the 18 zones of the Oromia regional state in Ethiopia. 
The research site is located between 37 and 100km Northwest of Addis Ababa. It has a high 
potential for rain-fed cereal and livestock production. The main food crops are barley, wheat, 
teff, beans and peas. Livestock is considered to be the main asset of the farming community. 
There are two cropping seasons in a year. The major cropping season is characterized by 
relatively high rainfall, starting in late June and lasting until October. This is the most productive 
season. The other wet season starts in February and continues up until June. Only some crops 
and croplands that have suitable soil characteristics are cultivated in this second season. 
Selale was selected for this study because of its tradition of and potential for dairy 
production. It has the largest milk market coverage in the country. In our sample, we randomly 
selected four primary dairy cooperatives from the list of 22 cooperatives that are member of 
Selale dairy cooperative union, the formal milk buyer in the area. The four kebeles (smallest 
administrative units) where the sample dairy cooperatives are located were taken as sample 
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kebeles for the study. By employing a stratified sampling technique, 300 farm households were 
selected proportional to the size of the population in the kebeles.  
Information on household time allocation was collected on the basis of a household 
survey and an observational study. For the household survey, we used a structured questionnaire 
with both closed and open-ended questions on the socio-economic and demographic background 
of the dairy farm households and on household time allocation. Based on the survey results, the 
households were further stratified into milk market participant, and non-participant households. 
We selected 168 households for the direct observation of intra-household time allocation. As 
Schwartz, Herz, & Frazis (2002) noticed, measuring adult household members` use of time 
produces valuable information on how household members jointly allocate their time.  
We trained 12 extension workers to conduct the observations. Based on the survey results, 
we determined the major activities taking place in the house that could be easily recorded.  These 
activities are feeding and watering livestock, housing livestock, preparing concentrated livestock 
feed, milking cows, processing milk, cleaning barn and dairy utensils, cleaning the house, 
fetching water, cooking, caring, schooling/study and wage work.  An observation checklist for 
recording these activities was developed.  
In the observational study, the time spent on the mentioned activities by four household 
members was recorded for two consecutive days from 6.00am to 12:00pm (for a total of 36 
hours). We observed the time allocation of four adult members; the husband and wife, an adult 
boy and an adult girl. This selection was made because the husband, wife and adult children are 
the major contributors to household labour and it was not feasible for the observers to make 
records for more than four household members. Only households with a husband and wife and at 
least one adult boy and girl were included in the study. 
Observations were made for activities taking place in almost all smallholder households 
in the study area. Irregular activities, like marketing, community services, and maintenance of 
buildings, could not be included. As in many households such activities did not take place during 
the observation period, no reliable data could be obtained. Observations were made between 
6.00am and 12.00pm. From 12.00pm to 6.00am no observations were made, because during this 
period people in the region tend to sleep. The checklist was pre-tested in 12 households. 
Complete observation checklists were returned for 156 households. Twelve households had to be 
discarded from the analysis, because their checklist was incomplete.  
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2.5. Analytical Approach  
 
This study aims to measure the average effect of household milk market participation on 
member’s intra-household time allocation, which is called the average treatment effect on 
treated households (ATT) (Heinrich, Maffioli, & Vázquez, 2010; Austin, 2011). The treatment is 
the participation of a household in the milk market. Households who sell raw milk into the milk 
market (to cooperatives, private collectors, processing companies, hotels and cafeterias) are 
considered participants. Those that are located in the same kebele as the participating households 
but do not sell raw milk to the market are non-participants. We used propensity scores to match 
participant and non-participant households as much as possible on their baseline characteristics, 
to ensure that the effect on the outcome variable was the result of the difference in milk market 
participation. 
 
 2.5.1. Propensity Score Matching  
 
Observational studies that aim to establish causal relationships face several methodological 
challenges. The first of these challenges is lack of the counterfactuals. As there are no baseline 
data in many observational studies and it is not possible for the treatment group to undergo and 
not undergo the treatment at the same time, the question “what would have happened to the 
treated group without the treatment” cannot be answered. Although constructing a control group 
can help to address this problem, control groups may not have exactly the same baseline 
characteristics as the treatment group. This difference in baseline characteristics may affect both 
treatment uptake and outcome, which leads to selection bias.  
Recently, there has been growing interest in methods based on propensity scores to 
reduce these biases (Austin, 2011). According to Heinrich et al. (2010) the effect of a treatment 
for an individual i, noted δi, can be defined as the difference between the  potential outcome in 
case of treatment and the potential outcome in the absence of the treatment: δi =Y1i −Y0i. 
According to the authors, the major aim of the evaluation is to estimate the mean effect of the 
intervention. This mean effect is obtained by averaging the effect across all the individuals in the 
population. This parameter is known as Average Treatment Effect (ATE) which is given as; ATE 
= E(δ)= E Y(Y1 −Y0 ) where E(δ) represents the average (or expected value).  
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 24 
The other variable of interest is the ATT discussed above which measures the impact of 
the program on those individuals who participated in the intervention: ATT = E (Y1 −Y0|D =1) 
(Heinrich et al., 2010). Finally, the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATU) measures 
the impact that the program would have had on those who did not participate: ATU = E (Y1 −Y0 
|D =0). However, this depends on counterfactual outcomes and is unobservable. Using the fact 
that the average of a difference is the difference of the averages, the ATT can be rewritten as:  
ATT = E (Y1|D =1) − E (Y0 |D =1). Hereby is E (Y0|D =1) the average outcome that the treated 
individuals would have obtained in the absence of treatment. This average outcome is not 
observable. However, we do observe the term E (Y0 |D =0), that is, the value of Y0 for the 
untreated individuals.  
Thus, we can calculate: Δ = E (Y1|D =1)− E (Y0 |D =0) By adding and subtracting the 
term E(Y0|D =1): Δ =E (Y1|D =1) −E (Y0|D=1)+E (Y0|D =1)−E (Y0|D =0), Δ = ATT 
+E(Y0|D=1) –E(Y0|D =0), Δ = ATT +SB. The second term, SB, is the selection bias: the 
difference between the counterfactual for treated individuals and the observed outcome for the 
untreated individuals. When this term is equal to zero, then the ATT can be estimated by the 
difference between the mean observed outcomes for treated and untreated group: ATT = E (Y|D 
=1) − E (Y|D =1) 
 Heinrich et al. (2010) identified two main assumptions for propensity score matching. 
The first is the conditional independence assumption (CIA) that supposes there is a set of X 
covariates observable to the researcher such that after controlling for these covariates, the 
potential outcomes are independent of the treatment status. The second is the common support 
condition (CSA), which assumes that for each value of X, there is a positive probability of being 
both treated and untreated. Based on these assumptions, propensity score matching can make 
selection bias (SB) zero, so that ATT is an unbiased estimator of the impact of the intervention 
on the treated.  
  
2.5.2. Propensity Score Estimation And The Matching Algorism                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Our analysis consisted of two steps. In the first step, we computed t-tests to assess mean 
differences between milk market participant and non-participant households on covariates and 
intra-household time allocation. After that, we matched the households based on their 
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characteristics. It turned out that there were households from the participant as well as the non-
participant group on the common support region. The distribution of the estimated propensity 
scores is presented in Figure 4.1.  
 
 
 
In the second step, two matching algorithms were used to estimate ATT, the mean 
difference in outcomes for market participant and non-participant households. These algorithms 
are nearest neighbor (NN) matching ‘with replacement’ and kernel matching. According to De 
Hoop (2012) using both matching algorithms provides a natural robustness check to guard 
against disadvantages of the matching algorithms. In NN matching, the individual from the 
control households is chosen as matching partner for a treated individual that is closest in terms 
of propensity score (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005). Matching with replacement’ allows an 
untreated individual to be used more than once.  
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 
Propensity Score 
Non-Participant households: Off support         Non-participant: On support 
Milk market participant households: On support 
Figure 2. 1. Distribution of the propensity scores 
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Kernel matching is a non-parametric matching estimator that uses weighted averages of 
all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2005). Each individual in a participant household is hereby matched with the entire 
sample of individuals in the non-participant households. This technique uses more information 
from the control household and can reduce variance. However, it might include observations that 
are bad matches. To minimize this drawback and to improve the robustness of the results, we 
have imposed the common support condition.  The standard errors have been computed using 
100 bootstrap replications. 
 
2.6. Empirical Results 
2.6.1. Household Characteristics  
 
Table 4.1 presents the characteristics of the milk market participant and non-participant 
households.  There are statistically significant differences between the two groups on 17 
covariates. Husbands in participant households are, on average older (mean 50) than husbands in 
non-participant households (mean 47). In terms of remoteness, participant households are located 
closer to the main road and milk collection centers (MCC) (2.84 and 2.79km respectively) 
compared to non-participant household (5.61 and 5.6km).  Participant households have 
significantly larger household size (7.9) compared to non-participant households (6.6). The 
number of female members is also significantly larger in participant (4.2) compared to non-
participant households (3.1).  
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Table 2. 1 Comparison of milk market participant and non-participant households on selected 
covariates   
Covariates Market Participant Non-Participant T-Stat 
Mean Std Error Mean Std Error  
Husband age 49,9 1,1 46,7 1,2 2,01** 
Wife Age 40.1 1,06 41.1 ,89 -,267 
Adult boy age 17.1 ,50 17.5 ,47 -,611 
Adult girl age 15.5 ,33 14.8 ,30 1,45 
Household distance from main road  2.8 ,24 5,6 ,31 -7.09*** 
Household distance from MCC 2,8 ,18 5,6 ,29 -8.17*** 
Total household size 7,9 ,26 6,6 ,19 3.91*** 
Total household females size 4,2 ,19 3,1 ,12 4.81*** 
Total household male size 3.6 ,12 3.4 ,12 0,98 
Number of children under five 0,51 .07 0,47 ,07 ,376 
Number of children in school 3,0 ,13 2,7 ,16 1,63 
Total household land Size 4,9 ,28 3,8 ,17 3.21*** 
Total household cows 4,8 ,18 4,0 ,14 3.81*** 
Total household lactating cows 2,9 ,13 2,1 ,06 5.52*** 
Households Indigenous cows 2,4 ,16 3,0 ,18 -2.39** 
Household crossbreed cows 2,4 ,19 ,91 ,12 6.37*** 
Years of experience in dairying 21,7 ,99 16,1 ,58 4.86*** 
Total household  milk Production (per 
day) 
12,4 ,95 5,4 ,31 7.02*** 
Milk processed into Butter (per day) ,564 ,15 4,1 ,23 13.2*** 
Household milk income (per day) 99,1 7,6 42,9 2,5 7,0*** 
Income from processed milk 
(women`s income) 
4,5 1,2 32,9 1,8 -13,2*** 
Income from raw milk sale (Men`s 
income) 
90,5 8,0 -- -- -- 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, Number of obs = 156 (78 milk market participant and 78 non-
participant) 
 
Participant households have significantly larger land size (4.9 hectare) compared to non-
participant households (3.8 hectare). Participant households have significantly more cows (mean 
4.8) compared to non-participant households (mean 4). Participant households also have more 
crossbreed cows (mean 2.4) than non-participant households (mean 0.9), while non-participant 
households have more indigenous breed cows (mean 3) than participant households (mean 2.4). 
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 Dairy experience is significantly higher among participant households (21.7 years) 
compared to non-participant households (16.1 years). Total household milk production per day is 
also significantly higher for participant households, with average milk production 12,4 liter per 
day against 5,4 liters for non-participant households. Participant households consume more milk 
(1, 23 liter) per day compared to non-participant households (0.77 liters).  However, the average 
volume of milk processed into butter per day is significantly lower among participant households 
(0, 56 liters) compared to non-participant (4, 11 liters). 
Household milk income per day is significantly higher for participant households (99 birr) 
compared to non-participants (43 birr). Participant households receive milk income every 15 
days through the registered heads of household (men). Women earn, on average, 4.5 birr per day 
in market participant households and 33 birr in non-participant households. Men earn, on 
average, 90 birr per day in market participant households, while they don't have regular dairy 
earning in non-participant households.   
 
2.6.2. Intra-Household Time Allocation  
 
The total time allocated to dairying and non-dairying activities by the four household members is 
presented in Table 2.2. Members of market participant households allocated significantly more 
hours (64) on household labour compared to members of non-participant households (45). The 
average number of hours allocated by men is 20.5 in participant households and 13.7 in non-
participant households. For women it is 43 hours in participant households and 31 hours in non-
participant households.  Member of participant households (both men and women) spent 
significantly more time on a dairying activities (44.7 hours) compared (22.7 hours) to non-
participant households. Over the observation period, men allocated 14.7 hours on dairy in 
participant and 7.7 hours in non-participant households, while women allocated 26 hours in 
participant and 15 hours in non-participant households. The time allocated by men is an average 
for the join time allocated by the husband and the adult boy and the time allocated by women is 
the average for the join time allocated by the wife and the adult girl.  
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Table 2. 2. Overall household work and dairying time allocation 
Outcome Variables Market Participant Non-Participant T-Stat 
Mean Std Error Mean Std Error   
Overall working time  
Total household time on work  63.5  ,917  44.7 1.10 13.14*** 
Men`s time on work 20.5  ,752  13.7     ,776 6,3*** 
Women`s time on work  43.0 ,68 31.0     ,700 12,2*** 
Dairy Related working time 
Total household dairy labour time 40.7 ,697 22.7 ,648  18.8*** 
Men dairy labour 14.7 ,507 7. 74 ,405  10.8*** 
Women dairy labour 25.9 ,490 15.01 ,417 16.9*** 
Note: time is measured over 36 hours working period (between 6;00 am to 12:00pm for two 
consecutive days), men`s time is the average for joint husband and boy time and women`s time is 
the average join time for the wife and girl *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, Number of obs = 156 (78 milk 
market participant and 78 non-participant) 
 
Time allocated to specific activities by the four adult household members also reveals 
significant differences between market participant and non-participant households (see Table 
2.3). Husbands spent 12 hours on various dairying activities plus wage work in participant 
households and 8 hours in non-participant households. Husband’s time allocated to feeding, 
watering and housing livestock, milking cows and preparation of concentrated livestock feeds 
shows significant differences between milk market participant and non-participant households. 
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Table 2. 3. Household member’s intra-household time allocation 
Outcome Variables Market Participant Non-Participant  
Mean Std Error Mean Std Error T-Stat 
Husband time on feeding &watering 
livestock 
3,2 ,23 2.0 ,23 3,7*** 
Husband time on housing livestock 1,7 ,09 2,1 ,13 -2,7*** 
Husband time on milking ,91 ,13 ,19 ,04 5.3*** 
Husband time for preparing concentrate 2,1 ,18 ,70 ,13 6.5*** 
Husband time on wage work 2.2 ,56 2.6 ,63 ,51 
Husband total hours on dairying and wage 
work  
11.6 ,56 7.7 ,65 4.6*** 
Husband  leisure hours 3 .305 3.4 .283 0.95 
Wife time on feeding &watering livestock 2,6 ,14 1,1 ,13 8.7*** 
Wife time on milking cows 3,0 ,13 2,1 ,08 6,0*** 
Wife time for preparing concentrate 2,1 ,11 ,42 ,08 12,6*** 
Wife time on burn cleaning 2,0 ,07 ,76 ,06 13,3*** 
Wife time on milk processing 1,0 ,17 1,5 ,18 -2,0** 
Wife time on cleaning milk utensils 2,0 ,09 1,1 ,07 8,8*** 
Wife time on cooking 5,2 0,22 5,2 0,15 00 
Wife time on cleaning house 2,4 ,15 1,6 ,19 3,5*** 
Wife time on caring ,50 ,15 ,43 ,16 0,40 
Wife total hours on dairying and domestic 
work  
23,8 ,27 15, 5 ,44 16,0*** 
Wife leisure time ,82 ,13 2,9 ,23 -7,8*** 
Boy time for feeding and watering 
livestock 
2,3 ,20 1,2 ,14 4,8*** 
Boy time for preparing concentrate ,60 ,14 ,30 ,08 1,9 
Boy dairying and wage work hours 8,9 ,52 6,0 ,44 4,3*** 
Girl feeding &watering hours 1,6 ,14 ,72 ,14 4,7*** 
Girl time for preparing concentrate 1,1 ,10 ,59 ,08 4,2*** 
Girl time on burn cleaning 1,6 ,10 1,1 ,06 4,5*** 
Girl time on cleaning dairy utensils 1,7 ,10 1,2 ,05 5,5*** 
Girl time on fetching water 1,6 ,19 ,78 ,11 3,8*** 
Girl total dairying and domestic hours 19,1 ,66 15,5 ,58 4,2*** 
Note: the time is measured over 36 hours period (between 6;00 am to 12:00pm for two 
consecutive days) *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, Number of obs = 156 (78 milk market participant and 
78 non-participant) 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 31 
 Wives spent 24 hours on dairying and domestic activities in participant household and 16 
hours in non-participant households. They spent significantly more hours on feeding and 
watering livestock, milking cows, cleaning activities (cow shed, milking utensils and house) and 
preparing concentrated cow feeds in participant households compared to non-participant 
households.  However, the wives` time for milk processing and in-house leisure is lower in 
participant households. 
 Adult boys allocated 9 hours on dairying; schooling and wage work in participant and 6 
hours in non-participant households. They spent significantly more hours on feeding and 
watering livestock in market participant households. Adult girls allocated 19 hours on dairying, 
domestic activities and schooling in participant households and 16 hours in non-participant 
households. Adult girls spent significantly more hours on feeding, watering, cleaning, 
preparation of concentrated livestock feeds and fetching water in participant compared to non-
participant households.   
2.6.3. Effect of Milk Market Participation  
 
In the next two sections, the results of the propensity score matching are presented, first for 
overall household time allocation and after that for specific activities. 
2.6.3.1. Effect on overall Household Labour Allocation 
 
The effect of milk market participation on overall household labour allocation is presented in 
Table 2.4. Milk market participation has a significant effect on overall household labour 
allocations. Market participant households allocated significantly more hours on overall 
household work compared to non-participant households. On average, these households spent 
18-22 hours more on household work over the 36 hours’ observation period. This effect is 
significant for both male and female members of the household. Men allocated 6-8 hours more 
on overall household work while women allocated 11-13 hours more on it. Women spent twice 
as much hour on household activities as men. 
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Table 2. 4. Effect of market participation on overall household time allocation 
Variables                                 NN  Matching          Kernel Matching 
     Mean 
difference 
S
E 
 T-stat Mean 
Difference                              
                                                     
S.E.
T-stat
Total household time on work 21.85 6.4 3.42 *** 18.03 1.66 10.87 ***   
Men`s time on work 8.4 1.87 2.26***  6.3 0.74 4.38*** 
Women`s time on work 13 1.62 4.14 *** 11 0.72 8.03*** 
Total household dairy labour 
time 
21.12 2.62 8.07 *** 16.29 3.95 4.12*** 
Men`s dairy labour 6.3 0.74 4.33 *** 5.5 1.13 2.44 *** 
Women`s dairy labour 11.6 0.72 8.00 *** 10.4 1.08 4.97 *** 
Note: time is measured over 36 hours working period (between 6;00 am to 12:00pm for two 
consecutive days), men`s time is the average for joint husband and boy time and women`s time is 
the average join time for the wife and girl *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, Number of obs = 156 (78 milk 
market participant and 78 non-participant) 
 
Milk market participation has also a significant effect on household dairy labour 
allocations. Participant households allocated 16-21 hours more on dairy related activities than 
non-participant households. The effect is significant for both men and women, but men spent 
only about half of women`s time in dairying. On average, a woman allocated 10-12 hours more 
on dairying in participant households compared to non-participant households. For men the 
increase was about 6 hours. These results show significant differences between participant and 
non-participant households as well as substantial gender differences in time allocation.   
 
2.6.3.2. Effect on Members Intra-Household Time Allocation  
 
The intra-household time allocation of the husband is presented in Table 2.5. Because husbands 
did not participate in activities like schooling, cleaning cowsheds, house and dairy utensils, 
processing milk, fetching water, cooking and caring activities, we did not consider these roles for 
them.  Husbands in participant households spent significantly more hours on milking cows and 
preparing concentrated livestock feeds. They spent 0.8 hours more on milking cows and 1.8 
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hours more on preparing concentrated livestock feed. Nevertheless, husband’s total working time 
is not significantly different between the two groups.  
Table 2. 5. Effect of market participation on husband`s time allocation 
Variables                                    NN Matching                     Kernel Matching 
     Mean 
difference 
S.E  T-stat Mean 
Differenc
e                              
                                                     
S.E. 
T-stat
Feeding and Watering Livestock -0.2 1.32 -0.14  0.64 0.76 0.84    
Housing Livestock -0.2 0.45 -0.54  -0.6 0.38 -1.57 
Milking Cows 0.8 0.20 4.2 *** 0.8 0.30 2.68 *** 
Preparing Concentrate 1.8 0.75 2.4 *** 1.8 0.42 4.22 *** 
Wage work (employment) 0.9 2.58 0.36  0.6 3.28 0.17  
Total  dairying and wage work 
time 
4.5 2.76 1.6  2.0 4.00 0.49  
Leisure time 0.3 1.43 0.21  -0.6 1.50 -0.43  
Total Number of Observation =156, Number of common support= 139 *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05 
 
Over the two day study period, wives spent 10-12 hours more time on dairying and other 
domestic activities in participant compared to non-participant households (Table 2.6). They spent 
2.0 hours more on feeding and watering livestock, 0.7 hours more on housing livestock, 0.7 
hours more on milking cows, 1.85 hours more on preparing concentrated livestock feed, 1.2 
hours more on cleaning barn and 1 hour more on cleaning milking utensils. Wives in participant 
households also spent 1.6 to 2 hours more on cleaning the house. The wives did not allocate time 
on schooling and wage work. In the Kernel matching model, wives’ in-house leisure time is 
significantly lower in participant compared to non-participant households.  
Table 2.7 shows that adult boys allocated 4 hours more on various activities in participant 
households compared to non-participant households. However, regarding boy’s time allocation 
for individual activities, only boys’ time spent on feeding and watering livestock differed 
significantly between participant and non-participant households. Adult boys spent 1.3-1.9 hours 
more on feeding and watering livestock in participant households. Similar to the husbands, the 
boys did not participate in cleaning, cooking and caring activities.  
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Table 2. 6. Effect of market participation on wives` time allocation 
Variable NN Matching Kernel Matching 
Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat 
Feeding and Watering Livestock 1.97 0.28 7.14 *** 1.82 0.26 6.93 *** 
Housing Livestock 0.76 0.15 5.13 *** 0.64 0.16 4.13 *** 
Milking Cows 0.80 0.46 1.72 * 0.62 0.29 2.15** 
Preparing Concentrate 1.95 0.21 9.18 *** 1.80 0.19 9.58*** 
Cleaning Burn 1.12 0.12 9.26*** 1.24 0.15 8.15*** 
Processing Milk 0.10 0.87 0.07  -0.18 0.42 -0.44  
Cleaning Dairy Utensils 1.09 0.14 7.64*** 1.08 0.12 8.93*** 
Cooking 0.64 0.72 0.89 -0.04 0.62 -0.07 
Cleaning House 2.077 0.51 4.04*** 1.55 0.39 3.92*** 
Fetching water and Firewood 0.615 0.67 0.92 0.21 0.43 0.50 
Caring 0.09 0.32 0.28  0.15 0.25 0.61  
Total dairying and domestic work 
time  
12.8 2.32 5.5*** 11.36 2.53 4.5*** 
Leisure time -0.47 1.48 -0.32 -1.38 0.56 -2.46 ** 
Total Number of Observation =156, Number of common support= 139*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05 
 
Table 2. 7. Effect of market participation on adult boy`s time allocation 
Variable NN Matching Kernel Matching 
Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat 
Feeding and Watering Livestock 1.92 0.61 3.14*** 1.32 0.37 3.57*** 
Housing Livestock -0.41 0.47 -0.87  -0.07 0.31 -0.23 
Preparing concentrate 0.41 0.55 0.75 0.33 0.19 1.76 
Study/School 1.10 0.65 0.51  0.67 0.38 1.75* 
Wage work (employment) 0.44 0.64 0.68  0.71 0.42 1.68 
Total dairying and wage work time  5.12 1.14 4.47*** 5.00 1.20 4.17*** 
Leisure time 0.51 1.6 0.32 -0.39 0.56 -0.70  
Total Number of Observation =156, Number of common support= 139, *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05 
 
Adult girls total time allocation does not differ significantly between milk market 
participating and non-participating household (Table 2.8), but many significant differences are 
observed for individual activities. Girls in participant households spent 1.2 hours more on 
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feeding and watering livestock, 0.5 hours more on preparing concentrated livestock feeds, 0.6 
hours more on cleaning barns, 0.6 hours more on cleaning milking utensils, 1 hour more on 
fetching water and 0.7 hours more on caring activities. Girls total working time did however not 
increase. This might caused by the fact that in participant households, girls spent 2 hours less on 
house cleaning. It seems this is only a shift of responsibilities. 
 
Table 2. 8. Effect of market participation on adult girl’s time allocation 
Variable NN Matching Kernel Matching 
Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat 
Feeding and Watering Livestock 1.2 0.38 3.1*** 1.2 0.27 4.35*** 
Housing Livestock 0.37 0.26 1.4 0.28 0.20 1.40 
Milking Cows -0.20 0.30 -0.69 -0.39 0.25 -1.53 
Preparing Concentrate 0.46 0.18 2.6*** 0.57 0.19 2.97*** 
Cleaning Burn 0.58 0.10 5.8*** 0.59 0.10 5.88*** 
Processing Milk 0.71 1.12 0.63 -0.36 0.74 -0.49 
Cleaning Dairy Utensils 0.71 0.23 23*** 0.54 0.18 3.06 *** 
Cooking 1.76 0.93 1.89* -1.318 0.68 -1.9 
Cleaning House -2.4 1.13 -2.1** -1.92 0.83 -2.3 ** 
Fetching water  1.3 0.50 2.6*** 0.95 0.41 2.31** 
Caring 0.65 0.28 2.3 ** 0.66 0.25 2.67*** 
Study/Schooling 0.21 0.51 0.41 0.04 0.33 0.11 
Total dairying and domestic work 
time  
1.45 1.84 0.79 1.30 1.86 0.70 
Leisure time 0.24 0.60 0.41 0.36 0.43 0.84 
Total Number of Observation =156, Number of common support= 139, *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05 
 
 
2.7. Discussion and Conclusion  
2.7.1. Discussion 
 
We studied the effect of household milk market participation on intra-household time allocation 
in rural Ethiopia, by observing 156 households --78 milk market participating and 78 non-
participating -- for two consecutive days. In this way we aimed to find out how a change in dairy 
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farming production and marketing system affects adult household member`s time allocation 
regarding dairying and non-dairying activities. 
  Our findings show that members of milk market participant households allocate 
significantly more hours on dairying and non-dairying activities compared to members of non-
participant households. Women`s dairying and domestic work time increased more than men`s 
dairying and wage work time. The extra time spent on dairying activities adds to their domestic 
responsibilities, which for the wives means an increase of their working time by about 12 hours 
in the two day period covered by our study. For men the increase was about 7 hours, hence 
market participation raised women`s workload substantially more than that of men. An important 
reason for this is the shift in the cattle management system, from freely grazing to feeding and 
watering them in the backyard. In market participant households the cows are kept in the 
backyard and feeding and watering the cows goes to the women as the extension of their 
domestic activities.    
Husbands in market participant households spent somewhat more time on milking cows 
and preparing concentrated livestock feeds compared to husbands from non-participant 
households. Given the traditional Ethiopian gender division of labour, whereby females are 
considered responsible for milking cows, this indicates that norms regarding intra-household 
gender role divisions are changing as a result of participation. However, our findings also 
indicate that the only dairying tasks currently receiving men’s attention are milking cows and 
preparing concentrated livestock feed.  The reason for this may be that engaging in these 
activities is a way to gain control over the milk production process and its quality.  
The major motivation for integrating Ethiopian farmers into the market is to increase 
their household income. Households earn cash income from milk either by selling raw milk, or 
by processing it into butter and cottage cheese. Control over milk income generated in these two 
ways differs by gender. Men/husbands sign the contract with the milk company and thus control 
income generated from selling raw milk in the formal milk market, whereas women/wives 
control income generated from selling processed milk in the local/informal market. Although 
total household income is indeed substantially higher in participating households, the shift 
towards selling raw milk in the market is associated with a decrease in the amount of milk 
locally processed and sold by the wives, and hence with a reduction of the income controlled by 
them.  
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These findings are consistent with previous studies in the area (Feleke, 2003, Lenjiso, 
2013 & Chagwiza, 2014), which found household milk income to increase with household 
integration into the milk market. However, they are also consistent with findings for other 
African countries (Njuki et al., 2011) that income control shifts from women to men as 
household’s market integration increase. This might have negative implications for household 
welfare given that income in the hands of women improves the development outcome of 
household members more than income in the hands of men (Goyal, 2007; Kabeer, 1999; Seebens, 
2011). Given the expansion of the milk market in the area, driven by urbanization and economic 
development of the country, the shift towards market oriented dairy production in the area, 
including the increase in (women’s) workload can be expected to continue in the coming years.     
Also the total time allocation by adult boys and girls to feeding and watering livestock is 
significantly higher in milk market participant compared to non-participant households. Boys 
allocate significantly more hours on feeding and watering livestock in market participant 
compared to non-participant households. Girls in participant households spent more hours on 
preparing concentrate, cleaning burns and milking utensils, fetching water and caring for 
children and elderly. This is, however compensated by a reduction in their time spent on cleaning 
activities. For girls it is thus merely a shift in responsibilities and their total time allocation is not 
affected by household market participation. 
 Our findings are in line with Fafchamps’ (2001) prediction that marketing leads to a shift 
in intra-household time allocation. They are also in line with other studies in the African context 
(Kaaria & Ashby, 2001; Njuki et al., 2011) arguing that in market oriented production systems 
men take over traditional women`s commodities and their roles in production and marketing, 
whenever they start to generate income. This might change the existing gender division of labour 
and ease women`s workload by increasing men`s involvement in their traditional roles. However, 
it also involves a shift in control over benefits from women to men. Our findings indicate that 
men involve mostly in strategically important dairy activities, which enable them to control the 
production process.   
Our study has two major limitations. First, we focused our observation study only on four 
adult household members, while the time allocated by other household member may vary as well 
between milk market participant and non-participant households. Second, we did not observe 
time allocation for all activities of the observed household members. In particular, activities 
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taking place outside of the household or at irregular time interval were not included. We also 
could not fully capture leisure time, because in part it is spent outside the household. We 
recommend other studies to address these limitations in the future.  
2.7.2. Conclusion and Recommendations   
 
Based on our results, we can conclude that household milk market participation is associated 
with higher household milk income, shifting income control from women to men and an 
increased household workload. There are substantial differences in overall household time 
allocation and time allocated to dairying, as well as important gender differences, between the 
two household types. Members of market participant households allocate significantly more 
hours on both dairying and non-dairying activities than members of non-participant households. 
At the individual level, wives spent twice as much time as husbands and adult girls spent twice 
as much time as adult boys on intra-household activities. For wives and adult girls, the extra time 
spent on dairying activities is added to their domestic responsibilities. There is also some shift in 
the gender division of labour: with the commercialization of milk production Ethiopian men start 
to take part in activities that in the traditional dairying system belonged to the women`s domain.  
This study informs dairy development policies in Ethiopia in several important ways. 
First, it shows that milk market participation not only increased household income, but also 
raised the intra-household workload and in particular the already heavy workload of women. The 
extra time women have to spend on these activities can negatively affect their other household 
duties. It may also increase the risk that children have to drop out of school to take over domestic 
roles. Hence, it is very important that with marketing also time-saving new technologies are 
introduced, such as easily cleanable milking utensils, milking machines, water and livestock 
feeds. These technologies may be particularly beneficial to women, ease their burden, and to a 
certain extent compensate for their loss of free time. Besides by time-saving technologies for 
milk production, much can also be gained by spending the increased milk income on the 
introduction of equipment that eases household chores. A refrigerator may save shopping time; 
cooking utensils like a mixer or water cooker save cooking time; etc. Given that all these tools 
run on electricity, connection to an electricity network is essential for reducing time spent on 
household chores substantially. 
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It is also important, as Ogato, Boon, and Subramani (2009) argue, to develop effective 
gender sensitization programs to encourage men to participate more in domestic activities. As the 
findings of this study show, in market participant households men start to take over some of the 
traditional women`s roles in dairy production. Raising men’s awareness and encouraging them to 
involve in other domestic activities can further solve women`s time constraints.   
A point of concern for policy makers is that the increase of women’s workloads goes 
together with a shift of control on the benefits of their labour to their husbands. In market 
participant households, women spend substantially less time on milk processing activities of 
which they control the income themselves (like making butter or cheese for the local market). 
Because the husbands sign the contract with the milk company, the cash income from marketing 
of raw milk is controlled by them. This is regrettable, because there is evidence that control over 
household income by women may lead to improved outcomes for all household members 
(Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000; Njuki et al., 2011). It is therefore of utmost importance that 
measures are taken to ensure that women get a fair share of the new income. 
Creating awareness on the gender sensitivity of commodities and on the benefits of 
women`s control over income may prevent women from losing control over the income they 
traditionally managed. One way to achieve that is to make women the milk-marketing agents in 
the formal milk market. They might represent the household when signing the contract with milk 
companies and receive the income gained by selling raw milk. This fits well in the new land 
certification and registration program that gives husbands and wives an equal status in 
representing the household by having both names and pictures on the land holding identification 
card. It is also important to increase women’s negotiating power and decision-making role by 
organizing them into groups, associations and cooperatives. As men may feel threatened by this 
process, interventions/policies must involve men and women in all negotiations to bring about 
equitable and sustainable changes. 
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Chapter 3: Transforming Gender Relations through the Market: 
Smallholder Milk Market Participation and Women`s Intra-
household Bargaining Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
"This chapter is based on Lenjiso, B., Smits, J., & Ruben, R. (2016). Transforming Gender 
Relation Through the Market: Smallholder Milk market Participation and Women`s Intra-
Household Bargaining power in Ethiopia. Paper published in Journal of Development Studies. 
IDO: http://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1139693 
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Abstract 
 
We study the relationship between smallholder milk market participation and women`s intra-
household bargaining position in Ethiopia, using a quasi-experiment and propensity score 
matching. In market participant households, milk income is higher and its control has shifted 
from women to men. Our data also indicate that men transfer this income partly to their wives. 
Qualitative findings indicate that men see this as recognition for their wives’ household 
maintenance responsibility. Women argue however that transferring income is also men`s tactic 
for reducing intra-household conflict. Overall, dependency between husbands and wives seems 
higher and a woman’s bargaining position stronger in participant households. 
 
Key words: Ethiopia, intra-household bargaining, propensity score matching, quasi-experiment,  
women 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Bargaining within the household is often hidden, involving emotional manipulations and 
unspoken power games that may not be readily detectable or fundamentally threatening 
(Locke & Okali, 1999, p-275).   
In response to the problems posed by a unitary conceptualization of the household, economists 
have proposed alternative household models. These models, especially those embodying the 
bargaining approach, provide a useful framework for analyzing gender relations (Agarwal, 1997).  
Research based on these models indicates that increased resources (earnings) in the hands of 
women may generate egalitarian shifts in gender relations, by enhancing women`s intra-
household bargaining power (e.g. Adato, et al., 2000,  Mahmud, Shah, & Becker, 2011,  Naved, 
2000 and  Sen, 1990). Foa & Foa (2012) argue that any trait or behavior that is valued by 
household members can be used to influence household decisions and intra-household gender 
relations. 
According to Sultana (2013), household bargaining is not only a matter of intra-
household relations, but is also influenced by institutionalized forms of gendered relations. As 
long as gender disparity is in operation, changes in earnings alone would do little to improve 
women`s intra-household bargaining. Whether changes in gender dynamics due to the 
introduction of a market system have the potential to transform existing gender imbalances, as 
has been suggested by some scholars (Agarwal, 1997; Goyal, 2007), remains however to be seen. 
There are indications that market developments, especially in Africa, do not benefit women and 
sometimes even worsen their intra-household positions (Abbas 1997, Sahan and Fischer-Bachery 
2011, Naved 2000,  Njuki et al. 2011 and  Okali 2011).  
In Ethiopia, the government has been implementing the Growth and Transformation Plan 
(GTP) since 2010, which is meant to change the country from a semi-subsistence agrarian 
economy to a more diversified and food secure economy. Smallholder market integration is one 
of the crucial features of the plan and the dairy sector is the target of the commercialization 
policy in the country. In Ethiopia, dairy has traditionally been a women`s business. Women were 
responsible for milking cows and for processing milk into butter, cottage cheese and yoghurt, for 
household consumption as well as for the local market. The dairy market surplus has been an 
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important source of income for Ethiopian rural women. However, with the integration of 
smallholder milk production into the formal market system this may have changed. The 
experience of other African countries indicates that cash crops and their benefits tend to be 
controlled by males (see Fischer & Qaim, 2012, Abbas 1997, Nijuk, 2011 and Endeley, 2001). 
Given that in market participant households dairy is considered more as cash commodity, the 
shift towards a market-oriented system may involve a shift of the control over milk income from 
women to men.  
Previous studies  (Tangka, Emerson, & Jabbar, 2002) have shown that while women in 
the central highland of Ethiopia received the total dairy income from the sale of butter in the 
local market, their earning share was reduced to 59% of the total milk income in market-oriented 
dairying. Similarly, Tangka, Ouma, & Staal (1999) found that women`s dairy income from 
selling butter in local market increased 4 times in market-oriented systems, thus indicating that 
marketing is favorable for women. However, these authors also found that at the same time 
men`s income increased 14 times. Hence with market integration of the dairy sector, the income 
of men grew more than 3 times as strong as that of women. To what extent market integration 
and the related income changes affect women’s intra-household bargaining position remains to 
be seen. Until now, no empirical evidence is available regarding this important issue. 
The current study aims to contribute to the literature on intra-household gender relations 
by assessing the relationship between household milk market participation and women`s intra-
household bargaining position in Ethiopia.  Using the information obtained in quasi-experimental 
games, a household survey and qualitative information collected from key informants and post-
game interviews, we aim to answer the following research question: What is the relationship 
between milk-market participation of dairy farm households and women’s intra-household 
bargaining power in Ethiopia? 
In this study, we define women’s intra-household bargaining power as the ability of 
wives to control a fair share of household income. To gain insight into the strength of women’s 
bargaining power in dairy farming households, our experimental game focuses on two major 
outcome parameters: the share of household income that husbands and wives think should go to 
the wife and the degree to which husbands and wives agree about the size of this share.    
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical 
model and a description of the quasi-experimental design. Section 3 is devoted to data collection, 
sampling and analytical procedures. Section 4 present empirical results and in section 5 the 
findings are summarized and discussed.  
 
3. 2. Theoretical models  
 
In the unitary household model, the household is considered as the unit of study. Household 
members are assumed to have homogeneous preferences and resources to be allocated equally by 
the altruistic household head. As the resources of spouses are pooled, it is irrelevant by which 
spouse the resources are controlled (Pollak, 1994). In most households, however, resources are 
neither pooled nor jointly allocated (Njuki et al., 2011, ). This is problematic for the unitary 
household model as it considers the household as a black box (Geisler, 1993; Katz, 1995). More 
recent research models address this issue by an explicit recognition that individual preferences 
and bargaining power within the household may affect the outcomes of household decisions 
(Agarwal, 1997; Himmelweit, Santos, Sevilla, & Sofer, 2013; Njuki et al., 2011). These studies 
also revert to early family models (e.g. Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Rodman, 1972, Sen, 1990) that 
consider households as a place for conflict as well as cooperation. These models focus on the 
interaction between varying, if not conflicting, preferences and power distributions among 
household members.  
In bargaining models, intra-household resource sharing is assumed to be the result of 
bargaining between household members, whether the bargaining is explicit or implicit 
(Himmelweit et al., 2013). Bargaining models of marriage presuppose that marriage generates 
substantial surpluses, the distributions of which is determined by bargaining within marriage 
rather than by prior agreements (Pollak, 1994). Bargaining power is supposed to influence the 
distribution of these surpluses by affecting the sharing rules. The basic hypothesis underlying 
these models is that there is a positive relationship between an individual's bargaining power, 
his/her influence on family decision-making, and his/her share of family resources (Seth, 1997). 
According to Katz  (1995) it is possible to peek into the “black box” of the household and to 
observe the complex intra-household dynamics that characterizes the domestic economy. 
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Mojirayo (2013) argues that individuals with a higher financial status in the household have 
more power and agency in household decision-making. This power and agency increases their 
confidence in making decisions that benefit them. 
To measure women`s intra-household bargaining power, a wide range of indicators have 
been used; like income, participation in labour market, asset ownership, education, bride price, 
whether the woman has given birth to a son, women’s role in household decision-making, and 
women`s autonomy to travel (Agarwal, 1997a; Dito, 2011; Doss, 2013). Sultana et al. (2013) 
argue that women`s intra-household position does not only depend on what women earn and how 
much they participate in decisions, but also on the spouses` perception of what they earn and 
their role in decision making. The mutual expectation of spouses should be an accurate reflection 
of their actual behavior (Kebedea, Tarazona, Munro, & Verschoora, 2014). Gaining insight into 
these perceptions and expectations, therefore, would provide us with information about the actual 
intra-household position of women.   
In this paper, we capture spouses’ perceptions of their and their partners bargaining 
power by performing an incentivized resource sharing game. A basic assumption underlying this 
approach is that the resource sharing rules in the game reflects the intra-household bargaining 
position of the spouses well. By comparing the outcomes of this game between milk-market 
participants and non-participant farm households, we intent to understand the consequences of 
market participation for the bargaining position of Ethiopian farmwomen. The central hypothesis 
tested in this way is that household milk market participation is negatively related to women`s 
intra-household bargaining power, because it shifts milk income control from women to men.  
 
3.3.  The Experimental Design 
 
According to Orsini & Spadaro (2005) the relative bargaining power of spouses can determine 
each spouse’s share of the available resources. Individuals exercise agency in order to maximize 
their benefits. This agency is necessarily bounded by the social institution that determines 
resource sharing (Slootmaker, 2013). In our experiment, this social institution is a resource 
sharing game in which husbands and wives are asked to divide an amount of money between 
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themselves and their partners, whereby agreement between husbands and wives regarding the 
amount given to the other determines whether they win the game. The amount to be divided is 
100 Ethiopian birr (ETB), which is equivalent to the daily milk income in market participant 
households. In our game there are two roles, (1) proposing how to share the amount between 
themselves and their spouse, and (2) indicating how much one expects to receive from the spouse. 
It is only when the proposals and the expectation of the spouses coincide, that the couple wins 
the game and receives the amount indicated in the game (plus the show up fee of 50 ETB), 
otherwise they get only the show up fee.  
The assumption behind this game is that the amounts proposed or expected depend on the 
perception of the players regarding their own and their partner’s bargaining power. This is 
because the spouses expectations of each other’s behavior in an experiment can be an important 
indicator of their actual positions (Kebedea et al., 2014). This will be especially so, if the 
partners agree which each other regarding each other’s behavior. The incentive of winning the 
game is supposed to control for other potential factors that influence sharing behaviors, like 
generosity, fairness, or togetherness and force the player to critically predict the bargaining 
position of the other party. Kebedea et al (2014) indicated that spouses who have better 
remarriage potential transfer less to their partner in Ethiopia, implying that individuals with 
better bargaining power transfer less money to their spouses in the game. Hence, we assume 
compared to players with a weak bargaining position the players with a better bargaining 
position will expect that their partners offer them more money and that those partners expect to 
receive less money. By doing this game with couples in milk-market participant and non-
participant households we aim to increase our understanding of how household milk market 
participation might influence the intra-household bargaining position of women versus their 
husbands. 
The game was played in two rounds to enable the spouses to play both roles. The spouses 
were located in different rooms to avoid communication between them. Husbands and wives 
were assigned to the rooms through a lottery method. In the first round, players in room-A were 
proposers and players in room-B indicated their expectations. In the second round the roles were 
reversed and players in room-A indicated their expectation, while player in room-B played the 
proposer role.  
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After entering the room, participants were informed that they play the proposer or 
receiver role. Each player was given an envelope containing a smaller coded envelope, a form 
with possible expectation options, and 100ETB divided into five twenty birr voucher notes. First 
they were asked to decide how to share the 100ETB between themselves and their husbands. The 
amount they wanted to send to their partner (the proposal) had to be placed in the smaller 
envelope. The proposal could be zero or a multiple of twenty (20, 40, 60, 80 or 100). It was not 
possible to share the money equally, so the proposers were forced to either benefit themselves or 
their spouses. We believe, this decision to benefit self or the spouse, in order to win the game, is 
determined by the relative position of oneself in relation to their spouse. After all participants 
made their decisions, the smaller envelopes were collected and the amounts contained in each 
envelope (proposal) was recorded alongside the household code.   
Participants playing the receiver role were asked to indicate their expectations regarding 
the amount their partner would send them. They received a form with possible proposal options 
(0, 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100) ETB and were asked to indicate the option that best represented their 
expectation. They were informed that there was no option of sharing the money equally, so that 
they had to benefit either themselves or their partners. Subsequently, all expectation decisions 
were collected and recorded alongside the household code. In the second round participants 
switched roles. The outcomes of the two rounds were recorded in four columns of excel sheet: 
the wives’ proposal`s, the husband`s expectations, the husband`s proposal and the wives’ 
expectations. Partners whose proposals and expectations coincided won the game and got the 
amount(s) they indicated in the game plus the 50ETB show up fee. Participants whose proposals 
and the expectations of their spouse didn’t coincide lost the game and got only the show up fee.  
The results of the game were changed into bargaining indexes in the following way: 
Women`s bargaining index in the game was calculated as: 
                         
             
        (1), where  
 WBI – Wife`s Bargaining Index in the game 
 WiExMo – Wife’s experimental money 
 WiPro – Wife’s proposal 
 WiEx – Wife’s expectation  
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Men`s bargaining index in the game was calculated as  
    
                     
             
 (2), where 
 HBI – Husband`s Bargaining Index in the game 
 HuExMo – Husband’s experimental money 
 HuPro – Husband’s proposal 
 HuEx – Husband’s expectation 
Subsequently, women`s relative intra-household bargaining position (women`s 
bargaining position in relation to her partner) was calculated by dividing women`s bargaining 
index in the game by the men`s bargaining index in the game: 
         
      
       
     (3)  
The basic assumption underlying the experiment is that the ratios indicated by the 
husbands’ and wives’ bargaining indexes in the game mimic their actual role in household 
financial decision-making. These ratios range from 0 to 1. Three situations are most relevant 
from a theoretical perspective. First, the case where the wives and the husbands retain all their 
endowments and expect that their partners would return all their endowment to them. In this case, 
the bargaining index would equal 1 and the husband or the wife is household’s dictator financial 
decision maker. This is consistent with the assumption of the unitary household model, where 
resources are pooled and the altruistic head of the household make resource allocation decisions.  
Second the case where the husband and the wife`s bargaining index equals 0.5. This 
option is based on equal sharing of the resources and the household is considered egalitarian. 
This would be in line with the collective household model, where each household member has a 
well-defined objective function, and interact to generate household level decisions. In this case 
husband and wife are supposed to make financial decisions on the basis of consensus. However, 
in the current study this option was not possible because we forced the players to either benefit 
themselves or their spouse with the aim to rule out perfect fairness.  
The third situation is mostly in line with many bargaining models. Husband and wife use 
their bargaining power in sharing the experimental endowments and any ratio that ranges 
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between 0 and 0.5 indicates lower individual bargaining power while a ratio between 0.5 and 1 
indicates better individual bargaining power.  
The ratio of the women`s bargaining index to the men`s bargaining index can be seen as a 
summary index for women`s relative intra-household bargaining position. The higher this ratio, 
the higher the bargaining power of the women compared to their husbands. 
 
3.4.  Methodology 
3.4.1.  Description of the Study Area  
 
The study was conducted in the Oromia state, the largest of the nine regional states in Ethiopia. 
With 354 thousand sq. km, Oromia covers one-third of the total area of the country. It has 36 
percent of the country's population (CSA, 2008). The climate of the region is favorable for 
farming and animal rearing. The region is classified into 18 zones and 190 weredas (districts). 
The study area, Selale, is one of the 18 zones in Oromia, known for its tradition and high 
potential for dairying. About 85% of the populations in Selale are engaged in agriculture and 
local livelihoods depend mainly on livestock raising and dairy production. Major crops grown 
include oats, teff, barley, wheat, horse beans and field peas. The climate and topography of the 
region favored the introduction of improved dairy cows, which has led to a further expansion of 
milk market in the area. 
3.4.2. Sampling and Data Collection Procedure  
 
Selale were selected for this study because of its tradition of and potential for dairy production, 
its milk market coverage and its dairy supply to the Addis Ababa market,  The Selale dairy 
cooperative union (SDCU) is the major formal milk buyer in the area. From the list of 22 dairy 
cooperatives that are active members of SDCU, we randomly selected four primary dairy 
cooperatives. The four kebeles (the smallest administrative unit) where these sample dairy 
cooperatives are located were taken as sample kebele for the study. By employing stratified 
sampling techniques, 300 farm households were selected from the four kebeles, proportionately 
to their population size.  
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We administered a structured questionnaire with both closed and open-ended questions 
regarding the socio-economic and demographic background of the dairy farm households. Based 
on the results of this survey, the households were stratified into market participant and non-
participant households. We randomly selected 168 households (couples), 84 from market 
participant and 84 from non-participant households for participating in the resource sharing game 
(discussed in section 2 above).  
Post-game interviews and interviews with a key informant were employed to get 
qualitative insights into the effect of household milk market participation on women`s intra-
household bargaining position. Our key informant was the former head of the livestock 
marketing agency officer in the area. The post-game interviews were held with 12 respondents 
who participated in the game. Six men and six women, three from market participants and three 
from non-participant households participated in the interview. We selected participants with 
higher and lower proposals and expectations on the bases of the experimental results. The 
information was discussed as direct quotes and fake names were used to keep the privacy of 
informants.     
 
3.5. The Analytical Approach 
 
This study examines the relationships between household market participation and women`s 
intra-household bargaining power by determining the average effect of milk market participation 
on women`s bargaining positions. Households who sell raw milk to cooperatives; private 
collectors, processing companies, hotels and cafeterias are considered as participants (treated). 
Households located in the same kebele as the treated households that did not sell raw milk were 
selected as non-participants (control). We used propensity scores (Heinrich et al., 2010 & Austin, 
2011) to match these households on their baseline characteristics to ascertain as much as possible 
that the effect on the outcome variable was the result of difference in milk market participation 
(treatment).  
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3.5.1.  Propensity Score Matching 
 
Random control trials (RTCs) are the most appropriate method for estimating the effect 
of a treatment on an outcome. This is because random treatment allocation can ensure that 
treatment effects are not cofounded by measured or unmeasured baseline characteristics (Austin, 
2011).  Recently, there has been growing interest in using observational studies to estimate the 
effect of interventions on outcomes. Heinrich, et al.,(2010) argue that the main challenge of a 
credible impact evaluation is the construction of the counterfactual outcome i.e., what would 
have happened to the participants in absence of the treatment. Although using a control group is 
the ideal way to solve this challenge, assignment of the participants into treatment and control 
group is often not random. Hence, treatment selection can be confounded by observable and 
unobservable characteristics of the participants. Recently, there was a growing interest in using 
propensity score matching (PSM) as a technique to reduce this selection bias. PSM uses 
information from a pool of units that do not participate in the intervention, to identify what 
would have happened to the participating units in the absence of the intervention (Heinrich et al., 
2010).  
Propensity score matching has two main assumptions; the conditional independence 
assumption and the common support assumption (Heinrich et al., 2010). ‘Conditional 
independence’ means that there is a set of X covariates and that controlling for these covariates 
makes the potential outcomes independent of the treatment status. ‘Common support’ implies 
that for each value of X, there is a positive probability of being both treated and untreated (to be 
on common support). To carry out the matching procedure with these assumptions, three types of 
variables are required. These are: (1) a dummy variable that groups participants into treatment 
and control, (2) predicted probability scores, indicating the probability that a unit in the 
combined sample of treated and untreated units receives the treatment given their observed 
characteristics and (3) the outcome variable(s) with which the average treatment effect on the 
treated will be evaluated. Based on these assumptions and variables the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT) is given as follows (Heinrich et al., 2010) 
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Where  
Y0 = the outcome in control group 
Y1 = the outcome in treatment group 
3.5.2. Propensity Score Estimation and Matching Algorism                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
To assess the mean differences between milk market participant and non-participant households 
on the covariates, we ran t-tests. After that, we matched the households based on their baseline 
characteristics. There were households from the participant as well as the non-participant group 
on the common support region. The distribution of the estimated propensity scores is presented 
in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 
Propensity Score 
Non-participant: Off support Non-participant: On support 
Market Participant: On support 
Figure 3. 1. Distribution of the propensity scores 
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To estimate ATT, the mean difference in outcomes for market participant and non-
participant households after matching, two matching algorithsm were used; nearest neighbor 
(NN) matching ‘with replacement’ and kernel matching. In NN matching, the treated individual 
is matched to a control person who is closest in terms of propensity score (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 
2005). Matching with replacement’ allows an untreated individual to be used more than once as a 
control. We followed this technique considering our restricted sample size. 
Kernel matching is a non-parametric matching technique that uses weighted averages of 
all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2005). Each individual in the treated household is thus matched with the entire sample 
of persons in the control households. This technique uses more information from the control 
households and can lower variance. However, it might include observations that are bad matches. 
We have imposed the common support condition to minimize this drawback and to improve the 
robustness of the results. The standard errors have been computed using 100 bootstrap 
replications. According to De Hoop (2012), using both nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement and kernel matching provides a natural robustness check to guard against the 
disadvantages of the two matching algorithms.  
 
3.6. Empirical results 
3.6.1. Household Characteristics   
 
To assess the mean differences between milk market participant (treated) and non-participant 
(control) households on observable covariates we ran t-tests (Table 3.1). We found statistically 
significant differences between milk market participant and non-participant households on 19 
variables. 
Women in milk market participant households are on average older (mean 41) than 
women in non-participant households (mean 37). Market participant households are located 
closer to milk collection centers (2.9km) and farther away from weekly markets (5km) compared 
to non-participant household (5.7km and 4km respectively). Market participant households are 
significantly larger (7.8 persons) compared to non-participants households (6.6 persons). The 
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number of female members is also significantly larger in market participant households (4.2) 
than in non-participant households (3.1).  
Market participant households have significantly larger land size (5.1 hectare) compared 
to non-participant households (3.7 hectare) and use significantly more land for animal grazing 
and crop production (2.8 hectare) compared to non-participant households (1.3 and 2.3 hectare). 
Market participant households have significantly more cows (5) and crossbreed cows (2.4) 
compared to non-participants (4 and 0.9). Dairy experience is significantly higher among market 
participant households (21.1 years) compared to non-participant households (16.5 years). Total 
household milk production per day is also significantly higher for milk market participant 
households (12.6 liter) than for non-participant households (5.0 liter).  
Table 3. 1. Comparing market participant and non-participant households on covariates  
Covariates Market Participant Non-Participant T-Stat 
Mean Std Error Mean Std 
Error 
 
Husband age 47 ,912 45 ,932 1,26 
Wife age 41 ,841 37 ,753 3,68*** 
Household distance from MCC  2,9 ,208 5,7 ,287 -7.90*** 
Household distance from weekly market 5,0 ,187 4,0 ,256 -3,00*** 
Total household size 7,8 ,242 6,6 ,186 4,05*** 
Total household females size 4,2 ,180 3,1 ,123 5,22*** 
Total household male size 3,6 ,114 3,5 ,118 -,624 
Number of children under five ,51 ,071 .45 .064 .558 
Total household land Size 5,1 ,270 3,7 ,159 4,34*** 
Land used for crop cultivation 2,8 ,151 2.20 .107 3.26*** 
Land used for grazing 1,8 ,130 1,3 ,067 3,74*** 
Total household cows 5,0 ,172 4,0 ,146 3.85*** 
Total household lactating cows 2,94 ,120 2.1 .076 5.75*** 
Households Indigenous cows 2,4 ,159 3,0 ,166 -2.71*** 
Household crossbreed cows 2,4 ,178 ,94 ,119 6,71*** 
Years of experience in dairying 21,1 ,971 16,5 ,557 3,38*** 
Total household  milk Production (per day) 12,6 ,875 5,0 ,210 8,51*** 
Milk processed into Butter (per day) ,47 ,124 4,2 ,210 -10,7*** 
Milk consumed at household level (per day) 1,3 ,161 ,74 ,081 2,93** 
Household milk income (per day) 101 7,00 48,8 9,11 4,55*** 
Income from processed milk (women`s 
income) 4,0 ,992 34 1,68 
-15,3*** 
Income from raw milk sale (Men`s income) 93 7,23 0,0 0,00 12,9*** 
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*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, Number of obs = 167 (83 market participant and 84 non-participant) 
Milk is sold raw, consumed at household level, or processed into cottage butter and 
cheese at the household level. Market participant households consume significantly more milk 
(1.3 liter) per day compared to non-participant households (0.7 liter). The average volume of 
milk processed into butter per day is significantly lower among market participant households 
(0.47 liters) than among non-participant households (4.2 liters). 
Household milk income per day is significantly higher for market participant households 
(101 birr) compared to non-participant households (49 birr). In milk market participant 
households, the husband generally receives the milk income, as it is the registered household 
head that signs the contract with the milk company. The women who do the processing work 
control the income of milk processed into butter and cheese and sold at the local market. Given 
that in market participant household women process less milk themselves, the women in those 
households earn only 4.0 birr per day, whereas women in non-participant households earn 34 birr 
per day. On the other hand, men earn, on average, 93 birr per day in market participant 
households while they don't earn from milk on daily bases in non-participant households.  
Inline with this, our key informant interview participant mentioned the challenges of milk 
marketing in the area as follows:  
 
“…the idea of selling raw milk was debated and challenged in the community and among 
household members. Traditionally, dairy income was the domain of women and men`s 
involvement was considered a taboo. However, households have to sign contract and receive 
milk income twice a month through a registered head of the households (mostly men) in the 
formal milk market. This has generated intense conflicts in the households” (Tesfaye, male, key 
informant). 
 
According to the informant, the conflicts were not only the result of shifting milk income 
control from women to men, but also because sometimes men did not share the income fairly 
with their wives. There were even cases where men spend the whole milk income on their own 
personal needs. In these cases, the women`s responses were sometimes systematic and subtle, for 
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instance by reducing the daily milk production. This could be done by leaving milk for calves or 
giving it to children, by hiding milk in the house, or by using unclean utensils to reduce milk 
quality so that the collectors will reject it. Women also chose to process extra milk into butter 
and cottage cheese to sell in the local market and in this way generate income for themselves.  
These interplays between intra-household gender relations and milk market participation 
also were brought to courts and elders in the community. Hence, although milk income control 
shifted from women to men, there were dynamic interplays within the households that resulted in 
redistribution of part of the income from men to women and might led to new resource-sharing 
norms in the local communities.  
 
3.6.2. Resource Sharing between Husband and the Wife  
 
To study the differences in the way income is distributed between spouses in market participant 
and non-participant households, a resource sharing game was conducted. In this game, husbands 
and wives were asked to propose an amount of money to be transferred to their partner and to 
mention their expectation regarding the amount their partner would transfer to them. The 
outcomes of this game are presented in Figure 3.2.  
 
 
Figure 3. 2. Mean of resource sharing in the game 
40 51,90 52,61 52,61 
36,14 
62,40 63,85 40,96 
0 1 
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There are substantial difference in the amounts proposed and expected by husbands and wives in 
participant and non-participant households. Women in milk market participant households made 
somewhat lower proposals (36 birr) compared to women in non-participant households (40 birr), 
however this difference is not statistically significant. Regarding the amount they expected to 
receive from their husbands, women in market participant households expected to receive a 
significantly larger share of their husband`s endowment (62 birr) compared to women in non-
participant households (52 birr). In line with women`s expectation, men in market participant 
households made significantly larger proposals (64 birr) compared to men in non-participant 
households (53 birr).  Men in market participant households expected to receive a significantly 
lower share of their wives` endowment (41 birr) compared to men in non-participant households 
(52.6 birr). The average amounts proposed by the men were almost completely in line with the 
amounts expected by the women in both participant and non-participant households. In the 
participant households also the average amounts proposed by the women were in line with the 
amounts expected by the men. So in these situations it seems that there is agreement between 
women and men regarding the share of income that should go to the wives. Only in non-
participant households there seems to be some disagreement regarding this, as the average 
amounts proposed by the women were significantly lower (40 birr) than was expected by the 
men (52.6 birr). 
 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 58 
 
Figure 3. 3. Men and women`s Intra-household bargaining index  
 Men and women`s intra-household bargaining indexes differed significantly between 
market participant and non-participant households (see Figure 3.3). The bargaining index is 
significantly higher (0.63) for women in market participant households compared to men in 
participant households (0.38) and to women in non-participant households (0.55). On the other 
hand, the bargaining index for men in market participant households (0.38) is significantly lower 
compared to women in market participant households (0.63) and to men in non-participant 
households (0.50). 
In the post-game interview, we focused on how participants allocated their endowments 
and the potential reasons that underlie their sharing behaviors/rules. In line with the game results, 
participants unanimously agreed that men in participating households make higher proposal and 
expect to receive less compared to women. The major explanation given for this was that women 
need more money because they are charged with the household maintenance responsibilities. We 
also posed a question whether there is a relationship between household milk market 
participation and intra-household resource allocation behavior. In this regard, men also argued 
that returning resources to their wives is a recognition for the women`s household maintenance 
responsibility and has nothing to do with the status of the household in the milk market.  They 
mentioned that women are the center of household, especially for those who depend on cash 
income; women manage the household income with care. According to one interviewee: 
0.55 0.63 
0.5 0.38 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 59 
…. “When the households produced crops and ate from their store, men used to spend the money 
on alcohol. But now crop production is declining in the area due to declining farm size and soil 
fertility. Thus income management is a critical matter for household maintenance and women do 
this better than men” (Chamada, male, from market participant household). 
 
On the other hand, women argued that the intra-household dynamics related to milk 
market integration have influenced men`s decision to return income to their wives. 
….” men`s decision to return resources to their wife, at least in part can be a strategy to 
shift the household maintenance responsibility completely to women and to reduce potential 
conflicts related to resource sharing in the household” (Hawine, female, from market participant 
households). 
 
3.6.3.  The Effect of Milk Market Participation on Women`s Bargaining   
 
Table 3. 2. Average effect of market participation on spouse’s proposals and expectations 
Outcome variable NN Matching Kernel Matching 
 Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat 
Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat 
Women`s Proposal -18,8 6,4 -2,9*** -18,4 7,5 -2,4** 
Women`s Expectation 18 7,8 2,3** 17,4 7,3 2,4** 
Men`s proposal 21,7 6,8 3,2*** 19,3 5,5 3,5*** 
Men`s Expectation -16,8 9,2 -1.8 -16,2 7,8 -2.05** 
Women`s bargaining Index 0,18 0,06 2,8*** 0,18 0,06 2,9*** 
Men`s Bargaining Index -0,19 0,07 -2,6*** 0,18 0,07 -2,6*** 
Women`s relative 
Bargaining power 
0,93 0,21 4,5*** 0,89 0,26 3,5*** 
Total Number of Obs =167, Number of common support= 145, *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, *P<0.1 
 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 60 
The results of the propensity score matching are presented in Table 2. Women in market 
participant households proposed significantly less (18%) and expected to receive significantly 
more (17-18%) of their husband`s endowments compared to women in non-participant 
households. Men in market-participant households proposed significantly more (19-22%) and 
expected to receive significantly less (16-17%) of their wife`s endowment compared to men in 
non-participant households. Hence men`s proposals and expectations were rather consistent with 
women`s expectations and proposals.  
Based on these figures, we have calculated the relative bargaining indices for husbands 
and wives. This index is also significantly higher (18%) for women in market participant 
households compared to women in non-participant households. On the other hand, men in 
market participant households showed a significantly lower bargaining index (17-19%) 
compared to men in non-participant households. Women`s relative intra-household bargaining 
power (compared to their husband’s) based on this figures also differed significantly between 
market participant and non-participant households. The ratio of the women`s bargaining index to 
their husbands bargaining index show that women in market participant have a 89-93% better 
bargaining position compared to women in non-participant households. This figure can suggest a 
positive relationship between household milk market participation and women`s relative intra-
household bargaining position. 
Information gained through the post-game interview indicates that the difference in resource 
sharing behavior between market participant and non-participant households can be related to the 
shift of milk income control from women to men. In non-participant households, women still 
generate income from the sale of dairy products, whereas in participant households dairy income 
is received through the head of the household. Since the husbands know that their wives have no 
earning, they return the milk income in part to their wife for household maintenance. The 
pressure from women to get a fair share of milk income might also be high in these households. 
Given that the women still to a large extent control the milk production in the household, they 
may have a relatively strong position in the bargaining process about this income.  
Participants also mentioned from time to time that divorce is expanding in the area and that a 
major reason underlying many divorce cases is resource-sharing issues. Reducing intra-
household conflict and divorce risk might therefore have been a major reason for sharing the 
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milk income with their wives. Another reason might be more tactical. By transferring income to 
their wives the husbands to a certain extent freed themselves from providing for the family. This 
might mean that in milk market participating households women`s burden has increased, because 
more household provision responsibilities have come on their shoulders. In sum, market 
participation involves various intra-household dynamics that put men and women into dialogue, 
conflict and bargaining, which could potentially influence women`s bargaining position. 
 
3.7. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we studied the relationship between the milk market participation of smallholder 
households and women`s intra-household bargaining power in Ethiopia. The main objective of 
integrating Ethiopian farmers into the market was to increase household income. Our data show 
that household income is indeed substantially higher in milk market participating households 
(101 versus 49 birr daily). This higher income of participating households is almost completely 
earned by selling raw milk to the market. The other way of receiving milk income -- processing 
raw milk into butter and cottage cheese for sale at the local market – is much less important in 
market participant households than in non-participant households.  
This difference has important consequences for the distribution of income within the 
household. Milk income from the formal market is received and controlled by men (who sign the 
contract with the milk company), whereas income from the local market is received and 
controlled by women.  The consequences for the intra-household distribution of income are 
clearly reflected in our data. In milk market participant households, men`s milk income is on 
average 93 birr per day, whereas in non-participant households men do not earn income from 
milk on a daily bases. Women tend to earn and control the entire dairy income in non-participant 
households (34 birr per day), but earn no more than 4 birr milk income per day in market 
participant households.  
The central goal of the current study was to find out what the consequences of this change 
are for the bargaining position of women in Ethiopian smallholder households. This is an 
important issue, as previous research (Adeto, 2000; Mahmud, Shah, & Becker, 2011) suggests 
that women`s share in household income determines their participation in household decision 
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making and their intra-household bargaining power. Moreover, Agarwal (1997), Quisumbing & 
Maluccio, (2000) and Njuki et al. (2011) indicated that income in the hands of women enhances 
the welfare of household members more than income in the hands of men. Hence, the income 
shift from women to men in market participant households can negatively affect the women`s 
intra-housheold bargaining power, as well as the other household member`s welfare. 
To study the difference in women’s bargaining power between spouses from milk-market 
participant and non-participant households, a resource sharing game was conducted. In this game, 
husbands and wives were asked to propose an amount of money to be transferred to their partner 
and to indicate their expectation regarding the amount their partner would transfer to them. They 
could only win the game if the amounts they proposed to give to their partner coincided with the 
amounts their partners expected to receive from them. It therefore is a coordination game that 
provides information on the division of income between husbands and wives as well as insight 
into the agreement between husbands and wives regarding this division.  
This game revealed substantial differences in the amounts proposed and expected 
between milk-market participant and non-participant households. Women`s expectations and the 
amounts actually proposed by their husbands were significantly higher in market participant 
compared to non-participant households Hence, whereas the income earned by selling milk to the 
market is controlled by the husband, the wives in the milk-market participating households were 
expecting and receiving a larger share of the experimental money than the wives in non-
participating households. The share of the money expected by the wives and proposed by the 
husbands in participant households was over 60% of the total amount that could be distributed. 
This indicates a stronger bargaining position of the wives in these households than in the non-
participant households, where this share was significantly less (about 50%).  
We also computed bargaining indices on the basis of the outcomes of the game and 
compared them between participant and non-participant households using propensity score 
matching. The results indicate that for women in participant households the average index is 0.18 
higher than for women in non-participant households, whereas for men it is 0.18 to 0.19 lower in 
participant compared to non-participant households. Hence, while we expected women in market 
participating households to have a weaker bargaining position – as the control of milk income 
has shifted from women to men – the outcomes of our experimental game point in the other 
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direction. These women in fact expect and receive significantly more money from their husband 
than women in non-participating households. How is this possible? 
There are (at least) two possible explanations for this. First, the loss of their personal milk 
income, and hence their financial independence, may have brought the women out of the 
traditional framework of separate female and male’s domains and into a situation where they 
have to bargain with their husband to get a fair share of the milk income. Although they do not 
receive the milk income themselves any more, these women are not without power. They still to 
a large extent control the milk production, which is the basis of the increased household income. 
As the interview with the livestock marketing agency officer indicates, they have subtle ways to 
influence the amount and quality of the milk that is produced and in this way may be able to 
‘convince’ their partner that it is wise to share the milk income. The intra-household conflicts 
related to milk income sharing might have also influenced the bargaining power of the women in 
market participant households. As Agarwal (1997) mentioned, the present bargaining power of 
an individual women with regard to any particular issue is related to her own successful 
bargaining and that of other women on the same issues in the past.     
Second, producing for the milk market involves important changes in the organization of 
the household, which might also involve other changes in responsibilities and dependencies than 
those directly related to milk production. Most smallholder households in the study area used to 
consume most of what they produced. However, with the introduction of the milk market, they 
start to produce a commodity of which they consume only a small amount; i.e they produce with 
marketing target and start to rely on cash to buy food. This new livelihood system requires new 
skills, like longer-term planning and income management, as our informant called it, a skill that 
becomes the responsibility of the women. Men may agree with women`s control over household 
cash income, because they believe that women manage the cash income better and use it more 
wisely and mainly for household maintenance purposes. But they may also agree in order to 
reduce intra-household conflict related to expenditure.  
Our findings contradict with Kebedea et al. (2014) study of Ethiopian couples that found 
actual and expected contributions rates of spouses to be systematically different, whereby 
husbands` expected their wives to contribute more than they actually contributed and wives 
expected their husbands to contribute less than they actually contributed. This difference might 
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be due to the fact that Kebeda et al.’s study was not a coordination game. In our experiment, 
husbands and wives were forced to think about the relative position of their partner, as they 
could only gain money by mentioning the same amounts as those partners. In Kebeda et al.’s 
game there was no such restriction on the amounts chosen, which means that their outcomes are 
probably much more influenced by situational factors, like social expectations. 
The indications found in our experimental study that women in market participant 
households might have a better intra-household bargaining position, suggest that the changing 
base of the livelihood system in the study area has unintended by-effects. The requirements of 
the new system may have increased the area for consultation and negotiation between husbands 
and wives as well as their interdependency. Findings also indicate that although the husband 
receives milk income, the wives‘ access to and control over this income in fact has increased. 
The husband may in name receive this income but this does not prevent his wife from having a 
strong say in the decisions about its expenditure. In general, the result of our study indicate that 
men are more willing to share income with their wives in milk market participant compared to 
non-participant households. Given that there is broad agreement in the bargaining literature (e.g 
Seth, 1997; Orsini & Spadaro 2005; Adato et al., 2000; Naved, 2000; Mahmud, Shah, & Becker, 
2011; Himmelweit et al., 2013) that women’s bargaining and decision making power is related to 
their share in household income, we feel confident to conclude that women in market participant 
households have better bargaining power compared to women in non-participant households.  
An important limitation of this study is that there is no full control of all confounding 
factors that could influence bargaining power of individual players. Although propensity score 
matching helps to use the available information as well as possible, it does not control for 
unmeasured factors that might offer alternative explanations for the relationships that were found. 
This implies that although important new information on the differences between milk market 
participation and nonparticipation households and on the willingness of spouses to transfer 
money to their partners is presented, no strict conclusions in terms of causal relations can be 
drawn.  
Another potential problem is that in our experiment intra-household bargaining power of 
husbands and wives is measured rather indirectly. Our conclusions are based on the assumption 
that the amounts proposed and expected in the experiment reflect the way income is distributed 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 65 
within the household. If this assumption does not hold, our conclusions might be wrong. 
However, we feel rather confident that it is correct. In the experiment the participants can gain 
(for them) a substantial amount of money if they come up with proposals/expectations that 
coincide with their partner’s proposals/expectations. However, after they have entered the 
experimental situation and obtained information about the game, they have no possibilities to 
communicate with their husband. This means that they have little other information to base their 
choice on than the way they usually distribute money within the household. If a husband does 
not share money in daily life, his wife will not expect him to be particularly generous in the 
experiment. Of course, we cannot completely exclude the possibility that the husbands are more 
generous in the experimental situation than in daily life, and that their wives are able to correctly 
guess this. However, even in that unlikely case the question remains why the husbands in the 
market participant households would be more generous in the game than those in the non-
participant households.  
Our confidence is further strengthened by the information obtained in the post-game 
interviews and by the fact that the average amounts the wives expected to receive were very 
similar to the proposals done by the husbands. The only discrepancy between expectations and 
proposals was for the males in the non-participating households, who received on average less 
money from their wives than they expected. However, even in these households, the average 
amounts expected by the wives were almost exactly the same as the average amounts proposed 
by their husbands. 
A final critical issue regarding our findings is whether the husbands in market participant 
households willingness to share more money with their wives would be the result of the fact that 
these husbands control more cash. We don’t think this to be the case. First, the amount to be won 
is quiet substantial in comparison to the husbands’ usual income, so we expect them to be 
motivated to play the experiment well. Second, winning the game is not based on how much 
money they want to give to their wives, but on whether they can predict how much their wives 
expect them to propose. Simply being generous and sending much money does not help to win, if 
they normally keep most money for themselves. As discussed above, the only clue the partners 
have about what to propose and expect is the way they share income in their daily situation. It 
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therefore seems likely that the amounts proposed/expected in the experiment paint a reasonable 
picture of that daily situation. 
For policy makers it is important to realize that while on the one hand gender insensitive 
development planning can end up in upsetting the existing gender relations, this on the other 
hand not always need to worsen the existing gender relations, as is often argued. Such plans may 
sometimes break the silence and open up new re-negotiation opportunities that improve women’s 
bargaining position and bring the gender relations on the right track. In this regard, we 
recommend reassessing the existing gender analytical tools to capture important social processes 
that can potentially affect the existing relationships. Gender relations are social relations; they 
change over time and take time to be realized. Our qualitative findings indicate that the shift of 
milk income from women to men in the Selale area and the related intra-household conflicts may 
have led to a transformation of the within households gender relations and may, according to our 
key informant, even to a certain extent influenced the legal practices in favor of women. Hence, 
understanding the processes involved and the perceptions of people of their own situation and of 
their relations with important others may provide a better guideline for developing scenarios than 
the information on what they earn and who receives the income. 
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Chapter 4: Smallholder Milk Market Participation, Dietary 
Diversity and Nutritional Status of young Children  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
*This chapter is based on Lenjiso, B., Smits, J., & Ruben, R. (2016). Smallholder milk market 
participation, dietary diversity and nutritional status among young children in Ethiopia. Journal 
of Gender, Agriculture and Food Security, 1(2), 129–147. 
 
*A reduced version of this chapter has been published as: Lenjiso, B., Smits, J., & Ruben, R. 
(2015). Transforming dairy production and marketing: An essential step in ensuring food and 
nutritional security among smallholder farmers in rural Ethiopia," published in IEEE Canada 
International: Humanitarian Technology Conference (IHTC2015), pp.1-7, 
DOI:10.1109/IHTC.2015.7238041 
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Abstract:   
 
We study the effects of smallholder milk market participation on household and intra-household 
dietary diversity and on nutritional status of young children in Ethiopia. Using the FAO dietary 
diversity questionnaire, we followed 164 households and recorded all food items consumed by 
five household members for two consecutive days. We use T-test and propensity score matching 
to analyze the data. Milk market participant households have significantly higher levels of milk 
production, household income, dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children. Despite 
significant differences in milk production between market participant and non-participant 
households, no significant differences were found with regard to animal source food 
consumption in general and milk consumption in particular. However, dietary diversity and 
nutritional status of children under five is better in participant households, thus indicating that 
smallholder market participation is positively associated with food security and nutritional 
status of farm households in rural Ethiopia.  
 
Key words: Child-anthropometry, dietary diversity, Ethiopia, milk-market, nutrition 
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4.1.  Introduction  
 
The food you eat can be either the safest and most powerful form of medicine or the 
slowest form of poison -- Ann Wigmore  
 
In its broadest sense, the concept of food security encompasses food availability, affordability, 
adequacy, safety and quality (Kirimi, Gitawi and Olunga, 2013). The most widely used 
definition of food security encompassing these dimensions has been forwarded at the World 
Food Summit in 1996. It was agreed that food security exists when all people, at all times, have 
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life (World Food Submmit & FAO, 1996). From 
this definition one can recognize that dietary diversity and the nutrient contents of the food are an 
important aspect of food security. In developing countries where the majority of the population 
lives in rural areas and derive their livelihood from agriculture, increasing agricultural 
productivity is seen as a critical step in ensuring sustainable food security (Headey, 2011, Kirimi, 
et al., 2013). Growing evidence indicates that the success of agricultural productivity depends on 
the expansion of market opportunities (Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade, 2004; Njuki, et al., 2011). 
Linking smallholder farmers to the market is therefore emphasized in many African countries.  
However, there is no consensus in the literature about the impact of smallholder 
commercialization on nutritional status and food security of household members. Some studies 
point to the existence of potential synergies. They argue that sustainable household food security 
and welfare requires a commercial transformation of subsistence agriculture, because this leads 
to higher productivity and increased household income and thus to improved welfare gains for 
the smallholder farmer (Pingali, 1997, World Bank, 2008). A rise in income accompanying 
commercial production does not, however, automatically lead to improved nutrition, at least not 
for all household members. A shift towards commercial agriculture may as well lead to a decline 
in nutritional status of household members (Dewey, 1981). It can lead to a diversion of resources 
from food to cash crop production and lower food availability from own production (Immink and 
Alarcon, 1993, Hoorweg et al., 2000). Commercial transformation may also have adverse 
consequences because it exposes households to volatile market prices in situations where the 
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rural markets are not well integrated (Jaleta et al., 2009). Hence, while commercial 
transformation may potentially affect the food security and nutritional status of farm households, 
no definitive evidence is available about the size and direction of the effects. 
In this chapter, we study the relationships between Ethiopian smallholder milk market 
participation, dietary diversity, and child nutritional status by performing a household survey and 
an observational study. We examine the pattern of milk consumption, household and intra-
household dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children in milk market participant 
and non-participant households.   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly present the 
background of the study. In section 3, we present a conceptual framework of the study. In section 
4, we discuss the data, methods, and analytical procedures. In section 5, we present the empirical 
findings and subsequently discuss in section 6. We conclude the study with some policy 
recommendations.  
 
4. 2.  Background  
 
The Ethiopian economy is based on subsistence agriculture, whereby 85% of the population 
produces its own food (CSA, 2008). In a recent development plan the country aims at 
transforming the agricultural sector from a subsistence to a market oriented production system. 
This transformation plan entails the participation of smallholders in both input and output 
markets. The policy targets dairy farmers in peri-urban areas. This is because Ethiopia, despite 
having the largest livestock population in Africa, has one of the lowest dairy production and 
consumption on the continent. The country has an average production of four billion liters of 
milk per annum and a consumption of 25.6kg/year per person (Ayenew, 2008). Food 
consumption in Ethiopia largely depends on cereals. In the central highland areas, Enjera-be wet, 
traditional bread with spiced sauce is the most common food item. The fasting season among the 
Orthodox Church followers restricts animal source food consumption for about five to seven 
months per year for adults. Hence, consumption is mostly based on cereals. However, cereal 
based diets are recognized as monotonous, lacking essential micronutrients and contributing to 
malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies, especially in children, who need energy and 
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nutrient-dense food to grow and develop both physically and mentally (Vakili et al., 2013; 
Arimond & Ruel, 2004 and (Bukania et al., 2014) 
Food consumption in Ethiopia is tidily associated with cultural taboos and religious 
practices (Seleshe et al,, 2014). Many tales and jokes in the country characterize eating as 
wasting resources and those who consume less are admired and considered as good boys and 
girls in the family. Preferential and sequential feeding is also common in rural households 
whereby the males eat first and the women eat the leftovers. Girls are advised to eat less to keep 
their body shape, and to tie their stomach with Mekenet, a strong traditional belt.  As a result of 
this culture and the pervasive food insecurity, Ethiopia has a high rate of stunting and great lack 
of dietary diversity (Hoddinott et al., 2014). Despite this fact, recently the government started to 
award farmers for saving more money in the bank or investing it in physical assets. This policy 
can divert attention from consumption and may worsen the already high level of food insecurity 
and micronutrient deficiencies in the country.  
According to Kennedy, et al., (2008) and Swindale & Bilinsky (2006) a more diversified 
diet is associated with improved birth weight, child anthropometric status, and hemoglobin level. 
Hence, improving dietary diversity and animal source foods intake can potentially contribute to 
alleviating micronutrient deficiencies in Ethiopia. This is also confirmed in empirical research 
that documented a positive relationship between dairy intensification and child nutritional status 
in the central highlands of Ethiopia (Ahmed et al., 2000, Tangka et al. 2002 and Ahmed et al., 
2003). A recent study by Hoddinott et al., (2014) also indicated that cow ownership raises 
children`s milk consumption, increase linear growth and reduces stunting. However, this positive 
impact might be the result of direct milk (product) consumption at the household level, which 
potentially might be affected by the level of households’ milk market integration. When the 
households are active in the milk market, milk consumption at the household level may happen 
only if the household can afford to forgo the cash income generated from its sale. Hence, in this 
paper we investigate whether and how smallholder milk market participation affects milk 
(product) consumption, dietary diversity and nutritional status of household members.   
4. 3. Conceptual Framework 
According to Njuki & Sanginga (2013 p 95-96) livestock plays an important role in 
contributing to food security through (i) enabling direct access to animal source foods (ASF) at 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 72 
household level (ii) providing cash income from sale of livestock and livestock products (dairy) 
that can in turn be used to purchase food (especially during time of food deficit) (iii) contributing 
to increased aggregate cereal supply as a result of improved productivity from use of manure and 
traction and (iv) lowering the price of livestock products and therefore increasing access to such 
products by the poor.  Ethiopia is making an effort to meet the increasing demand for livestock 
products by transforming the livestock and dairy sector from subsistence to market-oriented 
production system. This transformation can potentially affect food consumption, dietary diversity 
and nutritional status, at least via two pathways. First, it increases the availability of dairy 
products for consumption at household level. Second, the households can generate income from 
milk (products), which can be used to improve dietary quality at household and individual level.  
Figure 4.1 captures household market participation and its food consumption and 
nutrition effects. Dairy farm households make a critical decision in allocating their daily milk 
production between consuming at home, processing into butter/cheese or selling raw to generate 
cash income. When households directly consume their milk production, it will lead to better diet 
quality and nutritional status. When they process milk into butter and cheese, they can generate 
income by selling the products in the local market (controlled by women). Moreover, buttermilk 
will be consumed in the household contributing to dietary quality. When the household supplies 
the entire milk to the milk market, milk  (product) consumption might be negatively affected. 
However, the households can use the additional income to purchase diverse and quality food to 
boost their nutritional status. 
 By effecting these intra-household milk allocation decisions, between direct 
consumption, processing into butter/cheese or selling raw milk, milk market participation can 
affect animal source food consumption, dietary diversity and nutritional status at household and 
intra-household level. This study mainly aims to investigate this intra-household allocation 
decisions and its effect on food security in the Ethiopian context (Figure 4.1). 
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4.4. Materials and Methods  
4.4.1. Data and Measurement  
 
 
This study was conducted in Selale situated in Oromia national regional state of Ethiopia. Selale 
was selected for this study because of its potential for and tradition of dairy production and 
marketing. Most of the populations in Selale are followers of the Orthodox Church. This is 
relevant as the Orthodox Church followers have two fasting days every week and other 
additional major fasting seasons that makes up to five to seven months per years in which animal 
source food consumption is prohibited. The farming system and milk market coverage is similar 
across Selale. The Selale Dairy Cooperative Union (SDCU) is the only formal milk buyer in the 
Figure 4. 1. Dairy production, Marketing and Consumption: Conceptual Framework 
Milk Sold Raw 
Household Milk 
Income   
Purchased Food  Household Food  (Quality and Quantity) 
Intra-household Food allocation 
Household Milk Production  
Nutritional Status 
Milk processed at 
home 
Butter/Cheese Buttermilk Non-Food 
Investment 
Government 
incentives  
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area and is used as an entry point for this study.  Four primary dairy cooperatives were randomly 
selected from a list of 22 primary dairy cooperatives that are active members of SDCU. These 
dairy cooperatives were located in four different kebeles, which were taken as the sample kebeles 
for the study. By employing a stratified sampling technique, 300 farm households (150 members 
of dairy cooperatives and 150 non-members) were selected proportional to the size of the 
population in the kebeles.  
A structured questionnaire on the socioeconomic and demographic background of the 
dairy farm households and on household food consumption patterns was administered to the 
male head of the household or his spouse. After further stratifying the households into milk 
market participant and non-participant households based on the survey result, 168 farm 
households with five household members, four adult members and a young child under age of 
five were selected for the dietary diversity observational study.  
Dietary diversity is a qualitative measure of food consumption that reflects household 
access to a variety of foods as well as nutrient adequacy of the diet of individuals (Arimond & 
Ruel, 2004;). Dietary diversity is relevant for and contributes to food security (Hoddinott & 
Yohannes, 1999; Kennedy, 2009; Uraguchi, 2011). A dietary diversity observation checklist was 
prepared on the basis of FAO dietary diversity questionnaire (FAO, 2008). The checklist covers 
almost all food items used in the community. It includes questions on cereals, milk and milk 
products, meat, egg, potatoes and roots, vegetables, fruits, legumes, oil and fat, sweets, fish, and 
other food categories.  The food items were categorized into 12 food groups to create the 
household dietary diversity score (HDDS) (Table 1) and into nine food groups to compute an 
intra-household individual dietary diversity score (IDDS) (Table 2).  Any ingredient that was 
used in the meals independent of its quantity was recorded.  
The dietary diversity score used in this paper consists of a simple count of food groups 
from which the household/individual has consumed in the two-day study period. Based on 
(Kennedy et al., 2008), we assume this score at the household level to reflect the economic 
ability of the household to access a variety of food. At the individual level, it is assumed to 
reflect nutrient adequacy. Hoddinott & Yohannes (1999) and Kennedy et al., (2008) noted that 
dietary diversity could be used to assess changes in diet before and after an intervention with 
potential impact or after a disaster such as crop failure or drought. The mean dietary diversity 
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score can be used to compare sub-populations. Hence, we compared milk market participant and 
non-participant households in this regard. 
Table 4. 1. Household level food categories and examples 
S. N Food Groups Examples in the group 1=Yes, 0=No 
1 Cereals Any food made of cereals/grains (Injera, bread, 
rice, pasta, porage, pancake etc) 
 
2 Milk Products Milk, Buttermilk, cheese, butter, yogurt  
3 Meat Any meat   
4 Egg Egg  
5 Potatoes/Roots Potatoes and other root foods  
6 Vegetables Tomato, onion, cabbage  
7 Fruits Banana, Orange  
8 Legumes Beans, peas, lentils, nuts  
9 Oil and Fat Oil, fats, butter   
10 Sweets Sugar, honey  
11 Fish Fish foods  
12 Others Kolo, alcohol, coffee, tea, spices  
 
Table 4.  2. Individual level food categories and examples 
S. N Food Groups Examples in the group 1=Yes, 0=No 
1 Starchy stables Any food made of cereals/grains (Injera, 
bread, rice, pasta, porage, pancake etc) 
 
2 Milk Products Milk, Buttermilk, cheese, butter, yogurt  
3 Meat and Fish Flesh meat, fish and sea foods   
4 Organ meats Organ meats  
5 Eggs Eggs  
6 Vitamin A rich fruits & 
vegetables 
Vegetables, fruits  
7 Green leafy vegetables Cabbage  
8 Other fruits and vegetables   
9 Legumes Beans, peas, lentils, nuts  
 
We have also measured animal source food (ASF) consumption based on the sum of the 
score for animal origin foods. Animals source food score contains three food groups: meat foods, 
egg foods and milk and milk product foods and the score ranges between zero and three 
(Kennedy et al., 2008).  
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 Child anthropometry is considered as the best general proxy measure of human welfare 
of the poor, reflecting dietary inadequacies and other environmental health risks (UN-ACC/SCN, 
1992). It is also a strong and feasible predictor, at the individual and community level, and an 
appropriate indicator of the success or failure of interventions directed towards economic and 
environmental factors underlying nutrition deprivation. In this study the height, weight and age 
of children under five were measured and calculated the standard height-for-age, weight-for-age 
and weight-for-height z-scores by using WHO AnthroPlus for personal computer version 3.2.2, 
2011 Software (for children aged 0-59 months). Based on these indicators, the proportion of 
stunted, wasted and underweight children in milk market participant and non-participant 
households were determined. According to WHO (2010) stunting is below minus two standard 
deviations from median height-for-age of reference population. Child growth is an 
internationally recognized indicator of nutritional status and health in populations; hence the 
proportion of children with a low height-for-age (stunting) reflects the cumulative effects of 
under-nutrition and infections since and even before birth.  Similarly, the cut-off point for 
wasting is below minus two standard deviations from median weight-for-height of the reference 
population and is a symptom of acute under-nutrition, usually as a consequence of insufficient 
food intake or a high incidence of infectious diseases while underweight is below minus two 
standard deviations from median weight-for-age of reference population reflecting ‘wasting’, 
‘stunting’, or both (WHO, 2010). 
Twelve-extension worker comprising; eight agricultural and four health extension 
workers were trained to do the observation study. The checklist was pretested in 12 households. 
The extension workers stayed within the household and recorded food consumed by four-five 
household members for two consecutive non-fasting days. Completed observation checklists 
were returned from 164 households. For four households the checklists were incomplete. These 
households were discarded from the analysis to maintain consistency in the data. 
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4.4.2. Analyses  
 
4.4.2.1 T-Test Statistics 
 
We have used T-test to compare milk market participant and non-participant households on 
selected socio-economic and demographic backgrounds, anthropometric indices for children 
under five, daily milk production, and its intra-household allocation and dietary diversity 
score at household and intra-household level. 
4.4.2.2. Propensity Score Matching     
 
To determine the effect of smallholder milk market participation on household milk consumption 
and dietary diversity and on the animal source food score, we have to compare observed 
outcomes for these variables with the outcomes that would have been obtained for those same 
households in the same time-period if they did not participate in the milk market. The 
fundamental challenge here is that we do not have the counterfactual, the outcome of participant 
households if they would not have entered the milk market. The key to this challenge is to 
construct these counterfactual outcomes using information from non-participant households. 
However, a simple comparison of the average outcomes for the two households would 
misrepresent the effect, conflating differences caused by household market participation with 
differences that already existed (selection bias). Constructing a valid counterfactual is thus 
critical. This requires controlling for the effects of confounding factors that make participants 
systematically different from non-participants. By using effect estimates adjusted for these 
confounders the likelihood of selection bias will be reduced. 
For this adjustment, we rely on propensity score matching (PSM). PSM uses information 
from a pool of units that do not participate in the intervention, to identify what would have 
happened to the participating units in the absence of the intervention (Austin, 2011; Heinrich, 
Maffioli, & Vázquez, 2010; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). It has two major assumptions; the 
conditional independence assumption and the common support assumption (Rosenbaum, & 
Rubin,1983). ‘Conditional independence’ means that there is a set of X covariates and that 
controlling for these covariates makes the potential outcomes independent of the treatment status. 
‘Common support’ implies that for each value of X, there is a positive probability of being both 
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treated and untreated (to be on common support). Three main variables are required to do the 
matching. These are (1) a dummy variable that groups households into participants and non-
participant, (2) predicted probability scores, indicating the probability that a unit in the combined 
sample of treated and untreated units receives the treatment given their observed characteristics 
and (3) the outcome variable(s) on which the average treatment effect on the treated will be 
evaluated. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is given as follows (Austin, 2011; 
Heinrich et al., 2010; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  
  
                  
Where Y0 = the outcome in control group and Y1 = the outcome in treatment group 
To assess the effect of smallholder milk market participation on dietary diversity and nutritional 
status of young children, we matched the households based on their baseline characteristics 
which includes household distance from milk collection center (MCC), household size, 
household total number of cow, lactating cows and crossbreed cows, household land size, age of 
parents, education of parents, membership in dairy cooperatives and dairy experience. Household 
distance from milk collection center (MCC) is significantly and negatively related to household 
milk market participation. On the other hand, household size, age of head of the household head, 
education level of the household head, household crossbreed cow size and household diary 
experience are significantly and positively related to household milk market participation. The 
result of the logit regression is presented in table 4.3.  
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Table 4. 3. Probability of milk market participation 
Variables  Coff Stt.Er T-Stata 
Household distance from MCC  -.431 .1288 -3.35*** 
Household size .589 .236 2.12** 
Household female size -.187 .298 -0.63 
Household child under Five .1020 .959 0.11 
Husband age .048 .026 1.98** 
Wife age -.025 .0219 -1.17 
Household land size -.306 .160 -1.91 
Household Head education .544 .353 2.23** 
Household total cow size -.133 .196 -0.68 
Household lactating cow size .372 .299 1.24 
Household crossbred cow size 0.67 .134 2.34** 
Household dairy experiences .722 .033 1.99** 
Membership in dairy cooperatives  -.125 .482 -0.26 
_cons 1.292 2.21 -0.59 
Number of obs = 111,  LR chi2(12)  = 31.11, Prob > chi2 =  0.0019, Log likelihood = -
61.270373, Pseudo R2 = 0.2025, Region of common support [.16133051, .94757662] 
 
The result shows that there are households from the participant as well as the non-participant 
group on the common support region. The distribution of the estimated propensity scores is 
presented in Figure 4. 2. 
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Figure 4. 2. Distribution of the propensity scores 
 
To estimate ATT, the mean difference in outcomes for market participant and non-
participant households after matching, two matching algorism; nearest neighbor (NN) matching 
and kernel matching was used.  We have imposed the common support condition to minimize 
drawback and to improve the robustness of the results. The standard errors have been computed 
using 100 bootstrap replications. According to De Hoop (2012), using both nearest neighbor 
matching with replacement and kernel matching provides a natural robustness check to guard 
against the disadvantages of the two matching algorism.  
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4. 5. Empirical Results  
4.5.1. Background of the study participants  
 
Table 4. 4. Socioeconomic comparison in market participant and non-participant households   
Covariates Market Participant Non-Participant T-Stat 
Mean Std Error Mean Std Error  
Household distance from MCC 3,1 0,208 5,2 0,297 -5,2*** 
Household size 7,7 0,219 6,7 0.230 2,99*** 
Household land  4,7 0,260 3,9 0,195 2,22** 
Household total cow  4,7 0,187 4,1 0,140 2,50*** 
Household lactating cow  2,8 0,127 2,2 0,079 3,85*** 
Household crossbreed cow  2,1 0,189 1,2 0,138 3,58*** 
Household dairy experience 20,6 0,91 17,1 0,71 3,02*** 
Number of children <5  0,81 0,062 0,64 0,054 2,08** 
Age of child <5 (in months) 25,1 1,28 36,2 1,73 -5,05*** 
Weight of child <5 (in kg)  12,1 0,477 12,3 0,361 0,211 
Height of child <5 (in cm) 83,1 1,45 87,5 1,53 2,11** 
Height4Age Zscore -1,18 0,238 -1,94 0,240 2,22** 
Weight4Age Zscore  0,17 0,220 -1,15 0,154 3,68*** 
BMI4Age Zscore 0,80 0,351 0,15 0,273 1,47 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, Number of obs = 164 (84 market participant and 80 non-participant) 
 
About 51 percent of the households are milk market participants. They sell milk to 
cooperatives, middlemen, processing companies, hotels and cafeterias. The remaining 49% are 
non-participants. They do not sell raw milk, although they can process and sell butter and cheese 
in the local market. Market participants are located significantly closer to milk collection centers 
and have higher mean for household, land, total cow, lactating cows and crossbred cow size 
compared to non-participant households (Table 4.4). Milk market participants also have longer 
dairy experience compared to non-participant households. The number of children under five is 
also significantly higher in market participant compared to non-participant households. Children 
in market participant households are on average one year younger than children in non-
participant households. They are also significantly shorter, but there are no significant weight 
differences between both groups of children. Children in non-participant households are 
significantly more stunted and underweight compared to children from participant households. 
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4.5.2. Food Consumption Patterns in Market Participant and Non-Participant 
households 
 
Table 4. 5. Comparison of daily milk production and intra-household allocation 
 
 
Market Participant Non-Participant T-Test 
Mean Std Error Mean Std Error t-Value 
Total household  milk Production 
(per day) 
12,2 1,39 5,97 ,3034 4.34*** 
Milk sold raw 9.42 0,946 -- -- 9.22 
Own consumption 1,15 ,14017 1,05 ,1137 0.577 
Per capita Own consumption 0.15 ,182 0.176 ,210 0,864 
Milk processed into Butter per day 1,71 ,1874 4,925 ,274 11.44*** 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, Number of obs = 164 (84 market participant and 80 non-participant) 
 
Table 4. 5 summarize household total daily milk production and its allocation across 
home consumption, processing and sales in milk market participant and non-participant 
households. Market participant households produce significantly more milk per day than non-
participant households.  The mean for milk production per day in market participant household is 
12.3 liters while it is 6 liters in non-participant households. The milk that is produced can 
basically be used for three purposes; it can either be sold raw at the market, processed into butter 
and cheese at the household level, or be consumed at the household level. Milk market 
participant households sell 9.4 liters (76.6 percent) of their daily milk production and consume 
1.2 liters (9.4 percent) of their daily milk production. Non-participant households do not sell raw 
milk and they consume on average 1.1 liters (17.6percent) of their daily milk production. 
Participants process 1.7 liters (14 percent) of their daily milk production into butter and cheese, 
while non-participants process 4.9 liter (82.4%) of their daily milk production into butter and 
cheese.  
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Table 4.6. Dietary diversity and animal source food consumption comparison 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, Number of obs = 164 (84 market participant and 80 non-participant) 
Table 4.6 shows that market participant households have a mean dietary diversity score 
of 5.3 while non-participants have a score of 4.3. The dietary diversity score at the individual 
level is higher for the wives, boys and children under five in the participant households. For the 
husbands, this score does not differ between the groups. For husbands it is in both groups higher 
than for the wives. Compared to non-participant households, in participant households the animal 
source food score is higher for boys but lower for girls. A general observation is that males 
consume more animal source food than females.  
 
 
 
 
 
Score Market Participant Non-Participant T-Stat 
Mean Std 
Error 
Mean Std 
Error 
 
Household dietary diversity 5,37 ,153 4,08 ,111 6,90*** 
Household animal source food  ,818 ,194 ,845 ,042 0,105 
Husband`s dietary diversity 4,62 ,046 4,69 ,228 0,069 
Husband`s animal source food  1,01 ,088 1,14 ,098 0.95 
Wife`s dietary diversity 4,20 ,218 3,25 ,196 3,23*** 
Wife`s animal source food  ,523 ,0708 ,575 ,810 0,477 
Adult Boy`s dietary diversity 5,13 ,213 3,55 ,235 4,97*** 
Adult Boy`s animal source food  1,19 ,084 ,801 ,091 3,15*** 
Adult Girl`s dietary diversity 3,71 ,211 2,78 ,212 3,08*** 
Adult Girl`s animal source food  ,55 ,088 ,790 ,809 1,99** 
Child dietary diversity 4,66 ,273 3,96 ,196 2,09** 
Child Animal Source food  1,13 ,094 1,08 ,101 0,315 
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4.5.3. Effect of Milk Market Participation on Milk Consumption and Dietary 
Diversity 
 
Table 4.7. Effect of market participation on milk consumption at household level 
Variable NN Matching Kernel Matching 
Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat 
Total household milk Production 
(in liter per day) 
3,9 1,83 2,15** 4,4 1,58 2,80*** 
Milk sold raw (in liter) 8,94 0,96 9,26*** 8,94 0,95 9,39*** 
Own comsuption  (in liter) -0,33 0,29 -1,16 -0,21 0,20 -1,06 
Per capita own consumption -0,05 0,04 -1,35 -0,045 0,03 -1,35 
Milk processed (in liter) per day -5,69 0,94 -6,04*** -5,32 0,74 7,23*** 
Total Number of Obs =164, Number of common support= 123, *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05 
 
Table 4.7 presents the outcomes of the PSM analysis of the effect of household milk 
market participation on the daily milk production, consumption and marketing. Market 
participant households produce, on average, 4 liter more milk per day compared to non-
participant households. These households sell 9 liter more milk per day to the milk market 
(cooperatives, private middlemen, processors, hotels and cafeterias). On the other hand 
participant household’s process 5 liters less milk into butter and cheese at the household level 
compared to non-participants. In spite of the significant production difference between the two 
household types, there is no significant difference in the amount of milk that is consumed daily 
at the household level. 
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Table 4. 8. Effect of market participation on household and Intra-household dietary diversity 
Variable NN Matching Kernel Matching 
Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat Mean 
Difference 
S.E. T-stat 
i) Household level 
Household Dietary Diversity 4,40 1,75 2,52*** 3,70 1,25 2,97*** 
Household Animal Source food  0,46 0,38 1,21 0,24 0,32 0,39 
ii) Intra-housheold level (members) 
Husband Dietary Diversity 0,42 0,61 0,68 0,021 0,44 0,45 
Husband Animal Source food 0,08 0,18 0,46 -0,08 0,18 -0.47 
Wife Dietary Diversity 1,05 0,61 1.90* 1,13 0.48 2,34*** 
Wife Animal Source food 0,01 0,20 0.06 0.07 0,17 0.43 
Boy Dietary Diversity 2,01 0,68 2,97*** 1,40 0,43 3,22*** 
Boy Animal Source food 0,51 0,20 2,54*** 0,31 0,15 2,09** 
Girl Dietary Diversity 1,23 0,49 2,48** 0,98 0,50 1,97** 
Girl Animal Source food -0,14 0,19 -0,76 -0,18 0,18 -0,99 
Child Dietary Diversity 1,48 0,64 2,30** 2,15 0,44 4,87*** 
Child Animal Source food 0,65 0,51 1,77 0,29 0,46 0,62 
Total Number of Obs =164, Number of common support= 123, *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05 
Table 4. 8 presents the effect of market participation on dietary diversity. Market participant 
households have a better average dietary diversity score compared to non-participant households 
(about four points more). There is no significant difference between the household types in 
animal source food consumption. At the individual level, wives, boys, girls and children under 
five have significantly higher dietary diversity in market participant compared to non-participant 
households. Boy’s animal source food consumption is also significantly higher in market 
participant households. From this we can argue that household status in milk market has a 
positive effect on women`s dietary diversity compared to men`s dietary diversity because we 
observed that the average for women`s dietary diversity score is significantly higher in market 
participant households compared to non-participant households. However, the average 
magnitude for men`s dietary diversity score is already higher in non-participant households. 
Similarly, boy`s animal source food consumption is the only animal source food consumption 
score that has shown significant difference between members of market participant and non-
participant households.  
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4.5.4 Effect of Milk Market Participation on Child Nutritional Status  
 
Table 9 below shows the results of the PSM procedure for the effect of household milk market 
participation on the nutritional status of young children.  
Table 4. 9. Effect of milk market on Child nutritional status 
Outcome variable NN Matching Kernel Matching 
 Mean 
Difference S.E. T-stat 
Mean 
Difference S.E. T-stat 
Wasting -0,113 0,095 -1,196 -0,098 0,078 -1,401 
Stunting -0,347 0,125 -4,389 -0,531 0,131 -4,095 
Underweight -0,198 0,127 -1,633 -0,210 0,113 -1,961 
Total Number of Obs =164, Number of common support= 123, *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05 
 
 The average effect of household milk market participation on the proportion of children 
wasted, stunted and underweight is presented in the Table 9. The result shows that there is a 
significant difference between milk market participant and non-participant households in terms 
of the proportion of wasted, stunted and underweight children. Children from non-participant 
households have 11.3 percent more likelihood to be wasted compared to children from milk 
market participant households. However, this result is not statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. Similarly, we found a 34.7 percent difference in the probabilities of children being stunted 
in milk market participant and non-participant households, i.e. children from non-participant 
households have 35 percent more likelihood to be stunted compared to children from market 
participant households and this result is significant at 1 per cent level. There is also a difference 
in the proportion of underweight children in milk market participant and non-participant 
households. Children in non-participant households are 19.8 percent more likely to be 
underweight compared children from market participant households. This result is also 
statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
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4.6. Discussion and Policy Implication  
 
4.6.1. Discussion 
 
 
In this chapter, we examined the relationship between household milk market participation and 
food security as indicated by dietary quality and the nutritional status of young children. The 
analyses reveal a direct relationship between household milk market participation, household and 
intra-household dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children. Milk market 
participant households have better dietary diversity scores than non-participant households. 
Children in market participant households have better dietary diversity and nutritional status 
compared to children from non-participant households. These findings indicate that smallholder 
milk market participation has the potential to improve household and intra-household food 
security and nutritional status of young children in rural Ethiopia. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies in Ethiopia (Tankga et al., 2002, Ahmed et al., 2000 and Hoddinott et al., 2014), 
which suggested that cow ownership and increased dairy production can lead to improved child 
nutrient intake.     
The data shows that milk market participant households produce significantly more milk 
per day compared to non-participant households. This is consistent with previous studies that 
dairy market participation can increase milk production and income (Shapiro, et al., 2000). It 
was also observed that the intra-household allocation of milk differed substantially between 
market participant and non-participant households. More milk goes to milk market (cooperatives, 
middlemen and process companies) in market participant households, while more milk is 
processed into butter and cheese at the household level in non-participant households. Despite 
the significant production difference between the two household types, own consumption does 
not significantly differ between in market participant and non-participant households.  
The result of propensity score-matching analysis confirms that market participant 
households produce more milk, and sell more milk raw compared to non-participant households. 
Hence, there is no significant difference in own milk consumption between the two household 
types. However, these households have a better dietary diversity, both at household and intra-
household (individual) level. Participant households have about one third higher average dietary 
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diversity score compared to non-participants. This is the result of the income effect of 
smallholder milk market participation and hence, the conclusion that the commercial 
transformation of the dairy production system has the potential to improve household dietary 
diversity and food security. The fact that there is no significant difference in animal source food 
consumption between market participant and non-participants households could be explained by 
the consumption culture and the fasting tradition in the study area. 
 Intra-household dietary diversity also varies significantly between the member of market 
participant and non-participant households. In participant households, dietary diversity is higher 
for the wives, boys, girls and children under five. Women have better dietary diversity scores in 
participant compared to non-participant households and also compared to men. Dietary diversity 
of men is high in both types of households and does not significantly differ between the 
households. This is probably due to the preferential and sequential feeding culture whereby the 
man eats first with all possible diversity, and the other household members eat the leftovers. 
Animal source food consumption of boys is higher in participant compared to non-participant 
households. The increase for boys is in line with the culture of rearing male children as the 
security for the future of the household and as old age insurance.  
The result of the PSM procedure for child nutritional status shows that children in market 
participant households have less likelihood to be wasted, stunted and underweight compared to 
children from non-participant households. The difference in the proportion of children stunted 
(35 percent) and underweight (20 percent) is significantly higher in non-participant households 
compared to market participant households. This significant difference in under nutrition of 
children from market participant and non-participant households could be related to the better 
dietary diversity in market participant households as the result of their higher household income. 
The general conclusion is that milk market participation is associated with higher milk 
production and household income. There was no significant difference in animal source food 
consumption in general and milk consumption in particular between the two household types. 
Therefore, the significant difference in dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children 
is the result of increased income at household level. Consistent with previous research (FANTA, 
2006) which shows a positive relationship between dietary diversity and adequate micronutrient 
density of complementary foods for young children, the result of this study shows that children 
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in milk market participating households, where dietary diversity score is better both at household 
and individual level, have a better nutritional status as indicated by child anthropometric indices.  
 This study has several limitations. First, the behavior of the household members may 
have been influenced by the presence of the observers. Second, these observations were made on 
non-fasting days to reduce the difference between households based on religion. However, as 
many households in Selale are followers of the Orthodox Church that has a five-to-seven-month 
fasting period, the observations might provide only a partial perspective on the year-round 
dietary diversity and child nutritional status. Moreover, the fact that two consecutive days have 
been used rather than two random visits during a week may introduce some biases. Third, the 
study is based on observations within the household; therefore, our dietary diversity score might 
underestimate the true value since food consumed outside the household is not included. We 
recommend that future studies should take these potential limitations into consideration. 
4.6.2 Policy Implications 
 
 
This study indicates that milk market participant households have better dietary diversity 
compared to non-participant households. Individual members of market participant households, 
including children under five, also have better dietary diversity compared to those in non-
participant households 
Therefore, we conclude that transforming the dairy sector from subsistence to a market 
oriented production system and integrating dairy farmers into the milk market has the potential to 
improve food security in rural Ethiopia. Although we observed that the increased milk 
production in market participant households did not translate into more milk consumption at the 
household level, as has been argued in previous research (Steglich, 1998; Tangka et al., 2002), it 
seems that households use the additional income generated from selling milk at the market to 
boost their dietary quality and improve the nutritional status of their family members, especially 
children. This finding can encourage Ethiopian policy makers to further stimulate smallholder 
market integration and the transformation of their production. Given the high number of 
malnourished children in Ethiopia and the potential contribution of animal source food 
consumption in solving this problem, the study also calls for encouraging milk consumption at 
the household level as an important strategy for addressing micronutrient deficiencies in the 
country.  
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Chapter 5: Gender, Milk Market Participation and Parental 
Investment in Child Education   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
* This chapter is based on Lenjiso, B., Smits, J., & Ruben, R. (2016). Smallholder Milk Market 
participation and Parental Investment on Child education in Ethiopia. Submitted to Journal of 
Marriage and Family (forthcoming)  
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Abstract 
 
We examine the links between smallholder milk market participation, gender and the willingness 
of Ethiopian parents to invest in their children’s education under three experimental conditions: 
decisions made privately, decisions made with information exchange and decisions made with 
communication between the partners. Willingness to invest in children’s education was higher 
among mothers compared to fathers and in the conditions with knowledge about the partner’s 
experimental situation compared to the private condition. Investments were also higher among 
older parents and among parents with more children. If one of the partners invested more in the 
children’s education, the other partner also had a higher propensity to do so. The effect of 
smallholder milk market participation was strongly positive in the bivariate analysis but became 
substantially weaker and only marginally significant (P<0.1) in the multivariate analysis. We 
conclude that money in the hands of women and information exchange about income and 
investment opportunities has the potential to improve investment on child education in Ethiopia 
 
Key Words: Ethiopia, parental investment, gender, market, spouse information and 
communication, experiment 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
 
Fathers are biological necessities, but social accidents -- Margaret Mead 
 
The dynamic give-and-take relationship between parents and offspring has been explained in 
parental investment theory (see Trivers, 1972,Webster, 2009). According to this theory, parents 
have to choose between investing in themselves and investing in their offspring. Although both 
parents have a shared interest in the survival of their offspring, males in most species invest less 
in their offspring than females (Bjorklund & Shackelford, 1999, Webster, 2009, Shenk, 
2011).Parental investment theory has important implications for the study of human parenting; 
the processes responsible for the physical, social, emotional and intellectual development of 
children (Triver, 1972). Parenting plays a critical role in human capital investment, which 
depends on decisions made by parents, who may not always agree with each other (Ashraf, 
2009). Given the potential differences in parent’s preferences and the scarcity of resources, 
understanding the patterns of parental investment remains pertinent for understanding the status 
of child welfare in low-income countries.   
 Women`s empowerment and earnings are considered important, because of their positive 
spillover effects on child welfare. There are clear indications that income in the hands of women 
is more likely to be invested in children`s educational, nutritional and health welfare than income 
in the hands of men (see Agarwal, 1997; Ashraf, 2009; Fischer-Mackey & Sahan, 2011; Goyal, 
2007; Kabeer, 1999; Naved, 2000; Njuki, Kaaria, Chamunorwa, & Chiuri, 2011; Quisumbing & 
Maluccio, 1999; Seebens, 2010). There are two explanations for this asymmetric parental 
investment in children. The first explanation asserts that women invest more in child welfare 
because they are more altruistic compared to men. In line with this Ong, Ho & Ho (2012) 
document the existence of mutual altruism between mothers and children, but not between 
fathers and children. Vyrastekova et, al. (2014) argue that paternity uncertainty makes the 
expected return of childcare smaller for fathers compared to mothers. Hence, mothers invest 
more in children, because they are more certain about their parenthood compared to fathers. The 
second explanation holds that women invest more in child welfare because they have been given 
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the responsibility to do so by the existing societal norms.  In line with this Haddad (1999) argues 
that women`s tendency to care and provide for their children is the result of their closer 
emotional ties due to giving birth and raising and caring for children. Guyer (1988) argues that 
women and men have different spending preferences, not only because they hold different values, 
but also because they are in structurally different situations. According to Ashraf (2009) spousal 
information about other  parent`s received income and communication between them have effect 
on their financial choices. 
 Other studies question the empirical content, reliability and generality of the above 
conclusions and suggest that women’s control over income and decision-making at the 
household level can also have negative effects on their children’s nutrition, education and health 
(Dito, 2011; Rathnayake & Weerahewa, 2011). Research on Nicaragua indicates that children’s 
school enrolment declines in a household where women are more powerful than their husbands 
(Gitter & Barham, 2008). Aromolaran (2004) found a negative effect of women`s income share 
on calorie intake in Nigeria. Dito (2011) noted for Ethiopia that increases in women’s power 
relative to their husband’s power increases the hours children spend on domestic work.  
The contradictory findings of the studies discussed so far might imply that parental 
investment in children depends on the situation. There are, for instance indications that the age 
and education level of the parents can affect their investments (Davis-Kean, 2005; Hagen, 1999). 
Also child factors, such as sex of the child, number of children in the household and birth order 
can potentially be important (Woldehanna, Jones, & Tefera, 2008). In environments where 
fathers are absent, or where there is marital discord, the resulting stress may lead to harsh and 
inconsistent child care and insecure attachment (Bjorklund & Shackelford, 1999). Economic 
factors like household income and wealth are also important determinants of parental investment 
in children (Corwyn & Bradley, 1999; Dendir, 2014).   
This chapter focuses on the effects of smallholder market participation on the investment 
of parents in children`s education in Ethiopia. The growth and transformation plan of the country 
(MoFED, 2010) stresses the need to transform the agrarian structure from a subsistence to a 
market oriented production system. This is believed to increase household income and, in the 
long run, to improve families’ investment in human capital, health, and nutrition. In the context 
of dairy, this transformation has indeed increased household milk income substantially 
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(Chagwiza, 2014; Lenjiso, 2013). However, it has also shifted control over the milk income from 
women to men (Lenjiso, 2013; Tangka et al, 1999). To the extent that men`s and women`s 
investment decisions are driven by the underlying household control structure, this shift of 
income control from women to men may also affect the investments made by parents on behalf 
of their children.  
However, there is no study so far that explores whether and in which ways the 
transformations experienced by Ethiopian dairy farm households have influenced these decisions. 
We believe that understanding this is an important policy issue in the Ethiopian context, where 
scarcity of resources still very much hampers child development. This will help policy makers to 
choose the best channels for injecting resources aimed at increasing child welfare into the 
household. 
 In this chapter, we study the patterns of parental investment in children’s education and 
the factors that affect this investment by using incentivized parental choice experiments in rural 
Ethiopia. We designed an experimental situation in which mothers and fathers from market 
participant and non-participant households had to choose between the allocation of resources for 
their own personal needs or for their children`s educational expenses by varying information 
about other parent`s income and communication between them. The outcomes of this experiment 
shows that mothers are more willing to invest in children than fathers. Moreover, parents from 
milk market participant households invest more in children than parents from non-participant 
households.  Information about other parent`s income is positively correlated with parental 
willingness to invest in children`s education.   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
and experimental design. Section 3 is devoted to data collection, sampling and analytical 
procedures. Section 4 presents the empirical results and in section 5 we draw conclusions.  
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5. 2. Theoretical and Experimental Design 
5. 2.1. Determinants of Parental Investment  
 
Parental investment includes any investment by the parent in an individual offspring that 
increases the offspring’s chances of survival, at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in other 
offspring or in themselves (Travier, 1972). Since investing in themselves is as important as 
investing in their children, parents have to choose between caring for a child or insuring their 
own productive and reproductive successes (Turner & McAndrew, 2006). This choice can be 
influenced by socio-demographic characteristics of the individual as well as by social, cultural, 
economic and psychological factors at household and context level. The following variables are 
among the most frequently cited determinants of parental investment in children. 
i) Gender. The gender of the parent is considered one of the most important determinants 
of parent`s willingness to invest in their children. This factor is mentioned across disciplines, 
from biology to social anthropology, with rather similar conclusions but with different 
explanations. There is consensus that the gender identity of the parent who receives the income 
largely determines how the resources are invested in child welfare. There is evidence (Agarwal, 
1997; Kabeer, 1999) that income injected into the household through the mother improves the 
welfare of children more than resources injected through the father. Similarly, an exogenous 
increase in mothers` income may have a larger effect on children`s outcomes than the same 
increase in father’s income (Njuki, et al, 2011; Ong et al., 2012). In this study we will test the 
hypothesis that mothers invest more in children compared to fathers in the Ethiopian context. 
ii) Age. Age of the parents is another important determinant of parental investment in 
children.  Hagen (1999) argues regarding his defection hypothesis that mother’s age is a critical 
determinant of her investment on her children. Younger mothers who have plenty of future 
reproductive opportunities can afford to be choosier when it comes to deciding which child will 
be worth investing in compared to older ones who have few alternatives. Hagen considers young 
age of the mother as one of the best predictors of child abuse and infanticide and considers this 
risk to be even greater when these young mothers are unmarried, poor, and lacking social support.  
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 96 
iii) Education. According to Davis-Kean (2005) parental education is an important 
socioeconomic factor that needs to be taken into consideration in policy development and 
research regarding school age children. A higher parental education can positively influence 
child welfare by increasing parental awareness. However, as indicated by time investment 
studies, education also may increase parental involvement in the labour market, which may 
negatively affect childcare time.  
 iv) Child-level factors. The number, sex and birth order of children may also affect 
parental investment in children (Salmon, Shackelford, & Michalski, 2012; Woldehanna et al., 
2008). According to Woldehanna et al, (2008) having more siblings and being a later-born child 
raise the chances of school enrollment in Ethiopia. This is because first and last born children 
have better access to their parents and to parental resources compared to children born 
somewhere in the middle.  
v) Economic factors. Household income is among the most frequently mentioned 
determinants of child welfare (Corwyn & Bradley, 1999; Dendir, 2014). In low-income countries 
the welfare of children is directly influenced by the income and welfare of their parents. When 
income increases at the household level, intuitively that improves the welfare of all household 
members, especially children. Given that household milk market participation in rural Ethiopia 
has increased household income (Lenjiso, 2013; Chagwiza, 2014), we hypothesize that parents 
from milk market participant households invest more on child education compared to parents 
from non-participant households. 
vi) Psychological factors. Besides the demographic, social and economic factors 
mentioned above, more subtle factors may play a role as well. Evolutionary psychologists argue 
that parental investment decisions are largely unconscious and that the proximate forces guiding 
responses are emotional states such as feeling of love (e.g. Hertwig, Davis, & Sulloway, 2002; 
Turner & McAndrew, 2006). According to these scholars, it is familial altruism that engages the 
member of a family into voluntary and unconditional transfer of resources within the family. In 
our experiment, we test whether parents do unconditional transfer of resources by varying their 
knowledge about other parent income and outcomes in experiment.  
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5. 2.2. The Role of Information and Communication in Parental decisions 
 
Household outcomes depend on decisions made by spouses who may disagree (Ashraf, 2009). 
Although these potentials for disagreement and the contexts in which household decisions take 
place are important factors in influencing the welfare of the household members, they are 
generally overlooked because household models treat the household either as individual decision 
maker (ignoring intra-household dynamics) or as a place for bargaining whereby members have 
full information and able to communicate with each other. However, in contexts where male and 
female have different spheres of decision-makings, information can be private and 
communication between spouses can be limited. For example, there is gender specific decision-
making trend in Ethiopia that females make domestic decisions and males make public decisions. 
This trend could influence information sharing and communication between spouses. In line with 
this, recent experimental studies showed that information and communication between spouses 
can influence parental financial allocation decisions (Ashraf, 2009; Vyrastekova, et al, 2014). 
 Vyrastekova et al. (2014) found mothers to be more altruistic than fathers when the 
parents had to choose between an outcome that benefitted themselves and an outcome that 
benefitted their children. However when the choice situation was changed into a coordination 
game in which the parents knew that their partner was taking the same decision, the mothers 
were found to choose significantly less altruistic and the difference with the fathers disappeared. 
This result indicates that altruism of parents and especially mothers towards their children might 
depend on whether or not responsibility for the outcome is shared with the partner. Similarly, in 
three experimental setting with different limitation on information and communication between 
spouses, Ashraf (2009) found out that men put money into their personal accounts when choices 
are private, commit money to consumption for their own benefit when choices are observable to 
their spouse and put money into their wives` account when required to communicate.  
 In this study, we aimed to find out whether parental investments are the result of inherent 
altruism and unconditional emotional attachment with the children or whether it can be 
influenced by the situation of other parent`s income, communication between parents and other 
socioeconomic factors.  To gain insight into this dynamics, we make a distinction in our 
experiment between a private condition in which the parents make the decision alone and a 
public/information condition in which the parents know that their partner is making the same 
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decision. If parental investment in children is solely influenced by unconditional altruism and 
emotional attachment, the parents would invest their income completely on their children in 
private condition and that there would be no significant difference in parental investment among 
the experimental groups with varying information about other parents income and experimental 
payoffs. We assume the difference between the private and the public group can tell us about the 
effect of obscuring information about the spouse’s income and choices on parental investment in 
child educational welfare. 
 Besides a private and a public condition, our experiment includes a third condition that 
could be called the communication or negotiation condition. This condition is supposed to 
represent a cooperative household model, whereby both parents have full information and have 
the possibility to take decisions regarding household issues together. With this group we aimed 
to gain understanding into how bargaining between parents affects the allocation of money for 
children’s education and whether this differs between market participant and non-participant 
households. In general, we aim to study how spouses adjust strategically when information about 
their income, experimental options and subsequent outcomes are private, public and when 
communication with their spouse is possible. Figure 1: provides the conceptual link between 
contextual and parental factors, treatment in the experimental settings and parental investment. 
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Figure 5. 1. Conceptual links between contextual and parental factors, treatment in the 
experimental settings and parental investment in children 
 
5. 2.3.  Experimental Design  
 
To study the links between household milk market participation, gender of the parent who 
controls the income, the degree of information and communication between spouses and parental 
willingness to invest in children’s education, we adapted a parent choice experiment from Ashraf  
(2009). The game played in this experiment is a modified version of a dictator game. The 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 100 
participants have to decide how much, if any, of an endowment they give to another party, 
typically in a one-shot anonymous setting (Bardsley, 2008; Vyrastekova et al, 2014). We invited 
parents (mothers and fathers) to make a decision on how much, if any, of their experimental 
money (50ETB approximately equal to the daily wage of a farmer and the one term educational 
expense of a child) they are willing to invest in their children’s education. The money invested in 
children`s education is tripled and parents received voucher of the tripled amount to get 
educational material of their choice at the end of the experiment. There is no option of changing 
the voucher into cash. Participants receive the money they kept for themselves in cash.   
 Upon arrival, participants were along with their spouses randomly assigned to one of 
three settings. These settings had different limitations placed on the privacy of information about 
the partner`s income and experimental pay offs and on the communication between them. The 
experimental groups were named the “private”, “public/information” and 
“negotiation/communication” group on the basis of the level of information the spouses obtained 
and the communication they could have with each other. Figure 2.  Provides a schematic diagram 
of the experimental design. 
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Figure 5. 2. Schematic diagram of the experimental design 
 
In the first (Private) group, the participants were separated from their spouses and played 
the game in different rooms. After they had registered and received the experimental money 
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• Exit 
Public/Information group 
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Negotiation/Communication group 
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(50ETB), the participants were given a detailed instruction about the experiment. They were told 
that the money invested on child educational material would be tripled and a voucher would be 
provided to get the materials of their choice at the end of the game. The participants were also 
explicitly told that their spouses would get no information on whether they participated in the 
experiment, on the income they received or the choices they made and that they would get the 
vouchers before reuniting with their spouses. Next, they were asked to indicate how much, if any, 
of their experimental money they were willing to invest in their children’s educational materials.  
In the second (Public/Information) group the mother and father played in the same room. 
After they registered and received their experimental money (50ETB each) they took a seat in 
different rows, where they heard their own as well as their partner’s experimental instructions, 
including the payoffs and choice sets. The experimental payoffs were the same for all 
participants. Then they were asked to make decisions on how to allocate the money between 
their own needs and their children’s educational expenses, whereby they were not allowed to 
communicate or see the decision of one another. The money invested in children’s education was 
tripled and they received a voucher to get educational materials of their choice at the end of the 
experimental sessions.  
In the third (Negotiation/communication) group, participants were in the same situation 
as in the public group, but this time they sat on the same table and could communicate with their 
partner before making the decision. The participants received detailed instruction about the 
experimental settings and payoffs and were then allowed to discuss what would be the best 
decisions to follow. Finally, they made the decisions individually and received their payoffs 
individually. 
 
5. 3.  Methodology 
5. 3.1.  Study Area, Sampling and Data Collection  
 
This study was conducted in the Selale area located in the Oromia national regional state of 
Ethiopia. Selale is known for its tradition and high potential for dairying. It was purposely 
selected for this study based on its actual and potential dairy production, its dairy supply to the 
Addis Ababa market, and its milk market coverage. The Selale dairy cooperative union (SDCU) 
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-- the major formal milk buyer in Selale -- was used as the entry point for this study. A sample of 
four primary dairy cooperatives was randomly selected from the list of 22 dairy cooperatives that 
are active members of SDCU. The four kebeles (the smallest administrative unit) where the 
sample dairy cooperatives are located were taken as sample kebeles for the study. By employing 
stratified sampling techniques, 300 dairy farm households were selected from the four kebeles 
proportionately to their population size. A questionnaire was completed by the sample 
households to collect socioeconomic and demographic background information. After further 
stratifying the households on the basis of the survey results into milk market participant and non-
participant households, 167 households (couples) were selected from four kebeles to participate 
in the experiment (see section 2.3 above). 
 The participants (household heads and their respective spouses) were invited through 
letters produced by Ambo University. The local development agents approached the participants 
in person and asked them to sign a form in which they stated that they were willing to participate 
in the experiment. None of the participant approached refused to participate in the experiment. 
The experiments were conducted in local farmers training centers (FTC). Upon arriving in the 
training centers, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental groups 
through the lottery method.  
 Immediately after the experiment, we selected 12 participants for a qualitative study. This 
sample consisted of 6 mother and 6 fathers, 2 from each experimental group. Half of the 
participants were from milk market participant households and the other half from non-
participant households. We briefly checked the experimental results and included both 
individuals with higher and with lower investments to get insight into the motivations underlying 
their decisions in the experiment and their ideas about the investment patterns of other 
participants. 
 The interviews began by asking participants to reflect on their game experience. As one 
participant reflected:  
……..“decisions like these are our daily life. It is not new, we don’t have enough cash to spend 
and we have to make choices to make any payment. Most families know how much they need for 
their kids schooling. Since it is the right time to buy exercise books, pen and pencils now, they 
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can invest their allowance for this purpose easily”  (Tull A, male participant from a market 
participant household).  
 
5. 3.2. Data Analysis 
 
We use descriptive statistics to study the background of the participants (at the household and 
individual level) and to observe the pattern of parental investment in the different groups. To 
compare the investments made by fathers and mothers, in milk market participant and non-
participant households and by the different experimental groups, T-tests are used. The 
multivariate relationships between selected independent variables and parental investment in 
child education are studied using OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is parental 
investment in child education. Independent variables include gender of the parent (male=1, 
female=0), age of the parent, parent education (1=literate, 0=illiterate), total household size, 
number of school age children, household status in milk market (1=participant, 0= non-
participant), spousal information about other parent income and experimental outcomes (1=have 
information, 0=have no information) and communication between spouses in the experiment 
(1=with communication, 0=without communication). To find out to what extent the effects of 
gender, milk market status and the experimental conditions depend on the circumstances, we 
tested for interaction effects between these variables. 
 Qualitative information is used to explain the quantitative results. In the discussion 
section we combine the quantitative findings with the results of the in-depth interviews to gain 
further insight into the motivations underlying the experimental decisions. We include only 
information that relates to the quantitative finding and that help us to explain the result in more 
detail. 
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5. 4.  Empirical Findings 
5. 4.1.  Socioeconomic Background   
 
Table 5.1 shows that the average age of the parents in our sample is 42, the mean household size 
is 7.2, the mean number of school age children in the households is 2.5 and the mean parental 
milk income per day is 23 birr. About 88% of the participants can read and write. Given that 
couples are included, half of the sample is male and half female. About half of the participants 
are from milk market participant households and the other half from non-participant households. 
About 33% of the participants participated in the private group, 35% participated in the 
public/information group and the remaining 32% participated in the negotiation/communication 
group. 
The mean amount invested in children’s educational material was 24.7birr. This is about 
50% of the total single parents endowment or a quarter of the household endowment in the 
experiment. 
Table 5. 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Variables Mean (SD) 
Age, Mean (SD) 42.3 (8.7) 
Household size, Mean (SD) 7.2 (2.1) 
Household school age children Mean (SD)  2.5 (0.94) 
Parents milk income per day, Mean (SD) 23 (52.7) 
Educational status  
 Literate 88% 
 Illiterate  12% 
Gender  
 Female 50% 
 Male  50% 
Status in Milk market  
 Milk market participant 49.7% 
 Non-participant 50.3% 
Participant in experimental group   
 Private  33% 
 Public 35% 
 Negotiation  32% 
Parental investment on child education, Mean (SD) 24.7 (10.5) 
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5. 4.2. Parental Investments  
 
Table 5. 2 presents the parental investments by gender, household status in milk market 
and experimental groups. Comparison by the gender of the parent show that mothers invested 
significantly more in children’s education (27birr) than fathers (22.5birr). In line with this, 
participants of the post-game interviews (mothers and fathers) anonymously agreed that mothers 
invest more in their children compared to fathers. Some participants took the question farther and 
said that even if the mothers do not invest more in quantitative terms, they are always there to 
listen and to respond to their children’s need, which is not the case with the fathers. Some of this 
participants argue that the higher investment of mothers in children is because the children`s 
identify themselves with their mothers more than fathers. 
….children often present their requests to their mothers. It is rarely that children take 
requests directly to their fathers before they inform their mothers. This is not something related 
to paying their costs. Even when the children know that the mothers have no money to buy what 
they need and they know it is only the father who can afford to do so, the children first discuss 
with their mothers and then ask the mothers to ask their fathers or to support their request. 
Children believe that their mothers will consider their requests more seriously than their fathers 
(Tesfaye, Male, from market participant household).  
Some male participants argued that it is the household (both father and mother) who 
provide for children’s education but that the requests often come through the mother and that 
children most often acknowledge their mother for what they get. 
The bivariate analyses also showed that parental investment differs between parents from 
milk market participant and non-participant households. Parents from milk market participant 
households invested significantly more (26.6birr) in child education compared to parents from 
non-participating households (22.6birr). Some interview participants raised a consistent 
argument in this regard. They mentioned that market-oriented dairying and related technology 
adoption demands more labour at household level and children supply this labour. Hence, the 
higher investment in children’s education in market participant households is considered a 
compensation for children`s labour contribution in dairy production. 
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Table 5. 2: Comparison of Parental Investment (by gender and experimental group) 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, *P<0.1 
Regarding the experimental settings, we observed significant differences in parental 
investment between the private group on the one hand and the public/information and the 
negotiation/communication group on the other hand. In the private group, parental investment 
was significantly lower than in the other two groups. The mean amount allocated was 22.1 birr in 
the private group, 26,6 birr in the public/information group and 24.5 birr in the 
negotiation/communication group. The amounts invested in the public group and the negotiation 
group did not differ significantly.  
 
5. 4.3.  Multivariate analysis  
 
Table 5. 3 presents the estimation of multivariate regression analysis. Being female is positively 
and significantly correlated with the amounts invested in child education. Women invest 6 birr 
more in their children’s education than men. Household status in the milk market is also 
positively correlated with parental investment in child education. The effect is marginally 
significant at P=0.1 level. Parents from milk market participant households invest about 2 birr 
more in their children’s education than parents from non-participant households.  
Covariates 1 2 T-Stat 
Mean Std Error Mean Std Error 
Gender (male (1), female (2)) 22.5 ,804 26.88 ,787 -3.88*** 
Status in milk market (participant (1), 
non-participant (2)) 
26.6 .770 22.6 .824 3,60**** 
Experimental group (Private group (1), 
Public group (2)) 
22,09 1,08 26,6 ,85 -3,26*** 
Experimental group (Private group (1), 
Negotiation group (2)) 
22,09 1,08 25,4 ,101 -2,21** 
Experimental group (Public group (1), 
Negotiation group (2)) 
26,6 ,85 25,4 ,101 ,89 
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Table 5.3. Effect of selected independent variables on parental investment  
Parental investment Coef. Std. Err. T-Stat 
Gender is male -6.35 1.19 -5.33*** 
Age of the parent .182 .067 2.68*** 
Parent education level .556 1.75 0.32 
Household size -.104 .271 -0.38* 
School age children  2.47 .610 4.04*** 
Status in milk market 2.12 1.12 1.88 
Information sharing in the game 3.66 1.26 2.90*** 
Communication between spouses -.915 1.25 -0.73 
Other partners investment .185 .054 3.43*** 
_cons 6.38 3.80 1.68 
Number of obs  = 334,  F(10, 323)   =  11.14,  Prob > F = 0.0000, R-squared=    0.2564, Adj R-
squared = 0.2334, Root MSE  = 9.194 *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, *P<0.1 
 
 The age of the parent and the number of school age children in the household are 
positively and significantly related to parental investment in child education. Older parents invest 
more in child education compared to younger parents. Parents who have more school age 
children invested more than parents with less children. Information about the other parent’s 
experimental situation is positively and significantly related to investment in children`s 
education. Parents who know that their partner is involved in the same experimental situation as 
they are themselves invested 4 birr more in their children`s education than parents without this 
information.  
The amount the parents invest in their children’s education is significantly higher if their 
partner also invests more in the children’s education. Given that in most situations the 
respondents do not know what their partner invests, this indicates that there is a difference 
between households in the overall willingness to invest in the education of their children. This 
probably has to do with differences in household wealth. In wealthier households, the money is 
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not directly necessary and both parents can afford to accept the profitable offer and invest 
substantially in the education of their children. 
 To find out to what extent the effects of gender, milk market status, the experimental 
conditions and the partner’s investment depend on the circumstances, we tested for interaction 
effects between these variables. However, we found none of these interaction effects to be 
significant. This indicates that the effects of these factors and conditions are rather stable across 
circumstances.  
Additional evidence from the post-game interviews indicated that parents with more 
school-aged children invest more in the experiment in order to get as much educational material 
as possible at a cheap price and save their own money. On the other hand, some parents, 
especially from non-participant households, allocated less on educational materials, because they 
preferred to invest the money in their business in order to generate income in the coming years. 
Participants also considered the higher investments in children’s education of members of milk-
market participant households a compensation for the labour contribution of their children to the 
dairy business.  
 
5. 5.   Discussions and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we report the results of parental choice experiments followed by post-game 
interviews in Ethiopia. It has been widely reported that parental investments in children may 
differ between fathers and mothers. This view is held across disciplines. However, few studies 
have combined gender with other contextual factors to study how much this difference is 
consistent. In pursuit of this, we have conducted a choice experiment with parents and combined 
it with qualitative information to shed light on the patterns of parental willingness to invest in 
their children`s education as well as on the factors that influence these decisions.  
In our experiment parents got an amount of money that they could hold for themselves or 
partly or totally invest in their children’s education. The amount that was invested in their 
children’s education was tripled by the experimenter. There were three experimental conditions, 
whereby the information participants had about their partner’s experimental situation and the 
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possibility to communicate with their partner were varied. These three conditions were meant to 
increase our understanding of how information and communication between spouses may affect 
intra-household decisions and the welfare of the household members.  
In the first (private) group, the parent had no information about the amount that their 
partner obtained and what (s)he did with it. This condition was meant to find out to what extent 
parents invest in their children based on unconditional love, emotional ties and personal altruism, 
without being influenced by contextual factors. In the second (public/information) group, parents 
obtained information about their partner’s experimental money and choice options before they 
made their investment decisions. This condition was meant to determine whether fathers and 
mothers differ in their propensity to invest in their children’s education when they know that 
their partner is making the same decision at the same time. Such differences were supposed to 
provide insight into the degree to which participants consider it their own or their partner’s 
responsibility to invest in the education of their children. In the third (negotiation/communication) 
group, the parents knew their own and their spouse`s experimental money and choice options 
and could discuss with their partner what decision each of them would make. This condition was 
meant to help us understand how parental investment decisions are influenced by bargaining 
between the partners.  
We found parental investments to vary by gender of the parent, by the information 
available about the experimental money and choice options of the partner, and to some extent 
also by the household’s status in the milk market. In line with previous research (Agarwal, 1997a; 
Njuki et al., 2011; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000), the mothers who participated in our 
experiment invested significantly more in their children’s education than the fathers. The 
participants in the post-game interviews confirmed this finding. They mentioned that mothers 
invest more in children, because children usually identify themselves more with their mother 
than with their fathers. This is also because mothers are more approachable. Even when the 
children knew that the mothers have no money and only their father could provide for their needs, 
they first convinced their mothers and asked them to present their requests to their fathers, or at 
least to support their requests.  
Our bivariate analysis showed that parents from milk market participant household invest 
significantly more in child education compared to parents from non-participant households. In 
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the multivariate analysis, this effect was substantially weaker and only marginally significant 
(P<0.1). This difference between participant and non-participant households could be the result 
of the fact that the income of participant households is higher than that of the non-participants 
(Chagwiza, 2014; Lenjiso, 2013). The finding in our regression analysis that the amount invested 
by the partner was strongly and positively related to the respondent’s investment indicates that 
there are households where both partners invest more and households where both partners invest 
less. This points towards the existence of clear differences between households in the propensity 
to invest in their children’s education, which might be influenced by the household’s economic 
situation or other factors at the household level known to both parents. For instance, the post-
game interviews suggested that in milk market participant households the investments in 
children’s education might be a compensation for the children’s contribution to the dairy 
business. As the policy logic goes, milk market participation can enhance household’s 
investment in human capital development in the long run and pay-off the contribution of children 
in dairy labour by increasing investment in their education.   
By varying information about the other parent’s income and experimental outcomes, we 
could study the effect of information on the parents’ investments. The parents invested more in 
their children’s education when they knew that their partner was involved in the same 
experimental situation as they were themselves. This is consistent with Ashraf (2009) finding 
that spousal transparency regarding income and communication between spouses can influence 
their financial decisions. Moreover, provision for children is a family responsibility in Ethiopia 
and parents strategically respond to investing in their children by considering their environment. 
There could be needs of the respective parents that the other parent should provide for the 
children. However, the expectation of the children, the local context and natural tendencies like 
generosity and altruism might also influence the response of the parent in the experiment.   
We also found the age of the parent and the number of school aged children in the 
household to be significantly correlated with parental investment in child education in the 
Ethiopian context. The result shows that older parents invest significantly more in child 
education compared to younger parents. This is in line with the defection hypothesis of Hagen 
(1999) that parent`s age is significantly correlated with investment in children. The number of 
school-aged children in the household is also positively correlated with parental investment in 
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child education. This finding is consistent with Woldehanna et al, (2008) study that having more 
siblings and being a later-born child raise the chances of school enrollment in Ethiopia.  
In general, contextual factors, parental social and demographic variables and information 
treatment in the game are significantly correlated with parental investment in children`s 
education in our model. Our finding is consistent with previous studies in Ethiopia (Dendir, 2014; 
Woldehanna et al., 2008) that indicate that household wealth and income as well as parental and 
child characteristics can influence parental investment in children. Based on this findings, we 
argue that increasing income at household level (as the result of smallholder market participation) 
in general and increasing income in the hands of the women in particular has the potential to 
improve children`s educational achievement in Ethiopia.  
We need to acknowledge that our study might suffer from certain limitations. A first 
limitation is related to the likelihood of doing the calculations behind the logic of our 
experimental design among participants, because our participants are less educated. Therefore, 
there is a possibility that the behaviors that underlie their decision could be a random decision, or 
based on what they thought we needed from them, rather than the calculative behavior our game 
aims to capture. A second potential limitation is that parents may allocate more money to get 
educational materials because of its resale value, instead of its educational value for their 
children. A third potential problem is that the parents who retain more money do this because 
they want to invest the money on urgent child needs other than the children’s education. In that 
case not investing or investing less on education material does not mean parental investment on 
child welfare is less for those particular parents. To address these issues as well as possible, we 
have combined the quantitative results of the game with qualitative insights generated through 
the post-game interviews. These interviews largely confirmed the conclusions on the basis of our 
experiment.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
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6.1. Introduction 
 
Smallholder commercialization is receiving policy attention as a strategy for transforming the 
agricultural sector, increasing household productivity, and income and enhancing human welfare 
in agriculture dependent economies. In line with this, Ethiopia has adopted a growth and 
transformation plan (GTP) that aims to transform the agricultural sector from a subsistence-
oriented to market-oriented production system. The wish to transform the livestock sector in 
general and the dairy sector in particular has even a longer history in Ethiopia. Successive 
Ethiopian governments and donor agencies have introduced improved cattle breeds and animal 
feeds, organized smallholders into cooperatives and liberalized the dairy market in an effort to 
increase dairy production and market orientation of smallholder farmers. 
Traditionally, subsistence-oriented dairying has been women`s business in Ethiopia. 
Women were responsible for managing cows and calves, milking the cows, processing milk into 
butter and cheese and selling the surplus on the local market. The women also controlled the 
income they generated from the local markets. Selling raw milk was a social taboo in Oromo 
society, where the connection between the people and their cattle was strong. It was believed to 
cause damage to the cattle farm. However, the introduction of exotic cattle breeds weakened this 
taboo. People considered the new breeds as outsiders and selling their milk would not cause 
damage anymore.  Although, some households still sell only milk from the exotic breeds, this 
change has influenced the norm on milk sales in Oromo. People, especially the youth, started to 
consider milk as a cash commodity and milk selling has become the basis of livelihoods in peri-
urban areas. 
The adoption of these new dairy technologies and smallholder milk market participation 
in peri-urban areas of Ethiopia has increased milk production and household income. However, 
in contexts where different commodities are controlled by different gender groups and both 
formal and informal markets exists, smallholder commercialization may exclude one group from 
the new benefits and shift income control structure. This can affect intra-household resource 
allocation and welfare of the household members. Whereby policy makers in African countries 
are preoccupied with the aim of increasing productivity and household income by linking 
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smallholder to markets, the unintended consequences of these policies for the intra-household 
gender relations and resource allocation has received less attention. 
This thesis aims to assess the implications of smallholder milk market participation in 
four interconnected areas; (1) intra-household time allocation, (2) women`s intra-household 
bargaining position, (3) food consumption, dietary diversity and nutritional status of young 
children, and (4) parental investment in children`s human capital. The connections between these 
areas are summarized in Figure 6.1.  
 
 
 
 
As summarized in the diagram, smallholder milk market participation has raised 
household workload, especially women`s workload as well as household daily milk production 
Better Food Security and 
Nutritional Status  
 
 
Smallholder Milk Market Participation 
Increased Milk Production and Household Income 
 
Milk Processed at 
home reduced 
Milk Sold Raw 
increased  
Own Consumption not 
significantly changed 
Household milk 
Income 
Women`s Milk 
Income Share 
Women`s milk 
income decreased 
Men`s milk 
income increased 
Better Parental 
Investment in Children 
 
Raised household workload 
(especially women`s workload)  
Better Women`s Bargaining 
Power 
 
 
Figure 6 1 Diagrammatic Representation of Relationships Studied 
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and income.  As noted by previous studies, market-oriented dairying is labour-intensive in 
Ethiopia (Feleke, 2003; Lenjiso, 2013; Shapiro, et al, 2000). It is associated with the adoption of 
new cattle breeds, improved feed technology and new cattle management systems. Traditionally, 
dairying is a women`s business since they performed almost all the dairy activities. As time 
devoted to one activity competes with time devoted to alternative activities and household 
members divide their time between these competing activities, women`s role in dairying may 
give them a better position to bargian on household dairy income.  
 Intra-household milk allocation has important consequences for the distribution of 
income within the household. Income generated by selling butter and cheese in the local market 
is under women`s control. Milk income from the formal milk market by selling raw milk is 
received through the head of the household. With market participation the volume of milk 
processed into butter and cheese at home was reduced, while the volume of milk sold raw 
increased. Studies (Agarwal, 1997; Kabeer, 1999; Njuki et al., 2011) indicate that women`s 
household income share and control over income influences their intra-household bargaining 
power. In our experiment, we find that women from market participating households have 
expected and received more money from their husbands than their husband expected and 
received from them. Women`s income share in the game is significantly higher for women from 
market participating household compared to women from non-participant households. Hence, 
women from market participant households have better bargaining position than women from 
non-participant households.  
 The trade-off between income generation and calorie intake is an important area of 
investigation in the context of smallholder market integration. Despite the claim that 
technological change in smallholder agriculture can directly influence food security by 
increasing household food availability from own production, we find no significant influence of 
smallholder market participation (based on increased productivity) on own household milk 
consumption. The income effect of smallholder milk market participation is relatively strong. We 
find a direct relationship between household milk market participation, dietary diversity and 
nutritional status of young children. Milk market participant households realize better dietary 
diversity at household and individual level. Moreover, children from these households exhibit 
better nutritional status compared to children from non-participant households. 
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Increasing income at household level has the potential to influence parental investment in 
human capital development. Human capital investment often constitutes a core component of 
resources allocated to children by parents (Dendir, 2014). In Ethiopia, milk market participation 
is associated with increasing household income (Chagwiza, 2014; Lenjiso, 2013). Several studies 
(Agarwal, 1997; Ashraf, 2009; Njuki, et al, 2011; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000) indicate that 
the intra-household income control structure is as important as the income itself in improving 
investment in human welfare and that income controlled by women does improve child welfare 
more compared to income controlled by men. We find that mothers invest significantly more in 
children than fathers in Ethiopian context. Parents from market participant households also made 
better investment in children`s education than parents from non-participant households. The 
detailed summaries of these findings are presented and discussed in the next section.    
 
6.2.  Results  
 
6.2.1. Smallholder Milk market participation and intra-household time allocation 
 
The first objective of this study was to examine the effect of household milk market 
participation on intra-household time allocation. We followed 156 households for two 
consecutive days and recorded time allocated to dairying, domestic chores, schooling, wage 
work, and leisure by four adult household members. We used propensity score matching to 
determine the average effect of household market participation on intra-household time 
allocation for dairying and non-dairying activities. We find that smallholder milk market 
participation has increased both household income and household workload, especially women`s 
workload.  
The main objective of integrating Ethiopian farmers into the market is to increase 
household income. In line with the policy objectives, our study shows that household income is 
indeed substantially increased in milk market participant households. These households earn 99 
birr per day from milk and this is significantly higher than 43 birr in non-participant households. 
Members of market participant households also allocated significantly more hours on dairying 
and non-dairying activities compared to members from non-participant households. Women`s 
dairying and domestic work time increased more than men`s dairying and wage work time. The 
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extra time spent on dairying activities adds to women`s domestic responsibilities, which for the 
wives means an increase of their working time by about 12 hours in the two-day period covered 
by our study. For men the increase was about 7 hours, hence market participation raised 
women`s workload substantially more than that of men. An important reason for this is the shift 
in the cattle management system, from freely grazing to feeding and watering them in the 
backyard. In market participant households the cows are kept in the backyard and the women 
therefore do feeding and watering the cows, as the backyard activities are part of the domestic 
domain.  
Husbands in market participant households spent somewhat more time on milking cows 
and preparing concentrated livestock feeds compared to husbands in non-participant households. 
Given the traditional Ethiopian gender division of labour, whereby females are considered 
responsible for milking cows, this, on the one hand, indicates that norms regarding intra-
household gender role divisions are slowly changing as a result of participation. However, on the 
other hand, men do these activities maybe because engaging in these activities is a way to gain 
control over the milk production process and its quality.  
Also the time allocated by adult boys and girls to feeding and watering livestock is 
significantly higher in milk market participant compared to non-participant households. Boys 
allocate more hours on feeding and watering livestock in market participant compared to non-
participant households. Girls in participant households spent more hours on preparing 
concentrate, cleaning burns and milking utensils, fetching water and caring for children and 
elderly. This is, however compensated by a reduction in their time spent on cleaning activities 
and thus merely a shift in responsibilities for girls. Girls total time allocation is not affected by 
household market participation. 
We conclude that household milk market participation is associated with an increase of 
both household income and household workload. There are substantial differences in overall 
household time allocation and time allocated to dairying, as well as important gender differences, 
between the two household types. Members of market participant households allocate more 
hours on both dairying and non-dairying activities than members of non-participant households. 
At the individual level, wives spent twice as much time as husbands and adult girls spent twice 
as much time as adult boys on intra-household activities. There is also some shift in the gender 
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division of labour that with the commercialization of the milk production, Ethiopian men start to 
take part in activities that in the traditional dairying system belonged to the women`s domain.  
 
6.2.2. Smallholder milk market participation and Women`s intra -household 
bargaining power 
 
The second objective of this study is to examine the relationship between smallholder 
milk market participation and women`s intra-household bargaining power. We have used mixed 
methods to generate this information. Household socioeconomic data from a survey 
questionnaire has been combined with information generated with quasi-experimental games and 
post-game interviews. We used propensity score matching to assess the effect of smallholder 
milk market participation on women`s intra-household bargaining position. We defined women’s 
intra-household bargaining power as the ability of wives to control a fair share of household 
income.  
Households earn cash income from milk either by selling raw milk, or by processing it 
into butter and cottage cheese. Control over milk income generated in these two ways differs by 
gender. Men/husbands sign the contract with the milk company and thus control income 
generated from selling raw milk in the formal market, whereas women/wives control income 
generated from selling processed milk in the local/informal market. 
As shown in chapter two, total household income is indeed substantially higher in 
participating households. This higher income is almost completely earned by selling raw milk to 
the market. The other way of receiving milk income -- processing raw milk into butter and 
cottage cheese for sale at the local market – is much less important in the market participant 
households. In this chapter, we aimed to find out the consequences of this change in milk income 
control from women to men for the bargaining position of Ethiopian women. We believe this is 
an important issue because previous studies suggest that women`s share in household income 
determines their participation in household decision making and their intra-household bargaining 
power as well as the welfare of the other household members (see Adeto, 2000; Mahmud, Shah, 
& Becker, 2011, Agarwal (1997), Quisumbing & Maluccio (2000) and Njuki et al (2011). 
To address this issue, we have conducted resource-sharing games with 167 couples, 
where they were asked to divide 100ETB between themselves and their partners. There were two 
503018-L-bw-Lenjiso
 120 
roles, (1) proposing how to share the amount between themselves and their spouse, and (2) 
indicating how much one expected to receive from the spouse. The assumption behind this game 
is that the amounts proposed or expected depend on the perception of the players regarding their 
own and their partner’s bargaining power. This is because whether the spouses have accurate 
expectations of each other’s behavior in an experiment can be an important indicator of their 
actual positions (Kebedea et al., 2014). The results show that women`s expectations and the 
amounts actually proposed by their husbands were significantly higher in market participant 
compared to non-participant households. Consistently, men`s expectations and the amounts 
proposed by their wives were significantly lower in market participant households. Hence, the 
wives in the milk-market participating households both expected and received a larger share of 
the money than the wives in non-participating households.  
There could be two potential explanations for this interesting finding. First, women`s loss 
of their milk income, and hence their financial independence, may have brought the women out 
of the traditional framework of separate female and male’s domains into a new situation. In this 
new situation they have to bargain with their husband to get a fair share of the milk income. As 
they still to a large extent control the milk production, which is the basis of the increased 
household income, they may have a good bargaining position regarding milk income. From the 
interviews we concluded that women have subtle ways to influence the amount and quality of the 
milk that is produced and in this way they may be able to ‘convince’ their partner that it is wise 
to share the milk income. Although independent women may have a better bargaining position, 
our findings indicate that women who lost their independence may find new ways to influence 
household decisions. 
 Second, producing for the market involves important changes in the organization of the 
household, which might lead to changes in responsibilities and dependencies that are not directly 
related to milk production. Most smallholder households in the study area used to consume what 
they produced. With the introduction of the milk market, they start to produce a commodity of 
which they consume only a small amount. They produce for the market and start to rely on cash 
to buy food. This new livelihood system requires new skills, like longer-term planning and 
income management. It is possible that these skills become part of household duties of women.  
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In conclusion, these finding suggest that the altered base of the livelihood system in the 
study area has some unintended side effects. The requirements of the new system may in fact 
have increased the room for consultation and negotiation between husbands and wives as well as 
their interdependency. Although the husband may in name receive the milk income, the wife 
seems to have a fair share of this income and a say in the decisions about its expenditure.  
 
6.2.3. Smallholder milk market Participation, dietary diversity and nutritional status 
of young children  
 
 
The third objective of this study was to examine the relationship between household`s milk 
market participation and household food security. To do so, we studied the household`s pattern 
of milk consumption, dietary diversity and the nutritional status of young children. Using the 
FAO dietary diversity questionnaire, we followed 164 households and recorded all food items 
consumed by the husband, the wife, an adult boy, an adult girl and a child under five (when 
available) for two consecutive days. We use T-test and propensity score matching to analyze the 
data. Our analysis revealed a direct relationship between household milk market participation, 
dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children. Members of market participant 
households have better dietary diversity. Young children in market participant households have 
both better dietary diversity and better nutritional status compared to children from non-
participant households.  
Milk market participant households produce significantly more milk per day compared to 
non-participant households. However, despite a significant production difference between the 
two households, fluid milk consumption at household level does not significantly differ between 
participant and non-participant households. Milk market participant households sell about 76.6% 
of their daily milk production raw and consume 9.4% at home while non-participant households 
process about 82.4% of their daily milk production into butter and cheese and consume 17.6% of 
their daily milk production at home. 
In general, our propensity score matching analysis show that market participant 
households have better dietary diversity scores. The results show that participant households 
have about four points better dietary diversity scores compared to non-participants on a 12 point 
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dietary diversity measuring scale. At the individual level, wives, adult boys, adult girls and 
children under five have significantly better dietary diversity scores in market participant 
compared to non-participant households.  
We also found that children from market participant households are less likely to be 
wasted, stunted and underweight compared to children from non-participant households. In line 
with the findings of previous study (FANTA, 2006) that documented a positive relationship 
between dietary diversity and adequate micronutrient density of complementary foods for young 
children, our study shows that children from milk market participant households where dietary 
diversity is better also have better nutritional status as indicated by their anthropometric 
measures. We therefore, conclude that transforming the dairy sector from subsistence to market 
oriented production system has the potential to improve smallholder food and nutritional security 
in rural Ethiopia. Although increasing milk production in market participant households did not 
translate into better milk consumption at the household level, as argued by previous studies in 
Ethiopia (Steglich, 1999; Tangka et al., 2002), the significant difference in dietary diversity and 
nutritional status of young children could be the result of the increased income at household level. 
 
6.2.4. Gender, milk market participation and parental investment in children`s 
education 
 
The fourth objective of this study is to explore the relationship between the gender identity of 
parents, household status in milk market and parental investment in children`s education in 
Ethiopian context.  It has been reported that the gender of the parent can affect their investment 
in children. To see whether parental investment varies between mothers and fathers, and between 
parents from milk market participant and parents from non-participant households, we conducted 
a parental choice experiment with 167 households. We conducted the experiment in three groups 
by varying information about the other parent’s income and experimental outcomes and 
communication between them. In the first group, the parent has no information about the amount 
that their partner obtained and what (s)he did with it. This is to capture to what extent parent`s 
investment is influenced by their emotional ties and personal altruism. In the second group, 
parents obtained information about their partner’s experimental money and choice options.  In 
this case we aimed to determine whether fathers and mothers differ in their propensity to invest 
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in their children’s education, when they know that their partner is making the same decision. In 
the third group, the parents knew their own and their spouse`s experimental money and choice 
options and could discuss with their partner what decision each of them would make. This 
condition was meant to help us understand how parental investment decisions are influenced by 
parental bargaining.  
 The result indicates that parental investments vary by gender of the parent. This is in line 
with previous research (Agarwal, 1997; Njuki et al., 2011; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000; 
Vyrastekova et al., 2014). The mothers who participated in our experiment invested significantly 
more in their children’s education than the fathers. According to the post-game interviews, 
mothers invest more in children, because children identify themselves with their mothers more 
than they identify themselves with their fathers. Even when the children know that the mothers 
have no money and only their father could provide for their needs, they first convince their 
mothers and ask them to present their requests to their fathers, or at least to support their requests.  
 We also found that parents from milk market participant household invest significantly 
more in child education compared to parents from non-participant households. However, this 
effect was only firmly present in the bivariate analysis. In multivariate analysis it was 
substantially weaker and only marginally significant. This indicates that other differences 
between participant and non-participant households play a role, most likely the high income of 
participant households. We also found that the amount invested by the partner was positively 
related to the amount invested by the respondents. This indicates that there are households where 
both partners invest more and households where both partners invest less, which could be 
influenced by the household’s economic situation. In line with this, the post-game interviews 
suggested that investments in children’s education might be a compensation for the children’s 
contribution to the dairy business in milk market participant households. Hence, consistent with 
its policy logic, milk market participation can enhance household’s investment in human capital 
development in the long run and pay-off the contribution of children in dairy labour by 
increasing investment in their education.   
 We have varied information about the other parent’s income and experimental outcomes 
to study the effect of information on the parent’s investments. The result suggest that parents 
invested more in their children’s education when they knew that their partner was involved in the 
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same experimental situation. This is in line with Ashraf (2009) that spousal transparency 
regarding income and communication between spouses can influence their financial choices. We 
also found that the age of the parent and the number of school aged children in the household are 
significantly correlated with parental investment in child education. This is consistent with 
Hagen (1999) that older parents invest more in children compared to younger parents and 
Woldehanna et al, (2008) who argue that having more siblings and being a later-born child raise 
the chances of school enrollment in Ethiopia.  
In general, our study indicates that contextual factors, parental social and demographic 
variables and information about other parents situation are significantly correlated with parental 
investment in children`s education in the Ethiopian context. Our finding is consistent with 
previous studies in Ethiopia (Dendir, 2014; Woldehanna et al., 2008) indicating that household 
wealth and income as well as parental and child characteristics can influence parental investment 
in children. Hence, we argue that increasing income at household level by increasing smallholder 
market participation in general and increasing income in the hands of the women in particular 
has the potential to improve children`s educational achievement in Ethiopia. Table 6.1 
summarizes the research questions, major findings and its policy implications.  
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Table 6.1. Summary of the major findings  
Chapter Research Question Main Findings Policy implication 
2 How does 
smallholder milk 
market 
participation affect 
intra-household 
time allocation? 
 Milk production and household income 
is twice higher in milk market 
participant households 
 Intra-household workload also increased 
and women`s workload increased twice 
more than men`s workload 
Timesaving dairy 
technologies need to 
be introduced 
together with  milk 
marketing in Ethiopia 
3 How does 
smallholder milk 
market 
participation 
affects women`s 
intra-household 
bargaining power 
 In market participant households control 
over milk income shifted from women 
to men  
 However, women in participant 
households expected and recieved more 
experimental money from their 
husbands compared to women from 
non-participant households in the 
experiment 
Women`s intra-
housshold bargaining 
power is better in 
market participant 
households. 
However, they don`t 
have public access to 
milk income and that 
needs to be improved 
4 Does milk market 
participation affect 
dairy food 
consumption, 
dietary diversity 
and nutritional 
status of young 
children? 
 There is no signficant milk consumption 
difference between  
market participation and non-participant 
households 
 Market participant households have 
better dietary diversity (both at 
household and individual level)  
 These households also have better 
nutritional status of young children  
Given the high 
number of 
malnurioushed 
children in the 
country, animal 
source food 
consumption is still  
too low and needs 
attention in Ethiopia.  
5 How does the 
gender identity of 
the parent and 
household milk 
market 
participation affect 
parental 
investment in 
children`s 
education? 
 Mothers invest signficantly more in 
children`s education compared to fathers 
 Smallholder milk market partricipation 
through its income effect can postively 
influence investment in children`s 
education  
 Age of the parent and the number of 
school age children, and spouse`s 
information about earning/income is 
positively correlated with parental 
investment in children 
Increasing income at 
the household level 
and improving 
women`s control over 
this income has a 
potential  to  improve 
investment in 
children`s education 
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6.3. Contribution of the research  
 
This study demonstrates that smallholder market participation has significant effects on intra-
household time allocation, on dairy productivity and on household income. In participant 
households, feeding and watering livestock in the backyard raises time allocated to domestic 
activities and women remain largely responsible for these activities. While men take up only a 
small part of the dairy activities, milk income shifts from women to men with more market 
participation. Previous studies (Kabeer, 1999; Njuki et al., 2011; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000) 
indicate that income in the hands of women improves their bargaining power and their 
participation in decision making, as well as the welfare of other household members.  
 In this regard, our experimental game results revealed substantial differences in the 
amounts of experimental money proposed and expected by husbands and wives between milk-
market participant and non-participant households. As indicated by their share of the 
experimental money, women in market participant households have a better bargaining positions 
compared to women from non-participant households. We also find that milk market participant 
households have better dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children compared to 
non-participant households. This improvement is probably the result of the income effect of milk 
market participation as there is no significant difference in own milk consumption between the 
two household types. Our study also shows that mothers invest significantly more in their 
children`s education than fathers. Parents from market participant households and parents who 
have information about their partners participation in the experiment make more investment in 
children`s education compared to parents from non-participant households and non-informed 
parents.  
 This study contributes to the research field in several ways. First, our study indicates that 
with milk market participation intra-household workload increased, especially for the women. 
Moreover, milk income control shifts from women to men in participant households. Although 
these findings are consistent with previous studies (Endeley, 2001; Locke & Okali, 1999; Njuki 
et al., 2011) indicating the effect of smallholder market integration on labour demand and 
income control structure, the fact that our study is based on detailed intra-household time 
allocation data with special focus on commodity with gender differentiated role makes it relevant. 
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In this regard the study speaks loud to policy makers that it is very important to consider the 
nature of the commodities, and the respective role of men`s and women`s in its production, 
processing and marketing before its commercialization.  
 Second, this study contributes in measuring women`s intra-household bargaining power 
on the basis of experimental techniques. Contrary to many survey-based studies (Adato, et al., 
2000,  Mahmud, Shah, & Becker, 2011 and Naved, 2000) our experimental study shows that 
women`s intra-household bargaining is not necessarily income/earnings dependent. In milk 
market participant households, where milk income control is in the hands of men, women 
unexpectedly seemed to have a better bargaining position compared to women in non-participant 
households. Milk income has been traditionally a domain of women in subsistence-oriented 
dairying. This income has shifted from women to men and as the result women lost their income 
in market participant households. This situation potentially forced women to bargain compared 
to women from non-participant households who process milk into butter and cheese and generate 
income they directly control. Therefore, as Locke & Okali (1999) once argued, this study calls 
for reassessing the conventional gender analysis within the context of development intervention.  
 Third, this study is based on detailed intra-household food allocation and dietary diversity 
data collected through standardized FAO dietary diversity questionnaire and child 
anthropometric indices measured directly as an indicator of nutritional status of young children. 
We have assessed dairy food consumption, dietary diversity and nutritional status of children in 
milk market participant and non-participant households. The result indicates a direct relationship 
between smallholder milk market participation, dietary diversity and nutritional status of young 
children. This broadens the literature on dietary diversity as a promising indicator of food 
security. This specific and detailed information can be helpful to inform targeting efficiency of 
marketing programs, to improve policy recommendations regarding distributional effects, and to 
guide future studies on these areas.  
 Fourth, this study analyzes parental willingness to invest in children`s education on the 
basis of parental choice experiment. Improving investment in human capital development is a 
major development policy objective in many developing countries. However, how do parents 
respond to the decision of investing in their children`s education under different circumstances 
and which social, economic, psychological and contextual factors affect this decisions is an 
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interesting topic with no clear-cut answer so far. This study contributes in providing some 
answer to this question. It reveals that mothers generally tend to invest in their children more 
than fathers in the Ethiopian context. Parents who know that their spouse is involved in the same 
experiment and acknowledge the situation they are involving in, tend to invest more in children`s 
education than non-informed parents. The income effect from milk market participation is also 
found to affect parental willingness to invest in their children. This indicates that further research 
on intra-household information exchange might provide insights into its resource-sharing 
implications. 
 Fifth, the contribution of this thesis is also related to the way in which intra-household 
dynamics is studied. Intra-household resource allocation happens behind closed doors, which 
makes it neither easy nor straightforward for scientific inquires. Moreover, understanding intra-
household dynamics involves understanding of cultural concepts of the division of labour, 
attitudes towards status within households and the perceived versus actual contributions of each 
household member. According to Levin et al (1993) intra-household research demands a 
multidisciplinary approach. In line with this, this thesis combined different techniques 
(household surveys, experimental designs, detailed observations and interviews) in the form of 
triangulation and with the intention of backing information generated through one technique with 
information generated through another techniques. As each techniques is different and has its 
own strength and weakness, combining them is necessary to enrich the research findings; to 
benefit from the strengths of each method and to compensate for the weaknesses; and to establish 
confidence and obtain trustworthiness of the research findings. 
 
6.4. Policy Implications  
 
This study can inform dairy development policies in several important ways. First, the study 
shows that milk market participation not only increases household income, but also raises the 
intra-household workload and in particular the already heavy workload of women. The extra 
time women have to spend on these activities can negatively affect their other household duties 
and reduce their leisure time. Hence, it is very important that with marketing also time-saving 
new production technologies are introduced. These technologies may be particularly beneficial to 
the women, who are still mainly responsible for milk production. They may ease their burden 
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and to a certain extent compensate for their loss of free time. Besides by time-saving 
technologies for milk production, much can also be gained by spending the increased milk 
income on the introduction of equipment that eases household chores. 
 A point of concern for policy makers is that the increase of women’s workload goes 
together with a shift of control of the benefits of their labour to their husbands. Because the 
husbands sign the contract with the milk company, the cash income from marketing of raw milk 
is controlled by them. This might work out negatively, because there is evidence that control 
over household income by women may lead to better outcomes for all household members 
compared to household’s income controlled by men. It is therefore of importance that women get 
a fair share of the new income. Moreover, it is better to have the names of both husband and wife 
on the contract with the milk company so that both can sign and receive the milk income. 
Second, the study shows that for policy makers it is important to realize that gender 
insensitive development planning can end up in upsetting existing gender relations. At the same 
time, our findings indicate that this does not always deteriorate the existing gender relations, as is 
often argued. Such plans may sometimes break the silence and open up new re-negotiation 
opportunities that strengthen women’s bargaining position. In this regard, revisiting the existing 
gender analytical tools to capture important gendered social processes is critical. After all, 
gender relations are social relations; they change over time and take time to be realized. As 
Agarwal (1997) noted, the bargaining power of an individual woman with regard to any 
particular issue is not only related to her own successful bargaining, but also to that of other 
women on the same issue in the past. In this sense the shift of milk income from women to men 
and the related intra-household conflicts lead to a transformation of the within household gender 
relations in favor of women. Hence, understanding the processes involved and the perceptions of 
people of their own situation and of their relations with important others may help developing 
scenarios for understanding gender relation as well as the information on what they earn and who 
receives the income. 
Third, the finding that smallholder milk market participation positively influences intra-
household dietary diversity and the nutritional status of young children is encouraging for 
Ethiopian policy makers. It indicates that smallholder market participation can also be a tool for 
ensuring food security and nutrition status of young children. However, considering the 
importance of animal source food consumption for human capital development and for reducing 
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child malnutrition, this study also calls for efforts to encourage animal source consumptions in 
general and milk consumption in particular. Given that Ethiopia is the country with the highest 
number of malnourished children in the world, micronutrient deficiencies remain important 
policy targets.   
Fourth, one of the potential outcomes of smallholder market-oriented production is 
improved intra-household welfare as a result of increased investment in nutrition, health and 
education. It is therefore important to consider how these outcomes are affected by the process of 
smallholder commercialization and its interactions with other variables, like gender of the parent 
who control outputs and information and communication between spouses. Our finding indicate 
that in the Ethiopian context, mothers still invest significantly more in children`s education than 
fathers. Moreover, parents from market participant households, where household income is high, 
tend to invest more in children`s education compared to parents from non-participant households. 
Hence, increasing household income by integrating smallholder farmers into milk market in 
general and increasing women`s income control in particular can have the potential to improve 
investment on household welfare in general and children`s welfare in particular.  
 
6.5.  Limitations  
 
While presenting various interesting findings, the studies included in this thesis also suffer from 
some limitations that need to be considered in future research. The first limitation is related to 
the use of experimental designs in rural areas of low-income countries. Experimental games in 
economics often involve logical calculations. The participants are expected to arrive at decisions 
by doing those calculations. To be able to do these calculations, participants need a certain level 
of awareness and knowledge. For example, they might need to be educated. In environments 
where many people are uneducated, the possibilities for doing experiments are therefore limited. 
Decisions might be taken randomly, or in line with what participants think the researcher expects 
from them, instead of on the basis of the calculative behavior expected on the basis of game 
theory. 
 The decisions taken by people in experimental games might also be influenced by social 
and cultural factors, as well as by their immediate feelings, moods, needs and social relations. 
These kinds of factors might to a certain extent have influenced the outcomes of our experiments 
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in chapters 3 and 5. To reduce this kind of bias as much as possible, we have supplemented our 
experiments with post-game interviews with selected participants. These interviews provided 
additional information that helped interpret the experimental findings and place them in the local 
cultural context.   
A second limitation is related to the observational studies discussed in chapters 2 and 4. 
In that part of the study, the behavior of the household members might have been influenced by 
the presence of the observers. We have done our best to reduce this kind of reactivity, by using 
development agents and extension workers as observers, who have frequent contact with the 
farm households and are sometime living with them. Nevertheless there could have been some 
reactivity, whereby household member`s daily activities and food consumptions were different 
from usual, because they know someone is observing them. Another limitation of the 
observational studies is that only a restricted number of household members could be observed, 
that the observation period was restricted to two days, and that behavior outside the home was 
not included. This means that the information was not complete. Nevertheless, we were able to 
identify some important differences between milk market participant and non-participant 
households with regard to intra-household time allocation, dairy food consumption, dietary 
diversity and nutritional status of young children.  
A third potential limitation is related to the use of propensity score matching (PSM) to 
address potential causality and selection bias problems. Establishing a causal relationship in an 
observational study is a challenge, because of lack of counterfactuals. Although constructing a 
control group helps to address this challenge, control groups may not have exactly the same 
baseline characteristics as the treatment group. Such a difference may affect both treatment 
uptake and outcome, which leads to selection bias. PSM is used as a strategy to address these 
causality issues as much as possible with the available data. However, PSM does not control for 
unmeasured (and unobservable) factors that might offer alternative explanations for the 
relationships that are found. This implies that we cannot be completely sure that the identified 
relations are strictly causal. To address this issue as well as possible we have supplemented the 
quantitative findings with information derived from qualitative interviews. The additional 
information generated in this way has been very helpful for deriving conclusions on the bases of 
our findings.  
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6.6. Concluding thoughts  
 
 This thesis provides important evidence that smallholder milk market participation has increased 
household milk production/income as well as the intra-household workload. In market 
participant households, women spent twice as much time in dairy production compared to men, 
whereas control of milk income has shifted from women to men. We therefore expected a 
negative effect of household milk market participation (through its effect on income control 
structure) on women`s intra-household bargaining power. The results, however, show the 
opposite. Woman in participating households expected and received more (experimental) money 
from their husbands than their husbands expected and received from them. This secondary 
behavioural effect thus dominates the direct income effect that women`s income share in 
participating household is higher than women`s income share in non-participating households. 
Milk market participant households also have better dietary diversity and nutritional status of 
young children. Moreover, parents from market participant households and mothers make a 
significantly higher investment on child education compared to parents from non-participant 
households and men.  
We hope that the findings in this thesis can inspire other researchers interested in 
smallholder agricultural commercialization in developing countries. Governments and donor 
agencies consider smallholder commercialization as an indispensable pathway towards food 
security and sustainable development in agriculture dependent economies. Therefore, we believe 
adding the intra-household dynamics to its analysis is both inspiring and critically important.    
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English Summary 
 
Smallholder commercialization is frequently considered as a grand design development strategy 
in many African countries. It is receiving policy attention as a technique for transforming the 
agricultural sector, increasing household productivity, and income and enhancing human 
welfare. Recently, Ethiopia has adopted a growth and transformation plan (GTP-Ethiopia) that 
aims to transform the agricultural sector from a subsistence-oriented production system to 
market-oriented production system. In the dairy sector, the governments and donor agencies have 
introduced improved cattle breeds and animal feeds, organized smallholders into cooperatives 
and liberalized the dairy market in an effort to increase dairy production and market orientation 
of smallholder dairy farmers. However, the unintended consequences of these policies for the 
intra-household gender relations and resource allocation has received less attention. Thus, this 
thesis assess the implications of smallholder milk market participation for intra-household time 
allocation, women`s intra-household bargaining power, dairy food consumption, dietary diversity 
and nutritional status of young children and parental investment in children`s education in 
Ethiopia. 
 The research presented in this thesis is innovative in a sense that it combined data 
collected in several complementary ways. Household surveys, experimental games, observations 
and interviews are combined to collect different kinds of data needed for answering the research 
questions. Socioeconomic data (covariates) generated through a household survey are 
supplemented with observational data on intra-household time, food and nutritional allocations, 
and experimental data on women’s intra-household bargaining and parental investment in child 
education. Qualitative information generated through interviews has been used to gain insights 
into the motivations that underlie the participant’s decision in the games. The basic approach of 
data analysis is pairwise impact appraisal, using a comparison of milk market participants and 
non-participant households. The analysis has two-steps. First, survey data were quantitatively 
analyzed to categorized household into raw milk sellers and non-sellers and second, the 
comparison was made on four major outcomes variable.   
 First, we examined the effect of smallholder milk market participation on intra-household 
time allocation. The result indicate that smallholder milk market participation has increased both 
household income and household workload, especially women`s workload. The main objective 
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of integrating Ethiopian farmers into the market is to increase household income and the study 
shows that household income is indeed substantially increased in milk market participant 
households. Members of market participant households also allocated significantly more hours 
on dairying and non-dairying activities compared to members of non-participant households. 
Women`s dairying and domestic work time increased more than men`s dairying and wage work 
time. Wives spent twice as much time as husband`s and girls spent twice as much time as boys in 
dairy related activities. An important reason for this is the shift in the cattle management system, 
from freely grazing to feeding and watering them in the backyard. In market participant 
households the cows are kept in the backyard and the women therefore do feeding and watering 
the cows, as the backyard activities are part of the domestic domain. Husbands in market 
participant households spent somewhat more time on milking cows and preparing concentrated 
livestock feeds compared to husbands in non-participant households. Given the traditional 
Ethiopian gender division of labor, whereby females are considered responsible for milking 
cows, this, on the one hand, indicates that norms regarding intra-household gender role divisions 
are slowly changing as a result of participation. However, on the other hand, men do these 
activities maybe because engaging in these activities is a way to gain control over the milk 
production process and its quality. We conclude that household milk market participation is 
associated with an increase of both household income and household workload. There are 
substantial differences in overall household time allocation and time allocated to dairying, as 
well as important gender differences, between the two household types.  
 Second, as shown above total household income is indeed substantially higher in milk 
market participating households. This higher income is almost completely earned by selling raw 
milk to the market. The other way of receiving milk income, processing raw milk into butter and 
cottage cheese for sale at the local market, is much less important in the market participant 
households. How does this affect women`s intra-household bargaining position was our major 
question in the second chapter. The result of our experiments shows that women`s expectations 
and the amounts actually proposed by their husbands were significantly higher in market 
participant compared to non-participant households. Consistently, men`s expectations and the 
amounts proposed by their wives were significantly lower in market participant households. 
Hence, the wives in the milk-market participating households both expected and received a 
larger share of the money than the wives in non-participating households. There could be two 
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potential explanations for this interesting finding. First, women`s loss of their milk income, and 
hence their financial independence, may have brought the women out of the traditional 
framework of separate female and male’s domains into a new situation, where they have to 
bargain in order to get a fair share of the milk income. Second, producing for the market involves 
important changes in the organization of the household, which might lead to changes in 
responsibilities and dependencies that are not directly related to milk production. Milk market 
households produce for the market and rely on cash to buy food. This new livelihood system 
requires new skills, like long-term planning and income management. It is possible that these 
skills become part of household duties of women. In conclusion, the finding of this chapter 
suggests that the altered base of the livelihood system in the study area has unintended by-
effects. The requirements of the new system may in fact have increased the room for consultation 
and negotiation between husbands and wives as well as their interdependency which have 
improved women`s intra-household bargaining position.  
 Third, the study revealed a direct relationship between household milk market 
participation, dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children. Members of market 
participant households have better dietary diversity. Young children in market participant 
households have both better dietary diversity and better nutritional status compared to children 
from non-participant households. Milk market participant households produce significantly more 
milk per day compared to non-participant households. However, despite a significant production 
difference between the two households, fluid milk consumption at household level does not 
significantly differ between participant and non-participant households. Market participant 
households have better dietary diversity scores both at household and intra-household level. The 
study also shows that children from milk market participants have better nutritional status based 
on their anthropometric measures. Children from market participant households have lesser 
likelihood to be wasted, stunted and underweight compared to children from non-participant 
households. We therefore, conclude that transforming the dairy sector from subsistence to market 
oriented production system and integrating smallholder dairy farmers into the market has the 
potential to improve food security and nutritional status of young children in rural Ethiopia.  
 Finally, the study indicates that parental investments vary by gender of the parent. The 
mothers who participated in our experiment invested significantly more in their children’s 
education than the fathers. This is because children identify themselves with their mothers more 
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than they identify themselves with their fathers. Even when the children know that the mothers 
have no money and only their father could provide for their needs, they first convince their 
mothers and ask them to present their requests to their fathers, or at least to support their 
requests. We also found that parents from milk market participant household invest significantly 
more in child education compared to parents from non-participant households. However, this 
effect was only firmly present in the bivariate analysis. In multivariate analysis it was 
substantially weaker and only marginally significant. Hence, consistent with its policy logic, 
milk market participation can enhance household’s investment in human capital development in 
the long run and pay-off the contribution of children in dairy labor by increasing investment in 
their education.  We have varied information about the other parent’s income and experimental 
outcomes to study the effect of information on the parent’s investments. The result shows that 
parents invested more in their children’s education when they knew that their partner was 
involved in the same experimental situation. We also found that the age of the parent and the 
number of school aged children in the household are significantly correlated with parental 
investment in child education. In general, our study shows that contextual factors, parental social 
and demographic variables and information about other parents situation are significantly 
correlated with parental investment in children`s education and consistent with the findings of 
previous studies in Ethiopia. Hence, we argue that increasing income at household level by 
increasing smallholder market participation in general and increasing income in the hands of the 
women in particular has the potential to improve children`s educational achievement in Ethiopia.  
 In conclusion, this thesis provides evidence that smallholder milk market participation 
has increased household milk production/income as well as the intra-household workload. In 
market participant households, women spent twice as much time in dairy production as men 
whereas control of milk income has shifted from women to men. But woman in participating 
households expected and received more money from their husbands compared to women from 
non-participating households. Their income share and bargaining power is better than women`s 
in non-participating households. Milk market participant households also have better dietary 
diversity and nutritional status of young children compared to non-participant households. 
Moreover, parents from market participant households and mothers make a significantly higher 
investment in child education compared to parents from non-participant households and men. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Commercialisering van de landbouw wordt vaak beschouwd als een ‘grand design’ 
ontwikkelingsstrategie voor Afrikaanse landen. Beleidsmakers zien het als een belangrijk middel 
om de agrarische sector te transformeren, de productiviteit en het inkomen van huishoudens te 
verhogen en -- meer algemeen -- het welzijn van de agrarische bevolking te bevorderen. 
Recentelijk heeft Ethiopië een groei- en hervormingsplan doorgevoerd (GTP-Ethiopië, MoFED, 
2010) gericht op het transformeren van de agrarische sector van een voornamelijk op 
zelfvoorziening gericht systeem naar een marktgericht systeem. In de zuivelsector hebben 
regering en donoren verbeterde runderrassen en diervoeders geïntroduceerd, de oprichting van 
coöperaties gestimuleerd en de markt geliberaliseerd. Het doel van deze maatregelen was het 
verhogen van de marktgerichtheid en de productie van de kleine melkveehouders.  
Het beleid heeft echter ook consequenties voor de machtsverhoudingen en de verdeling 
van taken en middelen tussen vrouwen en mannen binnen de huishoudens van de 
melkveehouders. Deze consequenties hebben tot op heden minder aandacht gekregen. In dit 
proefschrift worden deze consequenties onderzocht. In een viertal studies worden op basis van 
empirische gegevens nagegaan wat de gevolgen zijn van de overgang van productie voor eigen 
gebruik naar productie voor de markt voor:  
(1) de tijd die mannen en vrouwen binnen het huishouden besteden aan diverse taken,  
(2)  de onderhandelingspositie van vrouwen binnen het huishouden,  
(3)  de melkconsumptie en voedseldiversiteit binnen het huishouden en de voedingsstatus van 
kleine kinderen  
(4)  de investeringen van ouders in het onderwijs van hun kinderen. 
Om deze zaken te onderzoeken zijn op verschillende, elkaar aanvullende, manieren gegevens 
verzameld. Het betreft een enquête onder de leden van de huishoudens, experimentele games, 
observatie studies en kwalitatieve interviews.  
Doel van de enquête was het verzamelen van sociaal-economische en demografische 
achtergrondinformatie over de huishoudens die in het onderzoek participeerden. Deze informatie 
werd aangevuld met data verkregen in een observatie studie gericht op de tijdsbesteding van 
huishoudensleden, de verdeling van voedsel binnen het huishouden, de voedseldiversiteit binnen 
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het huishouden en de voedingsstatus van jonge kinderen. Daarnaast zijn experimentele gegevens 
verzameld over de onderhandelingspositie van vrouwen binnen het huishouden en over 
ouderlijke investeringen in het onderwijs van hun kinderen. Om inzicht te verkrijgen in de 
motieven achter de keuzes die de mannen en vrouwen tijdens de experimenten maakten zijn ook 
kwalitatieve interviews gehouden met een deel van de participanten. Tenslotte zijn ook 
sleutelfiguren in de lokale gemeenschappen geïnterviewd om de verkregen informatie in een 
breder kader te kunnen plaatsen.  
Centraal in het proefschrift staat de vergelijking tussen zuivelboeren die (nog) produceren 
voor eigen gebruik en voor de lokale markt en zuivelboeren die (al) produceren voor de nationale 
melkmarkt. Om op basis van de verzamelde gegevens de verschillen tussen deze groepen zo 
efficiënt mogelijk te onderzoeken is gebruik gemaakt van ‘propensity-score matching’, een 
innovatieve methode waarbij boeren die produceren voor de melkmarkt worden gekoppeld aan 
boeren met zoveel mogelijk dezelfde kenmerken die nog niet produceren voor die markt. 
 In de eerste studie van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2) onderzoeken we het effect van 
productie voor de melkmarkt op de tijdsbesteding binnen het huishouden. Dit onderzoek laat zien 
dat boeren die voor de markt produceren een hoger inkomen hebben, maar dat ook de werkdruk 
binnen het huishouden -- en dan met name de werkdruk voor vrouwen -- is toegenpomen. Het 
belangrijkste doel van het intergreren van Ethiopische boeren in de melkmarkt is het verhogen 
van het huishoudensinkomen. Dat blijkt inderdaad het geval te zijn. Boeren die produceren voor 
de markt verdienen substantieel meer dan boeren die dat niet doen.  
De resultaten laten verder zien dat de leden van de huishoudens die voor de markt 
produceren significant meer tijd besteden aan activiteiten rondom de melkproductie en aan 
andere huishoudelijke en werkgerelateerde activiteiten. Daarbij neemt de tijd die vrouwen 
besteden aan melkproductie en huishoudelijke taken meer toe dan de tijd die mannen besteden 
aan melkproductie en betaald werk. De vrouwen blijken twee keer zoveel tijd aan de 
melkproductie te besteden dan hun echtgenoten. Verder blijklen dochters hieraan twee keer 
zoveel tijd te besteden als zonen.  
Een belangrijke verklaring hiervoor is dat bij productie voor de markt ook de wijze 
waarop het vee wordt gehouden verandert, van grazend in het veld naar stalling en verzorging bij 
het woonhuis. Huishoudens die voor de markt produceren houden de koeien bij het huis. Daar 
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worden ze gevoed en verzorgd door de vrouwen (moeders en dochters), omdat verzorging van 
dieren rond het huis tot de huishoudelijke taken worden gerekend.  
 Wel is het zo dat mannen in deze huishoudens wat meer tijd besteden aan het melken van 
de koeien en het bereiden van geconcentreerde voeding voor de koeien, dan mannen in 
huishoudens die niet voor de markt produceren. Gezien de traditionele arbeidsverdeling tussen 
mannen en vrouwen in Ethiopie -- waarbij vrouwen verantwoordelijk worden geacht voor de 
melkproductie -- duidt dit erop dat de normen op het gebied van de taakverdeling tussen mannen 
en vrouwen ten gevolge van de marktproductie aan het verschuiven zijn. Het is echter ook 
mogelijk dat de mannen aan deze activiteiten meedoen omdat ze daarmee controle verkrijgen 
over het melk productie proces en de kwaliteit van de melk. 
 We concluderen dat productie voor de melkmarkt samengaat met een toename van zowel 
het inkomen van het huishouden als de werkdruk binnen het huishouden. Bovendien bestaan er 
aanzienlijke verschillen tussen beide huishoudenstypen in de tijdsbesteding aan melk 
gerelateerde en andere activiteiten binnen het huishouden en de mate waarin die activiteiten door 
mannen en vrouwen worden verricht. 
 In de tweede studie (hoofdstuk 3) wordt onderzocht in hoeverre de verschillen tussen 
huishoudens die voor de melkmarkt produceren en huishoudens die voor eigen gebruik en de 
lokale markt produceren gevolgen hebben voor de onderhandelingspositie van vrouwen binnen 
het huishouden. Bij huishoudens die voor de markt produceren blijkt het inkomen dat met de 
melkproductie wordt verdiend beduidend hoger te zijn dan bij andere huishoudens. Dit hogere 
inkomen wordt bijna volledig verdiend door het verkopen van melk aan de markt. De andere 
manier om aan melk te verdienen, het omzetten van rauwe melk in boter en kwark, is bij deze 
huishoudens veel minder belangrijk.  
Deze verandering betekent enerzijds een flinke toename van het melkinkomen, maar 
anderzijds ook een verschuiving van de controle over dat inkomen van de vrouw naar de man. 
Het geld dat wordt verdiend met de verkoop op de lokale markt wordt als inkomen van de vrouw 
beschouwd. Bij productie voor de markt wordt het contract met de afnemer van de melk echter 
door de man ondertekend, die daarmee de controle over het melkinkomen verkrijgt. De centrale 
vraag in de tweede studie van dit proefschrift is wat deze verschuiving van controle over het 
melkinkomen voor gevolgen heeft voor de machtsverhoudingen binnen het huishouden. 
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Om deze vraag te beantwoorden is een experiment uitgevoerd, waarbij huwelijkspartners 
de gelegenheid kregen om geld te verdelen tussen henzelf en hun partner. Daarnaast werd hen 
gevraagd hoeveel geld ze dachten dat hun partner hun zou toekennen. Als het bedrag dat naar de 
partner werd gestuurd gelijk was aan het bedrag dat die partner verwachtte dan mocht men het 
geld houden. Bij dit experiment bleek dat de verwachtingen van vrouwen met betrekking tot het 
bedrag dat hun man hun zou toedelen en de bedragen die de mannen hun vrouwen daadwerkelijk 
toestuurden significant hoger waren bij de huishoudens die voor de markt produceerden. In 
overeenstemming hiermee bleken de verwachtingen van de mannen alsmede de bedragen die de 
vrouwen hun echtgenoot toedeelden bij deze huishoudens significant lager te zijn. 
De vrouwen in de huishoudens die in de melkmarkt participeerden verwachtten en kregen 
dus een groter deel van het geld dan de vrouwen in de huishoudens die niet in de melkmarkt 
participeerden. Hoe valt dit te verklaren? Een mogelijke verklaring is dat het verlies van hun 
melkinkomen, en dus van hun financiele onafhankelijkheid, de vrouwen uit het traditionele 
patroon van afzonderlijke mannelijke en vrouwelijke domeinen heeft gehaald en in een nieuwe 
situatie gebracht, waarbij ze moeten onderhandelen om een redelijk deel van het melkinkomen 
toebedeeld te krijgen. Een tweede verklaring is dat de productie voor de markt een aantal 
belangrijke veranderingen in de organizatie van het huishouden heeft veroorzaakt, waarbij ook 
verantwoordelijkheden en afhankelijkheden buiten het terrein van de melkproductie zijn 
veranderd. Huishoudens die voor de markt produceren zijn afhankelijk van inkomen voor het 
kopen van voedsel. Dit nieuwe ‘livelihood’ systeem vereist nieuwe vaardigheden, zoals lange 
termijn planning en inkomensmanagement. Het is mogelijk dat deze vaardigheden onderdeel 
worden van de huishoudelijke taken van de vrouwen.  
De bevindingen in dit hoofdstuk duiden er op dat de veranderde basis van het livelihood 
systeem in het studiegebied tot onverwachte en onbedoelde bijeffecten heeft geleid. Ondanks de 
verschuiving van de controle over het melkinkomen van de vrouw naar de man, lijkt binnen het 
nieuwe systeem de ruimte voor consultatie en onderhandeling tussen man en vrouw en hun 
wederzijdse afhankelijkheden toegenomen te zijn. De onderhandelingspositie van vrouwen lijkt 
door deze veranderingen eerder versterkt dan verzwakt te zijn. 
 In de derde studie (hoofdstuk 4) wordt de relatie tussen het participeren in de melkmarkt 
en de voedseldiversiteit binnen het huishouden en de voedingstoestand van kinderen onderzocht. 
Het blijkt dat de diversiteit van het voedsel dat geconsumeerd wordt groter is bij de huishoudens 
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die in de melkmarkt participeren dan bij de niet participerende huishoudens. Zowel de 
participerende huishoudens als geheel, als de verschillende leden van deze huishoudens, blijken 
een hogere dieet-diversiteitsscore te hebben dan de niet participerende huishoudens. Jonge 
kinderen in de participerende huishoudens blijken ook meer gevarieerd te consumeren en een 
betere voedingsstatus te hebben dan jonge kinderen in de niet participerende huishoudens.  
Verder zijn de anthropometrische uitkomsten gunstiger in de participerende huishoudens: 
Kinderen in deze huishoudens hebben een kleiner kans om ‘wasted’ (te licht voor hun lengte), 
‘stunted’ (te klein voor hun leeftijd) of ‘underweight’ (te licht voor hun leeftijd) te zijn dan 
kinderen uit huishoudens die niet in de melkmarkt participeren. We kunnen daarom concluderen 
dat de transformatie van de zuivelsector van productie voor eigen gebruik naar productie voor de 
melkmarkt en het integreren van zuivelproducerende boeren in deze markt in potentie een 
bijdrage kan leveren aan de verbetering van de voedselzekerheid en de voedingsstatus van de 
leden van huishoudens en in het bijzonder van jonge kinderen in de rurale gebieden van Ethiopia. 
 De vierde studie (hoofdstuk 5) richt zich op de investeringen die ouders doen in de 
scholing van hun kinderen. Hiertoe werd een experiment gedaan waarbij moeders en vaders 
konden kiezen hoeveel van een bepaald bedrag ze wilden investeren in het onderwijs van hun 
kinderen en hoeveel ze zelf wilden houden. Het bedrag dat zij wilden investeren in het onderwijs 
van hun kinderen werd met een factor drie verhoogd. Bij dit experiment bleken moeders 
significant meer te investeren in het onderwijs van hun kinderen dan vaders. Bij interviews met 
de deelnemers na het experiment werd opgemerkt dat dit waarschijnlijk komt doordat kinderen 
zich meer identificeren met hun moeders dan met hun vaders. Zelfs als kinderen weten dat hun 
moeder geen geld heeft en dat alleen de vader in hun behoeften kan voorzien, proberen ze eerst 
hun moeder te overtuigen en de vraag door hun moeder aan de vader te laten voorleggen, of haar 
in ieder geval hun verzoek te laten ondersteunen. Ouders in huishoudens die in de melkmarkt 
participeren bleken significant meer te investeren in het onderwijs van hun kinderen dan ouders 
in niet participerende huishoudens. Dit effect was echter alleen duidelijk aanwezig in de bivariate 
analyse. In de multivariate analyse was het veel zwakker en slechts marginaal significant. 
 Om na te gaan in hoeverre coordinatie met de partner een rol speelt bij de 
investeringskeuzes werd bij het experiment de mate waarin met informatie had over de keuze 
van de partner gevarieerd, van geen enkele informatie tot volledige informatie (en gezamenlijk 
beslissen). Hierbij bleken de investeringen in onderwijs hoger te zijn als de deelnemers wisten 
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dat hun partner voor dezelfde keuze werd gesteld. Verder bleken oudere ouders en ouders met 
meer schoolgaande kinderen meer in onderwijs te investeren. Ook enkele andere huishoudens- 
en contextfactoren bleken van invloed te zijn op het investeringsgedrag. De uitkomsten leiden tot 
de verwachting dat een toename van het huishoudensinkomen en met name een toename van het 
inkomen waarover vrouwen kunnen beslissen tot een verhoging van de onderwijsdeelname van 
Ethiopische kinderen zal leiden.  
 De resultaten van het onderzoek dat in dit proefschrift wordt gepresenteerd geven aan dat 
de overgang van productie voor eigen gebruik en voor de lokale markt naar productie voor de 
nationale melkmarkt samengaat met een toename van de melkproductie en het melkinkomen van 
huishoudens. Tegelijkertijd duiden de bevindingen erop dat deze overgang tot een hogere 
werkdruk binnen het huishouden en dan met name de werkdruk van de vrouwen heeft geleid. In 
de huishoudens die participeren in de melkmarkt besteden vrouwen twee keer zoveel tijd aan de 
melkproductie dan in de niet participerende huishoudens. Daar komt nog bij dat in participerende 
huishoudens de controle over het melkinkomen is verschoven van de vrouw naar de man. 
Opvallend genoeg lijkt deze laatste verschuiving niet ten koste van de onderhandelingspositie 
van de vrouwen te zijn gegaan. Onze experimenten laten namelijk zien dat de vrouwen in de 
participerende huishoudens meer geld van hun echtgenoot verwachtten te krijgen en ook 
daadwerkelijk kregen dan de vrouwen in de niet participerende huishoudens. Het deel van het 
inkomen dat ze ontvingen -- en daaraan gekoppeld hun onderhandelingspositie -- was beter dan 
bij de vrouwen in de niet participerende huishoudens. De participerende huishoudens scoren ook 
beter wat betreft voedseldiversiteit en de voedingsstatus van de kinderen. Bovendien investeren 
de ouders in participerende huishoudens significant meer geld in het onderwijs van hun kinderen. 
Al met al lijkt het beleid gericht op de commercialisering van de melksector in Ethiopie dus op 
meerdere vlakken tot gunstige uitkomsten voor de huishoudens in deze sector te leiden. 
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Smallholder commercialization has received policy attention 
for transforming the agricultural sector, for increasing house-
hold productivity, and income and for enhancing human wel-
fare in many African countries. Ethiopia has adopted a growth 
and transformation plan (GTP) that aims to transform the 
agricultural sector, especially in terms of rapid diversification 
and commercialization, complemented by an effective mar-
keting system. In the dairy sector, the governments and donor 
agencies have introduced improved cattle breeds and animal 
feeds, organized smallholders into cooperatives and liberalized dairy market in an 
effort to increase dairy production and market orientation of smallholder farmers. 
The unintended consequences of these policies for the intra-household gender rela-
tions and resource allocation however has received less attention. This thesis assess 
the implications of smallholder milk market participation for intra-household time 
allocation, women`s intra-household bargaining power, dairy food consumption, 
dietary diversity and nutritional status of young children and parental investment in 
children`s education in Ethiopia. The result indicate that smallholder milk market 
participation has increased household income as well as household workload, es-
pecially women`s workload. Although milk income control shifted from women to 
men with milk market participation, women in milk market participant households 
have showed better intra-household bargaining power compared to women from 
non-participant households. Milk market participant households also have better 
dietary diversity scores and better nutritional status of young children compared to 
non-participant households. Moreover, parents from market participant households 
(mothers more than fathers) invest in children`s education compared to parents 
from non-participant households.
 
 
 
